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Over the span of a decade, Ukraine saw two revolutions that rocked its political and 
social life to the very core. The Orange revolution of 2004, a watershed event in the post-Soviet 
history of East European states, reversed the authoritarian trend in the country and proclaimed its 
course for democracy and integration with the European Union. However, reforms and electoral 
promises of the revolutionary leaders quickly turned into shambles, and instead another pro-
Russian authoritarian leader consolidated power. As Ukrainian political elites vacillated between 
closer ties with the EU to its west and the Russian Federation to its east, the 2014 Revolution of 
Dignity rose again to defend the European future for Ukraine. 
In this work, I investigate the driving forces shaping foreign policymaking in Ukraine 
during these years. I posit that it was precisely because such policies were shaped in an uncertain 
post-revolutionary transitional political environment that we are able to see seemingly 
contradictory shifts in Ukraine’s relations with the EU and Russia. To understand how the 
process of foreign policy making works in a transitional state, I develop a new theoretical 
approach that combines insights from poliheuristic theory in foreign policy analysis with 
comparative politics’ scholarship on developing party systems. I argue that leaders in transitional 
states face a different kind and level of political uncertainty. Transitional uncertainty shortens 
leaders’ time horizons and prompts them not to seek re-elections, but rather pursue narrower 
personal and political benefits in the transitioning political system. In such context, transitional 
leaders rely on ‘party substitutes’ to provide them with a wealth of material, organizational and 
reputational resources, such as a safe exit, a personal remuneration, a party seat, and others. 
 Poliheuristic theory suggests that domestic politics is a primary and non-compensatory 
consideration in foreign policymaking. I elaborate a causal mechanism that links transitional 
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uncertainty, party substitutes’ interests and foreign policy change. I advance that party 
substitutes’ interests, such as oligarchic ones in Ukraine, are the key components in 
understanding how Ukrainian leaders built their foreign relations with the EU and Russia in the 
post-revolutionary period. The changes in Ukrainian leadership during the period of transition 
led to the changes in their oligarchic connections. The change in oligarchic interests influenced 
the corresponding foreign policy change that would take place. I process trace the empirical data 
in support of my theoretical argument in a multi-level analysis of documentary sources, historical 
records and chronicles, and primary data derived from interviews and personal observation, and 
provide an in-depth investigation of foreign policy making in Ukraine from 2004 through 2011. 
The causal mechanism I elaborate is theoretically open for subsequent extensions and 
empirical applications to foreign policymaking during transitions of other countries around the 
world. By applying this mechanism to the historically important post-revolutionary period in 
Ukraine, this work aims to be the first systematic and theory-driven English language study of 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Ukraine is opening the European history of the third millennium!” – ambitiously 
proclaimed the newly elected President Viktor Yushchenko on 23 January, 2005, in front of a 
half-a million crowd and the diplomatic corps from fifty-nine states. (Yushchenko 2005). 
Likening the Ukrainian Orange revolution of 2004 that swept him into power to the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the Polish Round Table talks of 1989, Mr. Yushchenko asserted that Ukraine’s 
destiny lay within the European Union (EU). He pledged to “consistently and boldly” to pursue 
this “national strategy” in foreign policy. Once in power, despite multiple rounds of negotiations 
with his European partners, President Yushchenko and his team missed to secure the EU 
membership prospects for the country, and refocused on Ukraine’s complex relationship with the 
neighboring Russian Federation. Ukraine’s dramatic foreign policy change, boldly announced at 
the backdrop of the Orange revolution inauguration never fully took off in as anticipated. 
In contrast, when the opponent of the ‘Orange’ camp, Viktor Yanukovych, took office as 
a new head of state in 2010, he emphasized that his foreign policy for Ukraine would shy away 
from joining any global alliances.  Rather, Ukraine would develop “equal partner relations with 
Russia, EU and the US” (Yanukovych 2010). His strong business and political connections to the 
Russian Federation and President Putin left little doubt in the minds of analysts as to where his 
foreign policy was headed – predominantly to the East, i.e. to closer relations with Russia. 
Nevertheless, flying in the face of these expectations came a new foreign policy change. Almost 
two years later, much to the disappointment of his Russian colleagues placing high stakes on the 
Eurasian Economic Union, Viktor Yanukovych declared unequivocal course toward signing the 
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Association Agreement with the EU. He emphasized that “the project to unite Europe will not be 
complete as long as such large European states and nations as Ukraine remain beyond its 
borders”(2011b). He then declared that the year of 2012 to be “without exaggeration, a 
determinative year for our state… We have started a new level of relations with the European 
Union” (2012).  
But two weeks before the signature of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in 
November 2014, a new drastic and unanticipated foreign policy change occurred. Mr. 
Yanukovych’ government halted all preparation for the official signing ceremony and retracted 
on its commitments to enter into the agreement. Despite massive protests growing on streets of 
Kyiv and other cities around the country, Viktor Yanukovych, contrary to public demand, did not 
sign the Association agreement. He fled the country shortly thereafter, as the Euromaidan 
revolution opposing his regime engulfed Ukraine.  
 
1.1. Research Question and Theoretical Argument 
  
Why did these foreign policy shifts take place in Ukraine, and how are we to make sense 
of continuity and changes in foreign policy of states undergoing transition? This is a larger 
theoretical question that animates my research agenda. I explore it in this dissertation on 
Ukrainian foreign policy making in the period between two watershed events, the Orange 
revolution of 2004 and the Euromaidan revolution of 2014, which both revealed deep pro-
Western vs. pro-Russian orientation conflicts in the Ukrainian foreign policy.  I select this case 
with a theory building research objective in mind: to illuminate how specific domestic factors 
characteristic to states in transition  from one regime to another impact their foreign policy 
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change. Taking insights from poliheuristic theory (Brulé 2008; Kinne 2005; Mintz 2005; 
Oppermann 2014) and academic works on foreign policy change (Gustavsson 1999; C. F. 
Hermann 1990; Welch 2005), I develop a new theoretical way to incorporate the concept of 
uncertainty persistent in transitional regimes (Lupu and Riedl 2013) to explain how conditions of 
uncertainty impact actors’ decision-making process and thus produce foreign policy changes.  
My major argument centers on the concept of uncertainty understood from the viewpoint 
of cognitivism in international relations (Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001; Tetlock 1998). In this 
framework, uncertainty originates from ambiguity of information in the complex world of 
political and social interactions.  In the face of such complexities, decision makers are limited in 
their cognitive abilities to accurately perceive cause and effect connections of the context in 
which they are working. Thus ‘analytically’ uncertain (Iida 1993), actors adopt cognitive 
shortcuts to arrive at necessary decisions. 
 The poliheuristic theory (PH) in foreign policy analysis suggests that the most essential 
of such heuristics is rejecting any alternatives that harm actors’ political prospects with domestic 
audiences (Mintz 1993, 600). Domestic political losses cannot be compensated by any other 
advantages-  no matter how attractive - on other dimensions (military, etc.) of a decision 
alternative. Thus, because political actors are primarily concerned with domestic political costs, 
foreign policy decisions are inherently tied to domestic calculations (Mintz 2004, 7).  The 
domestic politics’ dimension of foreign policy decision making is based on an assumption that 
leaders – in democratic and autocratic regimes alike – are concerned primarily with retaining 
political power and staying in office (Kinne 2005, 118). 
In this research project, I take the concept of uncertainty further by looking at how 
decision makers are influenced by uncertainty in significantly more complex conditions of 
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political regime transitions.  I argue that with a regime change, the transitional uncertainty is 
different in type and degree from normal conditions (Jung and Deering 2015). It shortens 
horizons for political actors to the point where seeking to stay in the office is not a major guiding 
principle of their behavior (Lupu and Riedl 2013). Rather, not being able to calculate their 
reelection prospects under transitional uncertainty, political actors at the helm of the state are 
primarily concerned with securing their personal and political fortunes during and past their 
initial term and it does not have to result in reelection.  In order to achieve that personal and 
political security, they resort to support from individuals and groups whose projected political 
influence is deemed to be further-reaching than their own: political parties and ‘party 
substitutes,’ such as politicized financial-industrial groups (Hale 2005). Whereas the fortunes of 
reelection cannot be properly assessed in the tumultuous transition, the interests of parties and 
party substitutes are much more easily identifiable and thus more predictable to work with for a 
political actor. In return for short-term ‘pork’ and logrolling, these groups offer a politician a 
sizable financial support (legally or illegally channeled), a comfortable party seat after his term, 
or a guarantee of a safe exit without legal persecution if transitional turmoil increases.   
 Outcomes of political decisions, and of a foreign policy decision in particular, are thus 
closely associated with the degree of uncertainty a political leader is facing. If uncertainty is 
high, a political leader will primarily seek to accommodate particular groups to secure one’s own 
political and personal fortune during and past his/her initial term and the resulting decision taken 
will be beneficial and traceable to the interests of these groups. When the uncertainty is low, the 
political leaders are more attuned to cutting wider domestic losses with their electorate on a 
particular issue in a decision making process. Changing levels of uncertainty thus provide us 
with an analytical window into the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of foreign policy shifts and changes in states 
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undergoing transition: political leaders may be motivated by differing calculations of interest 
under varying levels of uncertainty on the same issue of international import. 
In order to further elaborate this connection between transitional uncertainty, party 
substitutes and foreign policy change, in this research I develop a new causal mechanism which I 
process trace in the case study of the contemporary Ukrainian foreign policy. With a clear set of 
scope conditions, I argue that such research is able to generate larger theoretical propositions 
applicable in a more generalizable manner to a host of other transitional countries that face their 
own foreign policy challenges. 
1.2. Theoretical Contribution 
 
The case of Ukraine in 2005-2011 uniquely speaks to three underexplored areas in the 
field of foreign policy analysis (FPA). From its inception in the foundational works by Richard 
Snyder (1962), James Rosenau (1966), and Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956), FPA has been 
striving for systematic organization of its thought and cross-national applicability of 
generalizations about nation-state foreign policy behavior. After decades of fruitful development, 
the field arrived at the dawn of the 21st century with the following significant theoretical 
challenges yet to be addressed.  
First, FPA analytical endeavors for the most part have tended to focus on crisis decision 
making, such as choices to engage in a war, impose sanctions, etc., while “foreign policy 
decision making in the absence of crisis-related factors has gone largely unexplored” (Astorino-
Courtois and Trusty 2003, 29).  Put differently, presently we know more about how one-time 
foreign policy decisions are made in separate and relatively short-time instances under conditions 
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of significant situational urgency and stress, than about how the continuity of foreign policy is 
preserved or changed over longer stretches of time. 
Secondly, with the Cold War looming large on empirical and normative agenda of FPA 
scholars for decades, foreign policy analysts tended to focus on great powers and their foreign 
policy behavior on international arena, rarely paying attention to small or middle states. 
Presumably, this is due to their lesser power capabilities and perceived inability to “never, acting 
alone or in a small group, make impact on the [international] system” at large (Keohane 1969, 
296). The mainstream international literature and FPA within it, has conventionally told a story 
of great power politics and downplayed the strategies employed by small and middle states, less 
resourceful to accomplish their goals.  
But the end of Cold War brought a new dynamic into the practice of international 
relations, where these states are longer pawns in the global competition for the superpower status 
and “today they enjoy more international visibility and prestige than at any other time in history” 
(Hey 2003, 1).  And yet, according to Braveboy-Wagner (2003), “scholars are less likely than 
before to consider third world countries as having theoretical relevance to the foreign policy… 
enterprise.”  Several years later, examining the field, Marijke Breuning also underscored that 
small states’ foreign policy behavior and all the more prominent role in global affairs deserves a 
more consistent theoretical treatment within FPA than hitherto acknowledged (2007, 172).  
 Thirdly and closely connected to the previous point, having maintained largely limited 
North-Atlantic geographical focus on greater powers, most often FPA has treated cases of 
advanced industrialized democracies. And although from its theoretical beginnings FPA paid 
heed to domestic characteristics of a state, including those of regime type, it nonetheless heavily 
relied on one dichotomy of democratic/authoritarian regimes to account for foreign policy. FPA 
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has not sufficiently caught up with the rich dialogue in comparative politics on regime 
transitions, reversals and ‘grey zone’ cases of states that are resiliently stuck between democracy 
and authoritarianism. Foreign policies of these states in transition have not been considered as 
having an analytical merit of being treated as a separate category.  With some exceptions, it is 
only recently that the field started to turn its attention to the foreign policymaking of states other 
than advanced democracies or entrenched autocracies. It has just started to provide us with 
insights on how the theoretical propositions molded on the empirical examples of such states 
bear out in other political contexts.1 To reiterate, as Margaret G. Hermann (2001, 49) writes: “To 
date, models of foreign policy decision-making … have not fared as well when extended to … 
nondemocratic, transitional and less developed polities.”  
 The case study of Ukrainian foreign policymaking in transition is uniquely poised to 
contribute to all the three understudied areas of FPA outlined above. First, by selecting a period 
of almost a complete decade  - with an additional brief contextualization of the foreign policy 
practice that preceded the Orange revolution - I will examine the continuity in foreign policy 
making, as well as show how concrete foreign policy decisions are adopted in crisis-driven 
situations in the larger historical context of the time period I examine.  
In addition, the case of foreign policy making in Ukraine is welcome in the FPA research 
as it suggests a study of exactly the kind of international actors that have been traditionally 
under-researched in the current FPA scholarship. Ukraine is both a ‘small power’ and a state that 
does not belong to either North American or Western European traditionally explored countries 
and has been democratizing and reversing at different points over past 25 years. And yet, as the 
																																												
1 See, for instance, Brummer and Hudson (2015); and Giacalone (2012). 
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present violent events in Ukraine strongly suggest, its geopolitical position at the crossroads of 
the European Union and the Russian Federation and its foreign policy orientation between the 
West or the East give rise to extremely complicated international situation with global 
repercussions.  
1.3. Ukrainian Transition and Universe of Cases 
 
Ukraine has been undergoing complex social, economic and political transformations 
since the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991, including two power reversals in 2004 and 
2014 that were popularly termed as ‘revolutions.’ And whereas the nature of its quarter-century 
political and economic reforms remains controversial insofar as levels of corruption, civil 
liberties and other areas of good governance are concerned, the Ukrainian case has many 
parallels with transition dynamics characteristic to other countries in the region, such as Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, as well as Russia and the Baltic states in early stages of their new 
independence, along with a number of Balkan countries complimented by other post-communist 
states in Eastern and Central Europe.  
To cast an even wider geographic net, regime changes that occur under popular demands 
in countries undergoing significant social and political transformations, are well abundant and 
familiar to students of Latin America, but they are also characteristic to numerous states that in 
recent history have undergone regime transitions, such as Turkey, Nigeria, South Korea, 
Thailand, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Their foreign policies play nontrivial role in power relations 
in their respective regions.  In fact, under the definition of ‘transitional’ state that I adopt here 
from Ron Francisco (2000) and dwell on in more detail in Chapter 1, the author counted as many 
as 40 transitioning states in his sample period of 1979 - 1992. And although the many of them 
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are attributable to the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War bipolarity, numerous 
transitions still occur for various domestic and international reasons.  The larger point here, 
therefore, is that theoretical insights from and the empirical relevance of the study of Ukraine in 
transition may be well explored beyond its temporal and geographic scope, expanding the field 
of FPA in pertinent ways that address the existing gaps in our academic knowledge.  
1.4.  Methodological Note 
 
The methodological path to such knowledge that I take in this research is the application 
of qualitative tools of analysis.  For my single case study, I use process tracing to establish 
proposed theoretical connections between the variables. Process tracing in social science is a 
method based on systematic examination of diagnostic pieces of evidence using in-depth single 
case study that unwraps and divides the cause-effect link into “smaller steps; then the 
investigator looks for observable evidence of each step” (Bennett 2010; Van Evera 1997, 64). 
Building on original work of Alexander George and others, qualitative methodologists have built 
significant argumentation in favor of using process tracing for causal inferences for within-case 
study. Beach and Pederson (2013) further argue that process tracing could be used for theory 
building research. Methodological procedure founded on inductive reasoning allows a researcher 
to build new theoretical suggestions based on the investigated case. Following their guidelines, I 
employ Beach and Pederson’s theory-building process tracing to the case of Ukraine between 
2005 and 2011, dividing this period in two segments. 
 This dissertation is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 sets the current research 
within FPA literature and more specifically shows how the current research expands on the 
theoretical scope of the poliheuristic theory. The key concepts that I seek to investigate - ‘foreign 
	 10	
policy change’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘transition’ - are then elaborated and analytically fitted into the 
framework of the causal mechanism that I develop. Chapter 3 deals with methodological 
backbone of this work and explains the research design of the dissertation, focusing on the 
process tracing as the chosen method. This chapter also provides the operationalization for the 
causal mechanism under study. This causal mechanism is then sequentially traced in the five 
chapters that follow. Chapter 4 deals with the first component of the causal mechanism: the 
political transition in Ukraine leading to the Orange revolution and the struggles that the Orange 
leaders faced to put in practice their revolutionary values.  Chapter 5 unpacks the next element of 
the causal mechanism: the uncertainty that conditioned the decision making process for the 
Orange leaders in transitional period. Chapter 6 follows the political and financial connections of 
the Orange team to their party substitutes, the Ukrainian oligarchs. Chapter 7 evaluates the 
Ukraine’s foreign policies under Viktor Yushchenko in 2005-2009, providing a brief survey of 
the policies of his predecessor, Leonid Kuchma.  Chapter 8 analyzes the foreign policy of Viktor 
Yanukovych in his first years of the presidency.  Chapter 9 provides a general assessment of the 
results of the research and discusses some alternative explanations along with possible extension 
of this research in future. With such detailed approach, my goal is to produce the first systematic 
and theoretically-driven work in English on the Ukrainian foreign policy of the first decade in 




Chapter 2  
THEORETICAL GROUNDS 
 
In this Chapter, I will focus on two main concepts that define the research question set 
before me. The first is the concept foreign policy change.  I start by reviewing the existing 
literature in the foreign policy analysis that tackles this concept. I then focus on the second key 
concept: political uncertainty and review strands of research from both comparative politics and 
international relations. I specify how uncertainty could be integrated with the insights from the 
poliheuristic theory and applied to political transitions. I end the Chapter by suggesting the 
causal mechanism that links political transition, uncertainty, party substitutes and foreign policy 
change. 
 
2.1. Conceptualization of Foreign Policy Change 
 
Foreign policy change has not been in a stable focus of scholars in the discipline. Indeed, 
since the inception of the foreign policy analysis (FPA) as a field, the creative energies of the 
researchers were directed towards delineating of foreign policy (FP). In the context of seeming 
stability of foreign policy orientations during the Cold War, foreign policy change was both a 
seldom occurrence and a rare subject of study by foreign policy analysts.  Thus, several studies 
that did appear in the 1980s (Gilpin 1981; Goldmann 1988; Holsti 1982) had to both come to 
grips with the brewing international changes and with the task of developing initial theoretical 
frameworks that would adequately describe a foreign policy change.   
Precipitated by the newly fashioned foreign policy of various smaller and larger states in 
the post-Cold war environment, the concept of ‘foreign policy change’ started to percolate to the 
level of significant research attention of international relations scholars, including the works of 
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Hermann (1990),  Skidmore(1994), Carlsnaes (1993), Rosati et al (1994) and others. Most of 
these academic attempts were concerned with generating an explanatory model to elucidate how 
a foreign policy change occurs.  At the end of the decade, Gustavsson (1999) summarized the 
existing research as falling into the three categories:  checklist models that tend to provide 
typologies of independent and intervening variables that induce different FP changes (C. F. 
Hermann 1990; Holsti 1982); structural constraints models that center attention on stabilizing 
variables impeding a possible change (Goldman, 1988; Skidmore, 1994); and cyclical models 
that call for the study of longer time periods to discover recurrent patters in foreign policy 
continuity and change (Carlsnaes 1993; Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson 1994). While each 
theoretical group had its advantages and pitfalls, Gustavsson (1999) argued that combined 
importance of international and domestic structural conditions, political agency and the decision-
making process are all needed as constitutive parts of a model that would render foreign policy 
change understandable and explicable as a phenomenon.  
Such call for inclusion of different levels of analysis – from individual to international – 
in a single model has become a prominent appeal for progress in FPA since the turn of the 
century. As a field, FPA originally started with all-encompassing, complex and cross-nationally 
applicable models (Rosenau 1966; R. C. Snyder 1962; Sprout and Sprout 1956). But with the 
exception of a few alternative approaches, such as two-level game theory (Putnam 1988)  and 
domestic structure research  (Katzenstein 1976; Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry 1989); the 
work of integration of domestic and international factors remains largely unfinished, without 
precise conceptualization of its variables and strong methodological apparatus (Hudson 2013). It 
is often remarked that the dependent variable in FPA – foreign policy – is overdetermined by 
such variety of international, domestic and individual-level factors, that it makes the job of 
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constructing a ‘grand theory’ of FPA unfeasible (Gerner 1995). Thus, foreign policy analysts, 
while mindful of causal forces at different levels - individual, domestic state and international 
system (Neack 2008)–are better served by focusing on middle-range theories that emphasize 
relative importance of some variables holding others constant (Alden and Aran 2013). In that 
context, studying foreign policy change still remains one of the most significant theoretical 
challenges in the field (ibid).  
For my study I take Gustavsson (1999) typology of foreign policy change that draws on 
Hermann’s research (1990) and includes adjustment change, programme change, problem/goal 
change and international orientation change. These four changes represent degree to which 
foreign policy shift could occur compared to the previous foreign policy conduct. In adjustment 
change, minor changes occur at the level of effort put into policy. In program change, there is a 
difference in means and methods while basic goals remain unchanged. Problem/goal change 
refers to a shift in goals and objectives. Finally, international orientation change is a fundamental 
change in state’s entire orientation toward world affairs.  
These levels of changes could be observed by looking at ‘verbalized’ and ‘non-
verbalized’ programme (Goldmann 1988), pursued by government as well as its outcomes. 
Accordingly, change is ‘either a new act in a given situation or a given act in a situation 
previously associated with a different act” (ibid, p.10). Thus, I study Ukrainian foreign policy in 
transition and document its change by surveying official statements, policy documents and 
prominent speeches by key government officials involved in foreign policy making (primarily 
the president in Ukraine due to centralized nature of government foreign policy making in the 
time period under study) along with non-verbalized actions. I then compare these results to the 
foreign policies of previous leaders.  
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In conceptualization of the causal dynamics I am guided by the following model, 
developed by Gustavsson (1999): 
Figure 2.1 Model of the Causal Dynamics of Foreign Policy Change 
 
Source: Gustavsson (1999, 85) 
 
My elaboration of the causal mechanism (see page 23 below) fits well in the part of 
‘individual decision-maker à decision-making process’ of this model.2 And even though there 
may be debates in the literature as to the precise content or relative causal weight or interaction 
of domestic or international factors, in this research I am interested in the mechanics of the 
causal process per se. In other words, once the decision options are on the table (regardless of 
how they originated), I am interested to see how the decision-making itself proceeds, i.e. how 
leaders choose between the options they are presented with. Further, I take this mid-range 
approach to decision making and place it specific conditions – those of a transitional state. I 
																																												
2 While other models of foreign policy change are offered in the literature (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2014; 
Kleistra and Mayer 2001), importantly they also include the element of ‘decision making process’ – hence, 
poliheuristic theory insights could be included in them as well.  
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argue that foreign policy change as an outcome is influenced by the levels of uncertainty that 
actors face in the process of decision making. 
To clarify my treatment of political transition, following Francisco (2000, 42) I define it 
as a shift from one  structure of government to another that begins before formal or de facto 
collapse of a regime when new forces or parties mobilize. Transition ends when civil war or 
unrest does not threaten the existence of the new regime; new institutions are established or old 
ones reformed in conformity with the new political values; and a state (re)gains diplomatic 
recognition and successfully negotiates a financial long term-loan from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
2.2. Cognitivist Approach to Uncertainty and Its Role in Decision Making 
 
 In order to proceed with the analytical treatment of uncertainty in the foreign policy 
decision making process in transitional states, first the conceptual elaboration of ‘uncertainty’ is 
in order. In this section, I present a cognitivist approach to uncertainty that treats it as an 
analytical inability to discern logical connections and outcome of ones’ decision due to an 
abundancy of complicated information that actors face. Unlike rationalist approach that estimates 
uncertainty through risk assessment analysis, I stipulate here proxy measures that are posed to 
evaluate the complexity of the conditions generating multifarious information for decision 
makers.  I then specify how uncertainty could be used in conjunction with poliheuristic 
theoretical insights and applied to states undergoing transition.  
To start off, unpredictability to a degree is present in all forms of human interactions. In 
political science, Adam Przeworski (1991) famously noted that uncertainty may be found in all 
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forms of government. However, what distinguishes democracy from authoritarianism is that 
democracy is “institutionalized uncertainty” where actors “know what is possible and likely but 
not what will happen” (ibid).  Douglas North (1990) also postulated that democratic institutions 
manage uncertainty through the rules that resolve conflicts and the issues of leaders’ 
replacement. In other words, in contrast to states that undergo political transitions from one 
regime to another, in established democracies uncertainty is dealt through enshrining 
unpredictability of political outcomes into a set of rules that guarantees an overall fair treatment 
to those who do not competitively win in political joist for power. The uncertainty of outcomes, 
not of the functionality of the rules, is thus the major feature of democratic regimes. 
When democracy and authoritarianism are compared, the ‘institutionalized-uncertainty’ 
scholars posit that democracies are inherently more uncertain because the result of democratic 
procedures (elections, adjudicating competing claims in courts etc.) is not predetermined ex ante.  
In contrast, another approach in democratization theory based on the “rule-of-law” argues the 
opposite: authoritarian regimes lack viable and respected constitutions understood as primary 
organizing principle of political life (Linz and Stepan 1996) which limits the range of possible 
outcomes (Holmes 1995) and “shape[s] what substantive outcomes are possible, hence limiting 
uncertainty and enhancing security” (Mainwaring 1992, 313–16).  
The academic efforts to bring together these two approaches to a common denominator 
are still ongoing3 and what unites most of the insights on uncertainty is that they stem from a 
rationalist framework. The latter views uncertainty as ontologically objective lack of information 
																																												
3 This discussion of differences between the “rule-of-law” school and “institutional uncertainty” approach in more 
detail along with new theoretical propositions could be found in Alexander (2002). 
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for a decision maker to be able to judge the intentions of others and predict their choices and 
behavior in a given situation.4   
In international relations, however, addition to rational choice approach, cognitivism 
offers a competing definitions of the concept of uncertainty (Rathbun 2007). And this is the 
approach that I adopt for my research. From cognitive perspective, uncertainty originates not 
from the lack of information, but from the wealth of it. In cognitivism, complexities of the world 
generate plentiful and ambiguous information that decision makers need to tackle. Due to 
psychological reasons, actors are only able to partially understand and cognitively approximate 
the complexities they encounter (Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001; Tetlock 1998). Thus, uncertainty 
is rooted in the analytical confusion that the decision makers have to deal with. They are unable 
to fully process all the aspects of information they receive. In order to reduce uncertainty, actors 
find recourse in cognitive shortcuts or heuristics such as “consistency seeking” (Jervis 1976), 
“belief perseverance” (Levy 1994), or “evoked set” in learning (J. Snyder 1990) among others.  
The bridge between rationalist–cognitive divide in FPA is proposed by the poliheuristic 
theory (PT)  (Brulé 2008; Mintz 1993, 2004, 2005). In brief, PT advances a two-stage decision 
making process. First, poliheuristic scholars agree with cognitivist research that leaders use 
heuristics, and suggest that in FP decision in order to make such first cognitive shortcut actors 
eliminate those options off the table that would hurt them domestically. Domestic political losses 
cannot be compensated by any other advantages of that option if it entails domestic audience 
																																												
4
To note, in rationalist approach adjectives such as ‘greater’, ‘lesser degree’ or ‘severe’ are routinely applied to 
‘uncertainty’ and therefore indicate that this concept could be described in qualifying terms of some sort of measure, even 
if measurement is difficult to carry out. Scholars of prospect theory offer us a mathematical ways to evaluate risks involved 
in decision making situations characterized with uncertainty (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  
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costs – this is the domestic ‘political’ dimension of a decision. After that, in agreement with the 
rationalist framework, decision makers in PT are modelled to maximize benefits and minimize 
risks evaluating remaining options on different dimensions. With over 40 studies that applied PT 
to diverse FP decision making processes, PT has shown robust results with democracies and non-
democracies, at state and local levels, and with diverse methodological approaches 
(experimental, statistical, formal analyses and case studies).5  
In fact, A. Mintz, one of the original authors of PT, went as far as to suggest that the 
theory is widely applicable: “PH theory is generic. It is applicable to national security decisions, 
foreign policy decisions, foreign economic decisions, as well as to domestic decisions…The PH 
procedure can be extended to sequential decisions, interactive decisions, in dynamic and static 
settings, in familiar and unfamiliar contexts, and under conditions of uncertainty and/or 
ambiguity.” (Mintz 2005, 95). 
It is to the latter situations that my research aims to contribute: the situations with 
uncertainty characteristic to states undergoing complex transitions. I achieve it by making two 
analytical steps. First, I specify the underlying domestic political interests that motivate political 
leaders in conditions of uncertainty in transitional states when they make a first cognitive 
shortcut of eliminating costly alternatives. I then posit that the variation in the underlying interest 
that leaders seek on political dimension is thus associated with the variation in eventual policy 
decisions and ensuing foreign policy changes. 
 PT, as mentioned before, stipulates that politicians employ ‘avoid-major-losses’ principle 
in the initial screening of alternatives. And while each decision entails diverse dimensions 
																																												
5 For an overview see for instance, Mintz (2005) and Brule (2008). 
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(military, economic, etc. ),  it is on the basis of domestic politics per se, which is “the essence of 
decision” (Mintz et al. 1997), that the leaders make the first cut of the available alternatives. PT, 
however, is open as to what may figure into leaders’ calculation of gains and losses on the 
dimension of domestic politics, or political dimension for short (Mintz 2004, 9).  Kinne (2005) 
argues that one unifying principle undergirds the domestic political dimension: leaders in 
democracies and non-democracies alike seek to stay in office. For him, the concern for retaining 
political power and staying in office is the most important interest that leaders pursue and it 
defines the political dimension of a decision as such. Such proposition, is well known to students 
of vote-maximization literature that builds its models on the premise that the primary goal of 
democratic state leaders is their own political survival in office, and that all political choices are 
ultimately set against this backdrop (Hagan 1995). Kinne (2005) argues that retaining political 
power is the ultimate interest of authoritarian leaders as well. 
 However, what is missing in both of these perspectives – vote maximization literature 
and authoritarian regime studies - is the understanding of that states undergoing complex 
political and economic process of transition from one institutional arrangement of power to 
another are characterized by different environmental conditions that puts a different strain on the 
calculus of interest by a leader. Indeed, states in transitions lack established mechanisms through 
which the transfer of power can be reasonably expected to be achieved without fail. 
Constitutional division of powers may not yet be delineated, electoral formulas and salience of 
issues in new civil society in the making may change from one electoral cycle to another 
rendering politicians “strategic fools,” unable to predict their own political future (Andrews and 
Jackman 2005). In addition, economic liberalization and/or new economic re-arrangements 
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where assets are under the threat of being redistributed may leave a state much more open to 
economic shocks from outside, plummeting the reelection prospects of a leader.  
These factors significantly add to the level of uncertainty that actors face in their decision 
making. In fact, so much so that Lupu and Riedl (2013) argue that leaders in developing states 
under such uncertainty are forced to think in terms of one-shot game, rather than project repeated 
interactions between actors in the same institutional arrangements and that significantly shortens 
the political horizons they have for their own future.  
When this principle of behavior is configured into the first step of the decision making 
suggested by PT,6 what it means is that instead of seeking to stay in office, political leaders at 
the helm of state in conditions of high uncertainty could be modelled to pursue such domestic 
political interests that help them to support their power during the current term (the threat of 
regime reversal may be extremely high in the newly established regimes) and to secure their 
political and personal fortunes beyond their term without banking on reelection.  Only those 
actors who have longer than leaders’ own projected influence on domestic politics are able to 
grant such support in an uncertain environment. Two types of actors satisfy this criterion: 
political parties and “party substitutes” (Hale 2005).  
As for the parties, whereas democratic regimes are “unthinkable save in terms of parties” 
(Schattschneider 1942, 1), party systems remain a viable mechanism for transferring public 
																																												
6 The second step in the decision making, according to the PT, involves a calculation of risk and benefits from the 
available decision options, according to a more formalized rational choice model. However, since my research goal 
is not to dissect the details of each individual foreign policy decision that Ukrainian political leaders had on their 
tables in a span of a decade, but rather to provide a more long-termed targeted analysis of pro-Western vs. pro-
Russian foreign policy orientations that Ukraine pursued during the transitional period, such second step does not 
apply in my theoretical model. Indeed, I use PT insights on the importance non-compensatory domestic dimension 
in foreign policy making as a theoretical foreground, and do not strictly subject my case to PT treatment, but rather I 
aim to put such insights to use in developing a new causal mechanism that is applicable in transitional states.   
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preferences in governmental political choices both in established democracies (Dalton, Farrell, 
and McAllister 2011) and developing states (Miller et al. 2000).  However, in transitional states 
the support for parties waxes and wanes from one electoral cycle to another, forcing some parties 
to submerge into oblivion and others to (re)appear on the political horizon. This can lead 
decision makers to rely not necessarily on their party linkages to voters (programmatic appeals), 
but on charismatic or clientelistic linkages with voters (Kitschelt 2000). Such dynamic may lead 
to the formation of what Henry Hale terms ‘party substitutes,’ an alternative form of political 
organization that is able to deliver votes and political guarantees in newly formed electoral 
societies. The exact nature of party substitutes may differ from society to society but it largely 
“hinges on the particular pattern of concentration of those political and economic resources that 
can potentially be mobilized for electoral purposes” (2005, 150). In post-communist Russia, for 
instance, such examples of party substitutes include governor’s political machines and politicized 
financial-industrial groups (ibid). Similarly, in my case study of Ukraine of 2005-2011, the 
politicized financial industrial groups led by oligarchs are the party substitutes.  
To summarize my argument based on poliheuristic theory and current research on 
uncertainty and cognitive constraints in decision making, when uncertainty is heightened, 
politicians in transitional states view their term as ‘one-shot’ game without necessarily pursuing 
reelection but rather seeking to secure their own political and personal fortunes with parties 
and/or party substitutes. Thus, actors eliminate those alternatives in a heuristic decision making 
which would hurt their relationships with such groups. However, when uncertainty is relatively 
low the underlying guiding principle of political behavior- the retaining power in office – applies 
in PT calculus of domestic dimension.   
	 22	
 If uncertainty is posited to be a “continuous variable” (Lupu and Riedl 2013) with 
different levels, as much comparative and international relations literature imply, how can it be 
operationalized and its impact measured? In its rationalist-cognitivist approach, PT makes a 
general assumption that once a wealth of information is available to a leader, the uncertainty has 
an impact on decision makers by forcing them to resort to cognitive heuristics. While this 
assumption may appear to be strong – I cannot tap into exact perceptions of actors without 
thorny methodological issues - multiple studies, including experimental ones have shown that PT 
is correct in estimating its proposed mechanism of decision making (see references above). 
If approached this way, uncertainty that stems from a wealth of complex information 
hampering leaders’ ability to predict cause-effect connections, could be traced to the sources that 
generate such confusion in the first place. Jung and Deering (2015) suggest that there are four 
factors contributing to the level of uncertainty in transitioning countries: 
1) pace of democratic transition: gradual vs. abrupt (abrupt transition – higher 
uncertainty, gradual transition – lower uncertainty). 
2) the extent to which prior authoritarian regime allowed political competition (the more 
competition before regime change, the lower uncertainty) 
3) coincidence of state-building with democratization (when both happen at the same 
time it leads to higher uncertainty) 
4) economic growth (Economic downturns contribute to higher uncertainty). 
Lupu and Riedl (2013) parallel the three of these factors when they postulate “regime 
uncertainty” (1); “economic uncertainty” (4); and “institutional uncertainty” (3) altogether 
characterized as ‘political uncertainty’. However, the authors do not offer any operationalization 
or empirical application of their typology. Thus I find Jung and Deering (2015) 4-variable 
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estimation of the level of uncertainty more practical for my research and I record the levels of 
these factors for two divided periods of my case study. 
To encapsulate this theoretical discussion of uncertainty and transition, I posit that in 
transitional states with heightened uncertainty, decision makers are motivated to base their 
calculations of domestic interest on how it would affect their relations with party substitutes. 
Specifically, I put forward that the following causal mechanism is at works in the foreign policy 
decision making in transitional states:7 
Transition (impacts the level and nature of) à Uncertainty (shortens time horizons 
for) à Foreign policy decision maker to consider voter vs. sponsor interests (sets the course 
for) à level of foreign policy change.  
In the remaining part of this research I will process trace this causal mechanism with the 
case study of the Ukrainian foreign policy in 2005-2011 and examine the foreign policy change 
as tied to the levels of uncertainty that Ukrainian state leaders were dealing with in their decision 
making. Before proceeding to my case, however, I will delineate the methodological foundations 
of the process tracing used in this research and provide the operationalization for the empirical 
part of this study in Chapter 3. 
  
																																												
7 For the purposes of this project I do not inquire into the exact origins of a new set of circumstances that presents a 
decision making situation for a leader, since I focus primarily on the mechanics of the decision making as a process 
per se, once the options have come to be generated for a leader to choose from. Gustavsson’s model of 1999 used 




Chapter 3  
METHOD OF STUDY 
 AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES 
 
In this chapter, I first provide a general overview of the development of process tracing as 
a method in political science. I then place my case study into a rigorous evaluation of the so 
called “ten steps of good process tracing” that helps me to clarify a range of ontological, 
epistemological and other issues that apply to a single-case focused study. I finish the chapter by 
proposing concrete ways of conceptualizing the causal mechanism that I elaborate in this 
research. 
3.1. Definition of the Method 
 
Process tracing as a tool of qualitative research has received considerable attention in the 
political methodology literature of the past decade.  As a method, however, it originated much 
earlier in the psychological and cognitive studies of the late 1970s, borne out of the debates 
surrounding different models of decision making. These debates wrestled with the criticism that 
despite algebraically equivalent goodness-of-fit, the linear models of decision making suggested 
fundamentally different underlying cognitive processes (Svenson 1979, Pitz and Sachs, 1984).8 
A new experimentation had to be developed in order to uncover these processes. Payne (1976) 
pioneered such approach with his analysis of ‘information boards’ and ‘verbal protocols’ where 
																																												
8 For a current review of the process tracing in decision making studies see Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M.; Kühberger, 
A.; Ranyard, R., eds. A Handbook of Process Tracing Methods for Decision Research: A Critical Review and User’s 
Guide. New York: Taylor & Francis 
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the latter required decision makers to think aloud and describe their evaluation of information as 
they were making a decision at hand. The analysis of such documented ‘process’ constituted in 
Payne’s terms a ‘process tracing.’  
In political science, process method was first used by Alexander George, who similarly to 
the decision making scholars emphasized the importance of studying not just the statistical 
correlation between independent and dependent variables, but rather advocated for going further 
in research designs “to establish whether there exists an intervening process, that is, a causal 
nexus” between the explanatory and explained variables (1979, 46). According to George 
(1979), such procedure of uncovering a “causal nexus” - analogously to Payne’s suggestion -  
involved tracing the process, or the “intervening steps” through which, for instance in George’s 
research, certain institutional arrangements influenced the behavior of political actors.  In various 
later interpretations, to which I return briefly in the later section of this chapter, these 
‘intervening steps’ or ‘causal nexus’ and their role in constructing scientifically valid argument 
have become known in the methodological literature as causal mechanisms.   
More recently, process tracing was compared to “a detective attempting to solve a crime 
by looking at clues and suspects and piecing together a convincing explanation based on fine-
grained evidence that bears on potential suspects’ means, motives and opportunity to have 
committed the crime in question. It is also analogous to a doctor trying to diagnose an illness by 
taking in the details of a patient’s case history and symptoms and applying diagnostic tests that 
can, for example, distinguish between a viral and a bacterial infection” (Bennett 2010, 208).   
Bennett states that process tracing focuses on “intervening steps in a hypothesized causal 
process” that gives a qualitative scholar a significant advantage in solving issues that statistical 
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analysis alone may not able to address: the causal direction between correlated of variables and 
potential spuriousness (ibid, 208). 
 Since Andrew Bennett and Alexander George’s refitting of the process tracing as 
qualitative tool based, the methodological literature of the past ten years has seen a remarkably 
abundant discussion on internal/external validity of process-traced cases, on the deterministic or 
probabilistic causality assumptions in process tracing and to varieties of its effective use among 
else. In the light of proliferation of such studies, Waldner (2012, 67) cautioned researchers  that 
‘process tracing’ is currently becoming an ‘umbrella term’ that may encompass varieties of 
conceptual definitions of the term. In their recent work Trampusch and Palier (2016) are likewise 
wary of “methodological stretching” that process tracing is currently undergoing, akin to concept 
stretching (Sartori 1970), although they remark that scholars across the board commonly agree 
that process tracing traces causal mechanisms that connect theorized causes and effects. 
 In order to avoid methodological ambiguities, for the purposes of this research I adopt 
the following definition of process tracing suggested by a recent volume on the method edited by 
Andrew Bennet and Checkel (2015, 7): “Process tracing is the analysis of evidence on processes, 
sequences and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or 
testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally  explain the case.”  
A question that naturally flows out such definition is what is meant by ‘causal 
mechanisms.” Mahoney (2001, 579–80) counts twenty-four existing definitions of causal 
mechanisms that range from treating causal mechanisms as ‘intervening variables through which 
causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects’ to ‘events that alter relations among some 
specified set of elements.’ Going against this tendency to reduce causal mechanisms to 
intervening variables or events thereby ‘blackboxing’ or ‘grayboxing’ the process itself, Derek 
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Beach  (2016, 3) has recently argued that mechanisms rather should be treated as theoretical 
systems where entities that engage in activities transmit causal forces from cause to outcome. 
Metaphorically, in such approach  causal mechanisms are likened to the wheelwork of cogs and 
wheels producing a movement – it is the “assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent 
in any one of them” (Hernes 1998, 74).  
This is the methodological treatment that I also subscribe to in this research. I approach 
causal mechanisms as systems where both entities (A, B, and C) and arrows that connect them 
(activities) are indispensable in X à[AàBàC] àY chain9. Simply adding a variable between 
cause (X) and effect (Y), such as A, B or C without providing a theorized activity through which 
such variable transmits causal forces (an arrow in the diagram) leaves an explanatory gap in a 
research (Machamer et al 2000, 3 in Beach 2016). 
In order to proceed with my investigation, I will remain engaged in this methodological 
discussion from here on only inasmuch it serves the pragmatic goal of this research focused on 
building an understanding of foreign policymaking in transitional states. I place the method at 
the service the deciphering the theoretical causal mechanism that works in foreign policymaking 
of transitional states as traced in the case of Ukraine in the time period under study.  Thus, in the 
remainder of this chapter, I will provide a methodological blueprint for the process tracing of my 
case study that will be applied in the next empirical chapters.  
 
																																												
9 For the simplicity of representation, this causal chain is presented here as a linear process. This is not to imply that 
all causal mechanisms are linear. See, for instance, the causal graph developed by Baugh, McNallen and Frazelle 
(2014) as they elaborate and map concepts for historical research. 
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3.2.  “Ten Steps for Good Process Tracing” for Ukrainian Foreign Policy Case  
 
In order to lay groundwork for my case study and before I specify my operationalization 
and data collection plan, I will first use Trampusch and Palier (2016) list of “ten steps for good 
process tracing,”  a collection of best practices that significantly improve the quality of process 
tracing application. 
In the first step, process tracers are recommended “to clarify their ontology.” This 
requires researchers to point out whether they espouse deterministic of probabilistic view of 
causality when process tracing a case study. A deterministic approach to process tracing would 
postulate that a specified causal mechanism, once uncovered in a case study, will always produce 
the specified outcome in the population of all cases.  In other words, by exploring the foreign 
policy making in Ukraine from a deterministic point of view, one would claim external validity 
of the uncovered explanation that extends and unfailingly works in other cases of transitioning 
states working out their foreign policies. In the probabilistic approach, the claim would be that 
even though a causal mechanism has been uncovered in the case of foreign policymaking in 
Ukraine, it does not mean that a priori we can determine the outcomes of all transitional foreign 
policymaking in all other cases, since mechanisms may interact with different features of the 
context in which they operate.  
Between these two ontological positions, I take the probabilistic view in my process 
tracing of the case of the Ukrainian foreign policymaking. Indeed, I cannot claim external 
validity of the studied mechanism of foreign policy making in all transitioning states due to the 
fact that their contextual conditions that may vary drastically. Nonetheless I approach my study 
with an assumption that the causal similarities (or the scope conditions) between certain 
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transitioning states potentially allow for a pool of causally homogenous population of cases 
where my theoretical insights may be applicable to.10   To be more exact, in my suggested causal 
mechanism for this study, the scope conditions would be those that pertain to the first casually 
important element in the mechanism: transition.  
I have earlier defined a transition, following Francisco (2000) as a shift from one 
structure of government to another that begins before formal or de facto collapse of a regime 
when new forces or parties mobilize. Transition ends when civil war or unrest does not threaten 
the existence of the new regime and new institutions are established or old ones reformed in 
conformity with the new political values, plus a state (re)gains diplomatic recognition and a 
membership in the IMF with a (re)-negotiated financial loan.11 Hence, if these scope conditions 
are satisfied, then other cases will be in the pool of causally homogenous population. 
 However, we may imagine a contextual condition that is not directly linked to the causal 
condition (transition) that exerts an overriding influence on foreign policy of a state leaving no 
room for the causal mechanism to engage all causal forces and thereby overdetermine the 
outcome. For instance, if a transitional state has had a security overdependence on a great power, 
we can assume that even in transitional state such dependence may override foreign policy 
choices and outcomes. 
This is, in fact, similar to what Beach and Pederson (2016b) describe as the difference 
between causal and contextual conditions in the example of a car as a causal mechanism. In a 
																																												
10 “A causally homogenous population is one in which a given cause can be expected to have the same causal 
relationship with the outcome across case in the population (Beach and Pedersen 2016b, 50) 
11 Potentially, this Francisco (2000) criterion could be extended to include other international organizations may 
provide the same vote of legitimacy and solvency, for instance a variety of regional banks for development and 
reconstructions, regional international organizations and/or economic unions. 
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causal mechanism of a car, a cause (the burning fuel) may be engaged but will not work towards 
the expected outcome (movement forward) if contextual conditions do not allow for it: “If we 
throw the car mechanism in a lake, even though the mechanism might be in perfect shape, it will 
still not work, as it is outside the contextual conditions in which it will run” (2016a, 89).  
Thus, in my theorized causal mechanism of foreign policy change in transitional states, 
whereas causal conditions (transition) may be present, the impact of contextual conditions for 
cases which this mechanism is to be applied should be carefully considered to determine whether 
they override the impact of the theorized cause to start with.  Acknowledging the importance of 
this theoretical point on external validity and applicability of the current research, I am leaving 
the discussion of precise demarcation of contextual vs. causal conditions for the theorized causal 
mechanism for my future study, since the current focus of this work is to primarily detect the 
theorized mechanism itself in the first place and trace it in the case of the Ukrainian foreign 
policy. However, as a preliminary theoretical hunch, I will point out that most likely states that 
are middle powers and not inextricably aligned are most likely to exhibit the causal mechanism 
described here at work, which includes for instance, a number of former Soviet Union republics 
after the fall of the regime in 1991. 
In the second step of good process-tracing, a researcher “must determine whether his/her 
epistemological  interest  is inductive or deductive” (Trampusch and Palier 2016, 13). Thus, a 
scholar needs to point out whether the study’s objective is to generate or specify a hypothesis 
about a causal mechanism, or if it seeks to probe the causal mechanism that has already been 
theorized. This determination of the epistemological interest is directly linked to the status quo of 
available theories and state of the art, as well as to the availability of data. In this regard, my 
research has been primarily concerned with theory-building goal until now. Indeed, in Chapter 2, 
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I surveyed the literature on poliheuristic theory (PT), on international relations’ approaches to the 
concept of uncertainty and on foreign policy change. I then advanced a theorized causal 
mechanism that connects uncertainty at the start of the causal chain to the subsequent foreign 
policy change. In this endeavor in Chapter 2, my epistemological interest was deductive and 
theory -building in nature: I have worked with higher levels of abstractions in order to come to 
conclusions of what could be expected at the empirical level.  
However, as I proceed with the subsequent empirical chapters of this dissertation, I am 
taking a more inductive turn. Having theorized the causal mechanism of foreign policymaking in 
transitional states, I am now looking to move to the “theory-testing” aspects of this project.  Here 
I put “theory-testing” in inverted commas for important reasons.  Indeed, while “testing” 
describes my general epistemological interest in as far as putting theory to work with available 
evidence is concerned, this “testing” is not akin to experimental or quasi-experimental analysis 
of average effects in a variance-based design. As Waldner (2015) aptly points out, process-traced 
case studies when held up to such “testing” standard fail to address the fundamental problem of 
causal inference: we cannot observe a unit under treatment and under control simultaneously in 
order for the “testing” to be valid. Hence, because of this problem of missing data, unit-level 
causal inference in this case is “simply impossible” (2015, 246). For these reasons, in strictly 
epistemological terms I do not claim causal inference for this study,12 but rather I make use of 
descriptive inference in further steps of this research project. 
																																												
12 Waldner (2015) further suggests the “completeness standard” for process tracing to resolve the fundamental 
problem of causal inference. It requires of a researcher to design a causal graph that represent two states of the 
world, one under control and one under treatment in order to record unobserved potential outcome; as well as event-
history maps compiled from case-based evidence. He also points out that completeness standard is an “aspirational 
standard” which many good works, including his own, fail to meet. 
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In this sense,  I agree with David Welch (2005, 9) that when analyzing international 
decision making “…we must moderate our hopes and expectations for “testing” theory— 
Newton’s experiments would have consistently failed if the bodies he pushed and dropped and 
threw had the will, capacity, and malice to misbehave— but since international politics is not an 
entirely capricious domain, and human nature is not infinitely malleable, we can still use 
evidence to distinguish better from worse statements about how the world works. We are not 
confined merely to interpreting it, or bearing witness to it.” Rather, as the author continues -  and 
I ascribe to the same epistemological position - “[t]he middleground approach to epistemology…  
- “test driving” rather than “testing” theory; judging its performance, its comfort, and its fit-and-
finish, rather than its “truth” or even, in comparative perspective, its relative usefulness— is as 
much … as the subject matter will allow.” 
In sum, having dealt with deductive goals of Chapter 2 where I elaborated theoretical 
foundations for transitional foreign policymaking drawing poliheuristic theory, in the next 
chapters I will proceed to a more inductive enterprise of “test-driving” these theoretical points in 
the case of Ukrainian foreign policymaking. 
In the third step of good practices for process tracing, the researchers who combine 
methods in multi-method research (MMR), such as process tracing accompanied by statistical 
analysis and/or experiments etc., should clarify how the underlying theoretical and 
epistemological assumptions of different methods collide or complement one another. Since my 
research design does not foresee a mix of methods to be used towards the same research question 
but rather uses one method of process tracing, no clarification of such kind on this step is further 
needed. 
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The fourth step of good process tracing calls researchers to start with “good theory, so 
that they know where to focus their analytical attention, which actors to study and interview and 
historical sequences of events to analyze” (Trampusch and Palier 2016, 14). Process tracers are 
thus compelled in this step to likewise investigate whether the theories they use to explore or 
explain a case “have proven their value in previous research” (ibid).  This could also be 
interpreted as encouraging scholars to work with theories that are progressive in Lakatosian 
sense of progressive research program (Lakatos 1980). As far as a “proven value” of PT is 
concerned, in my survey of the field in Chapter 2 I mentioned that in the current state of art, the 
PT research program has been estimated by Brule (2008) to be progressive in Lakatosian terms 
as compared to other theories in foreign policy decision making (e.g. cybernetic theory and 
expected utility decision making theory).  
The robustness of the PT theoretical propositions has also been demonstrated in a number 
of studies that vary greatly in their methodological approaches, such as experimental research, 
large-N statistical analysis and case studies (some examples, correspondingly include 
Christensen and Redd (2004); DeRouen and Sprecher (2004);  Taylor-Robinson and Redd 
(2003), to name a few). Moreover, PT has also been productively applied to study a range of 
international issue areas, such as terrorism, international environmental agreements, diversionary 
use of force, international crises, international bargaining and coalition formation.13 Thus, even 
though, the PT scholars are yet to provide a more engaged response as to how it distinctly sets 
																																												
13 For a more comprehensive review of PT’s robustness, see Redd, Steven B., David Brulé and Alex Mintz. 
"Poliheuristic Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis." The International Studies Encyclopedia. Denemark, Robert A. 





itself apart,  theoretically speaking, from the political survival perspective (De Mesquita 2005, 
2010; De Mesquita and Lalman 2008; De Mesquita and Smith 2011); audience cost perspective 
(Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001) and operational code analysis (Schafer and Walker 2006), PT is 
nonetheless deemed be both progressive (Brulé 2008) and a leading theoretical effort that bridges 
cognitive-rationalist divide in foreign policy analysis as of today (Oppermann 2014). 
In the fifth step of “good process tracing,” researchers are encouraged to think through 
their case selection strategy in order to situate their research in terms of the theoretical leverage 
they purport to exert. Trampusch and Palier (2016) thus recommend scholars to follow the 
classic works of Eckstein (1975) and Lijphart (1971) as well as Gerring (2007) to determine 
whether the causal mechanism they are tracing are being examined in a typical, deviant, 
most/least likely, crucial or other kind of case. In this way, process tracers are better able to 
specify the significance of their contribution to the accumulation of theoretical knowledge.   
Indeed, the topic of case selection has gathered considerable attention from qualitative 
and quantitative methodologists alike. One of the most widely often discussed challenges of 
single-case design as it pertains to case selection and theoretical import has been the risk of 
conflating theory with data: the theory is generated and tested in the same case (Eckstein 
1975; King et al. 1994; Bueno de Mesquita 1996). Admittedly, researchers frequently start with 
either a theory in search of a test or with a case in need of a theory to explain it (King, Keohane, 
and Verba 1994, 17–18). And whereas either strategy is acceptable as a starting point, single-
case study in its “testing” (or test-driving as is in the current research) part may become prone to 
the selection bias if a universe of cases is underspecified (A. L. George and Bennett 2005, 83–
84). In order to avoid this pitfall, I resort to the matrix of mapping the population of cases: 
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Figure 3.1. Typology of Cases 
 
Source: Beach and Pederson (2016a, 281), adapted. 
The case of the Ukrainian foreign policy-making falls in the first quadrant of this matrix, 
since both the causal variable (transitional uncertainty) and outcome (foreign policy change) are 
present in the studied case. In this way, the Ukrainian case here is “typical” from the viewpoint 
of its relation to the population of cases that my theoretical approach aims to apply to.  
From a variance-based design point of view, this may appear to be problematic in as far 
as social scientists are routinely advised to avoid “the most egregious error” of selecting 
observations in which “the explanatory and dependent variables vary together in ways that are 
known to be consistent with the hypothesis that the research purports to test” or otherwise select 
cases with positive values on dependent variable (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 142). Such 
view, however, does not comport either with the epistemological foundations for this research 
that I delineated above, or with the foundational premises of process tracing as a method.  
First, as far as selecting a case with positive values on both dependent and independent 
variable prior to examining the empirics of the Ukrainian foreign policy making case, I have 
developed the proposed causal mechanism exclusively from the theoretical propositions existing 
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in the field rather than drawing on the case itself. Hence, the variation in the levels explanans 
and explanandum in the Ukrainian case did not bear in any way on how this causal mechanism 
was theoretically conceptualized.  
Secondly, because I am focused on process tracing how the cause and outcome are linked 
in the theorized mechanism, rather than on how much they are related (i.e. not on the correlated 
levels of variation between a cause and an effect), the selection of a “typical case” is likewise 
justifiable. Indeed, one cannot study the inner workings of a political process other than by 
tracing it in cases where such a process did occur, rather than contrasting it to some control 
group with no process observed.  Further research in this direction may thus potentially include 
comparing one set of transitioning states to another (for example, cases from Quadrant II, IV and 
III), but such endeavor is beyond the scope of the present research that aims to initially develop 
and ‘test-drive’ the causal mechanism in the first place. 
Step six for good process tracing stipulates that  “sound causal observations need time, 
contextual evidence and ‘a good knowledge of individual cases’”(Trampusch and Palier 2016, 
14). Process tracers are therefore encouraged to collect various data with an eye to measurement 
validity that avoids bias in the use of primary and secondary sources contributing to “thoughtful 
data collection” (ibid). Acknowledging the importance of well-thought out data collection and 
measurement validity, I treat this subject the next section to follow in this chapter. 
In step seven, counterfactual analysis and mental experiments are suggested for process 
tracers to resort to  in order to supplement the conceptualizations of their mechanisms with  
cognitive constructions “in cases where there are reality gaps” (Trampusch and Palier 2016, 14). 
Admittedly, according to the authors, the proper use of counterfactual analysis on its own or 
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alongside with process tracing is an ambitious task no easily achieved. The research goals and 
availability of empirical data for my project, however, does not necessitate its use.  
Further, good process tracers in step eight “should carefully investigate when the 
processes we analyze have started and when they end” (ibid). In this step, both theory and 
observations are helpful guides for scholars to distinguish where to begin and to stop the analysis 
of a causal mechanism from its cause to the described outcome. In this regard, having the clear 
criteria of when the period of political transition begins and ends as I have detailed above, gives 
the causal mechanism I intend to study very analytically discernable points of departure and 
conclusion. 
The last but one step of good process tracing, step nine, reminds scholars who employ 
qualitative methods of the ongoing ‘transparency revolution,’ which encourages researchers 
provide an online database of interviews and other data that has been used in the research, along 
with ‘analytic’ and ‘productive’ transparency thereby giving readers and reviewers access to the 
process of how the segments of qualitative data were interpreted and conclusions derived at. 
Following this recommendation, I will specify in a comprehensive way all materials used for this 
research. 
Finally, in step ten, the authors urge process tracers to “be aware of and always remember 
that when it is a method of causal interpretation of one case, process tracing is not a causal 
explanation reached by statistics.” Unfortunately, this is where Trampusch and Palier leave off 
and do not indicate anything further for this step, whereas it is laden with much theoretical and 
methodological controversy surrounding the nature of causality and ways in which quantitative 
and qualitative scholars make causal inferences and claims in their research. However, since the 
previous steps have required me to clarify my ontological and epistemological positions for 
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process tracing, in addition to discussing the generalizability and validity of my research, I am 
confident that there should be no doubt left that I do not approach this project with an 
assumption that conclusions reached in this work could be equated to inferences made with the 
help of statistical tools. 
 
3.3. Putting the Method to Work: Operationalization and Data 
 
Having thus clarified the foundational premises for the use of process tracing in my case 
study, I now turn to delineating how this method will be specifically employed in the empirical 
chapters to follow.  
In order to present my causal mechanism in line with previously discussed understanding 
of causal mechanisms as a system14 I will use the following template for the design of causal 
mechanisms:15 
Figure 3.2.  A Template for a Two-Part Causal Mechanism 
 
Source: Beach and Pederson (2016b, 80). 
																																												
14 See the discussion of Beach and Pederson (2016) in the previous section of this chapter above. 
15 The template suggested here is for a two-part causal mechanism, although theoretically a mechanism could consist 
of more entities linked by more activities. 
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Here, according to this approach, entities are understood to be factors (actors, 
organizations or structures) and activities are producers of change or what transmits causal forces 
through a mechanism (Beach 2016, 3).   
When this template is applied to the particular causal mechanism of transitional 
uncertainty and foreign policy change under study - with ‘test-driving’ epistemological goal in 
mind -  I derive the following representation: 
Figure 3.3. Causal Mechanism Diagram: Foreign Policy Change under Transitional 
Uncertainty 
 
Source: Beach and Pederson (2013, 15), adapted. 
In this diagram, the verb-centered Activity 1 that transmits causal force from Entity 1 
(uncertainty, a structural factor) and Entity 2 (foreign policy decision maker, an actor) is 
“shortens time horizons.” And the verb-centered Activity 2 that connects Entity 2 (foreign policy 
decision maker, an actor) and the outcome of the causal mechanism, Y (foreign policy change) is 
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“chooses between public vs sponsor interests” which ultimately sets a course for certain change 
in foreign policy of a transitional state.16 
Having had the concept of transition, uncertainty and foreign policy change delineated in 
and the decision maker behavior theoretical modeled in Chapter 2, I now proceed to Step 2 in 
Figure 3.4 which is to operationalize the concepts in the specified causal mechanism. 
 
3.3.1. Operationalization of Transition 
 
To operationalize transition I follow conceptualization of the term by Ronald Francisco 
(2000, 42), who states that transition begins “before the formal or de facto collapse of a regime” 
when “new forces or parties mobilize.” In accordance with this definition, I operationalize this 
variable by looking at the context of the political competition in presidential elections of 2004 
and years preceding the outbreak of the Orange revolution. In particular, I trace statements of 
political contenders and their respective parties in a selection of texts aimed to communicate 
partisan and candidate positions as they distinctly present themselves as “new forces” and parties 
that oppose President Kuchma regime. I also look through journalistic accounts of protests by a 
new generation of civil society activists that were involved “Ukraine without Kuchma!” and 
other movements that signaled an emergence of new political forces. This data also includes my 
interview with Orange revolution activist who was involved in these political processes. 
As for operationalization of the endpoint of transition, according to Francisco’s (2000) 
definition occurs when transition regimes are “rooted, reasonably stable but not immune from the 
																																												
16 Or no change if causal conditions are not present or a case is deviant, as deliberated above. 
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vagaries of nature – or politics.” To be more precise, Francisco specified four criteria that to 
define the endpoint of the transition: 
1) the new regime no longer faces civil war or unrest at a level that threatens its 
existence; 
2) the new regime a) establishes new, functioning institutions of government, or b) 
reforms existing institutions to bring them into conformity with the new political 
values; 
3) achieves widespread diplomatic recognition; 
4) gains membership in the IMF and the IBRD and successfully negotiates a long-
term loan from them (if required). 
Regarding the operationalization of the threat of civil war or unrest, I will trace the 
historical records of the Orange protests as well as the protests in the eastern parts of Ukraine in 
support of Kuchma and against the Orange government to track when the record of the last active 
demonstrations occurred.  
Concerning the second criterion of establishing of new, functioning institutions of 
government or reforming the existing institutions to bring them into conformity with the new 
political values, I operationalize this factor by examining several important data sources. First, 
for the period of 2005 – 2009 of President Yushchenko’s presidency, I survey the records of the 
Presidential Acts and Directives relative to the reform and restructuring of the system of 
government and in particular examine the Law of Ukraine # 2222-IV on Amendments to the 
Constitution of Ukraine. The latter became a law because of Yushchenko’s compromise with an 
outgoing regime and it paved a way to a range of new institutional practices. This eventually 
enabled Yushchenko-Yanukovych cohabitation cabinet to come into existence on August 4, 
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2006. I had the ability to observe firsthand the internal workings on this cohabitation government 
apparatus from May 2006 until September 2007 when I worked on administrative reform and the 
reform of civil service at the Center for Support for Civil Service Institutional Development 
(Ukrainian government agency) in cooperation with the Embassy of France in Kyiv, Ukraine. I 
draw on this in-depth contextual knowledge as well as assessments of international experts to 
evaluate the progress of institutional reforms in conformity with the professed political values of 
the Orange revolution.  
Thirdly, as far as the widespread diplomatic recognition of the new regime, this criterion 
for the end of transition has been satisfied very early on when President Yushchenko took office 
on January 24, 2005 and representatives of fifty-nine states attended the inaugural ceremony. 
The diplomatic relations with a worldwide range of governments likewise continued during 
President Yanukovych’ term. 
Finally, Ukraine has been a recognized member of both International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IRBD or World Bank) 
since September 3, 1992 and has effectively negotiated long-term loans from these institutions 
throughout the time of study until today. 
In sum, in order to operationalize the beginning and the end of the political transition in 
Ukraine, I refer to range of empirical evidence that bears on the conceptual aspects of the 
definition of transition as a term as well as the four criteria for its endpoint. These data sources 
include both electronic archives, online depositories of Presidential documents, examination of 
news reports, expert evaluations of reform progress, an interview with an Orange protest activist 
and my memoir of professional experience working in the Ukrainian capital during the transition. 
As I ultimately show in subsequent chapters, the transition indeed started in months preceding 
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the Orange revolution and ended when President Yanukovych reorganized government to 
consolidate power by the end of 2011. 
 
3.3.2. Operationalization of Uncertainty 
 
In previous chapter, I have settled on the cognitivist approach to uncertainty which treats 
it as an analytical confusion and cognitive inability to process a wealth of ambiguous information 
available to the decision maker in a complex political and social world. Whereas I cannot 
directly test or observe in the framework of the current research design the cognitive  limitations 
of particular decision makers responsible for foreign policy choices in Ukraine  in 2004 -2014 at 
their occurrence, I use the proxy rubric for measuring transitional uncertainty developed  by Jung 
and Deering (2015) that is comprised of four factors that impact uncertainty in democratic 
transitions. To recapitulate, these are as follows: 
1) The pace of democratic transition impacts degree of uncertainty: if the process of 
transition is abrupt, then the level of uncertainty is likely to be higher since it throws the 
leaders into the unknown field of competition with the major powerholder (typically an 
authoritarian leader) out of calculation. If transition is gradual, then most likely the 
politicians have had a chance to estimate their own individual political reputations that 
they can subsequently carry into the transitional stage of politics. 
 More specifically, Jung and Deering (2015) reference Shugart (1998) research where the 
author reflects on the “abrupt break with the authoritarian regime” and its impact on 
legislative competition vs. gradual transition from autocracy to democracy. Even though my 
study is concerned with a different set of issues, the conceptual distinction of gradual vs. 
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abrupt transition is still useful in terms of describing transitional uncertainty.  Since I use 
Francisco (2000) criteria to determine the duration of transition, I will apply Jung and 
Deering (2015) estimation of the pace of transition to the regime change proper. In order 
words, I will consider whether the handover of executive power from old regime to new 
political actors was done in an abrupt and unexpected way, or rather it proceeded in more 
gradual and institutionally predictable manner. 
In order to tap into the abrupt vs. gradual nature of transition, I examine a range of 
primary sources (news reports, interviews and public onion surveys) as well secondary 
sources (scholarly and journalistic accounts).  I will estimate whether the actors involved in 
the Orange revolution and their opponents were expecting and prepared for the way the 
regime change proceeded and saw it as a natural progression of what had already been 
instituted in known practice or not. 
2) The extent to which prior authoritarian regime allowed political competition affects the 
level of uncertainty in transition. According to Jung and Deering, if under a given regime 
parties and individuals are allowed to freely participate in political contestation of power, 
they are better able to estimate their election prospects and thus bargaining position in 
transition.  
This factor can be operationalized by examining a selected number of indicators pertaining to 
the Freedom of Association cluster from the V-Dem dataset:17  barriers to parties; opposition 
parties’ autonomy; national party control; party ban; multi-party elections; civil society 
																																												
17 The dataset is developed by through collaboration of 50 scholars headed by a team of principal investigators from 
the University of Notre Dame and the University of Gothenburg. The data is collected through a network of 2,500 
country experts and is available online at v-dem.net.  
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organization entry and exit, as well as repression indicators.  I will examine into each 
indicator and its numerical value in a greater depth in the following empirical chapters.  
3) According to Jung and Deering uncertainty “will be much higher where democratization 
coincides with state-building18  than in cases without this additional burden” (Jung and 
Deering 2015, 64). They further expand that this factor is to accommodate processes that 
take place in newly independent countries or those that emerge out of secession where 
“political actors face greater uncertainty” (ibid).  
Even though Ukraine became independent in 1991, after the fall of Kuchma regime and 
continued into the presidency of Yushchenko and Yanukovych, there were significant state-
building efforts that were generally comprised under the title of “constitutional reform” in 
Ukraine. This reform included important rearrangement of power and authority prerogatives 
between different branches as well as changes in the electoral system of the state. I will 
operationalize this state-building factor that contributed to uncertainty by examining the 
efforts in institutional design that were underway in Ukraine in this period of study. I will 
evaluate the magnitude of changes under constitutional reform in each sub-period of the 
study by assessing how much re-organization of state institutions and their functions as a 
result of this reform. In Chapter 5 I suggest a more detailed additive formula to gauge the 
level of in constitutional and democratization and their effect on the levels of uncertainty. 
4) Finally, the authors suggest that uncertainty is aggravated during the severe economic 
downturns. Essentially, when leaders face the situation of economic hardship the 
																																												
18 It is important to note that in Jung and Deering (2015) treatment, state-building is equivalent to institution 
building, or institutional design. Therefore, following such lead, I use “state-building” and institutional design 
interchangeably.  
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calculation of other political decisions becomes more complex due to economic 
constraints that budgetary process imposes.  To operationalize the economic factor 
contributing to uncertainty, I use GDP per capita as well as other estimates from the 
World Bank data. I will examine the magnitude of decline or increase in these indicators 
compared to economic record of their predecessors and establish whether it added or 
detracted from the level of transitional uncertainty. 
A discussion is in order as to how each of these four factors matter relative to the 
complex evaluation of the level of uncertainty. Jung and Deering (2015) use the first three 
variables as categorical and economic factor as numeric in their logit analysis of 
constitutional choices of democratizing nations. Here, however, without any previous 
theoretical work to guide me as to assigning relative weights to each of the factors, in my 
more qualitatively oriented work, I resort to categorizing these factors at four levels: HIGH 
(3), MODERATE (2), LOW (1) and NONE (0) in a simple additive formula: 
Figure 3.4.  Model to Estimate Levels of Transitional Uncertainty 
Pace of Political Transition + Political Competition + State-Building+ Economic Downturn 
à Level of Uncertainty 
The highest level possible in this estimation would be 12, whereas the lowest is 0. Thus, 
uncertainty would be considered low, if it is estimated at levels from 1 to 4, moderate from 5 to 8 
and high at the level of 9 and higher.19 
																																												
19 I acknowledge that there may be interactive relations between, for instance, the levels of political competition and 
state-building etc. However, since the study of these criteria as they relate to political uncertainty have not been 
undertaken in quantitative studies at the moment with the exception of Jung and Deering (2015), there are no 
verifiable estimates as to the existence, magnitude or direction of such interactions. Therefore, I leave this question 
open for future exploration. 
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3.3.3. Operationalization of Foreign Policy Decision Maker and Party Substitute Interests 
 
Until this point in my research, I have implicitly referred to Ukrainian presidents as the 
main political decision makers as far as the foreign policy is concerned. This is not to neglect the 
vast amount of FPA literature that discusses the influence of various other actors involved in the 
process of making a foreign policy decision. From the point of its analytical inception, diverse 
actors participate in conceptualizing, framing and lobbying for particular decision outcomes. 
From bureaucratic and organizational models of policymaking in the early classical work of 
Graham T. Allison (1969), to prominent research on ‘groupthink’ in decision making by Irving 
Janis (1972) and Hart (1990)  and more recent deliberations on ‘polythink’ and elite group 
decision-making (Mintz and Wayne 2016) -  there is a growing strand of FPA that explores the 
various roles, processes and outcomes in foreign policy as a results of interaction of multiple 
actors involved in the decision making. 
However, there are two important arguments – a theoretical and an empirical one -  that 
prompt my focus on the Ukrainian presidents proper as the decision makers. First, on the 
empirical side, in the system of government that emerged in Ukraine in post-Soviet context, the 
institutional legacy of foreign policy values and orientations being shaped and put in place 
primarily by the top executive of the government has remained strongly entrenched. The foreign 
policy decisions that pertain to the country’s alignment have consistently been the prerogative of 
the government, largely without consultation with civil society groups. 
Further, after the division of powers that was achieved under Yushchenko-Yanukovych 
cohabitation arrangement, the President was explicitly vested with the formulation and oversight 
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of implementing foreign policy, thereby limiting the access to the decision making process by 
other diverse groups in this government.  
Finally, as my detailed process tracing of the state-building during President Yanukovych 
term in Chapter 8 showcases as well, the strategy of cutting out stakeholders from all important 
decision in in policymaking with the exception of the so-called “Family” clan by Viktor 
Yanukovych also meant that for the most part the ultimate foreign policy decision remained 
within the realm of President’s responsibility. 
From the theoretical considerations, PT at its core, is focused on a single decision maker. 
It is his/her calculation of one’s own reelection prospects that guides the primary consideration 
of the so-called “domestic dimension” of the decision, as I discuss in Chapter 2. With multiple 
propositions on the table and perspectives discussed, in the final arbitrage, the decision itself is 
typically stipulated by the highest power holder in the room, even if afterwards it must undergo a 
vetting in other democratic institutions such as parliamentary approval etc. 
Thus, in order to operationalize “foreign policy maker” I will be looking specifically at 
President Yushchenko and President Yanukovych, but more so in the context of their choices 
that cater to the interests of their own political sponsors. This requires a separate note on the 
aspects of operationalization of these interests.  
The interests of political sponsors of President Yushchenko and President Yanukovych in 
a particular foreign policy calculation are complex to tap into. I first establish the financial links 
between these two figures and their respective sponsors. I resort to a range of investigative 
journalist articles that have been published in recent years, mostly post the Revolution of 
Dignity. I also use materials of the civil society movements Chysta Ukrayina and Chesno, who 
followed both financial, personal and party connections between political actors, their parties and 
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financial contributors prior to Orange revolution and beyond. Likewise, I explore the video 
reports of the Radio Liberty project “Skhemy: koruptsiya v detaliakh” (Schemes: The Corruption 
in Detail”) in this regard as well. Having established the connections between President 
Yanukovych, President Yushchenko and their sponsors, I detect the oligarchic interests, based on 
their primary business connections to EU vs. Russian markets, analyzing how these party 
substitutes would gain or lose in their business or other dealings depending on which foreign 
policy option is chosen. 
 
3.3.4. Operationalization of Foreign Policy Change 
 
Two conceptual parts make “foreign policy change” concept that need to be 
operationalized respectively. First, I need to operationalize “foreign policy” and then, according 
to the definition of the levels of change discussed in Chapter 2, to find observable manifestations 
of “change.”  
First, as far as “foreign policy” conceptualization is concerned, following Goldmann 
(1988) I consider that there is both “verbalized” and “non-verbalized” policy program that a 
government pursues. For the verbalized part of the policy, I look at the range of keystone texts 
produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, official addresses of the respective 
heads of this agency at different time points, their informal interviews, press-conferences and 
commentaries. In addition, I examine the “text and talk” (Chilton and Schäffner 2002) of 
Presidents Yushchenko and Yanukovych regarding their foreign policy. This includes examining 
official addresses, key electronic and other media documents, directives to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and interviews.  I likewise look at Viktor Yushchenko’s memoirs in his recently 
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published book “Nederzhavni taiemnytsi” (“Non-State Secrets”) published in 2014, as well 
Viktor Yanukovych’s book “Opportunity Ukraine,” and several other previous monographs 
published in Ukraine.  
As far as “non-verbalized” acts that constitute foreign policy, I track several major 
indicators. First, it is the record of foreign delegation visits to and from Ukraine to the respective 
states of the EU, to the Russian Federation and states that are aligned with it. I note the level of 
the delegation, the length of the visits and the official purpose and content of these trips. I also 
examine the available data on the international cooperation projects between particular state 
agencies of Ukraine with their foreign partners during the studies time period. Finally, I look at 
the track record of Ukraine in terms of its economic relationships with its neighbors in 2004-
2014, paying special attention to trade and energy sectors. 
As for the final element in need of operationalization, “change” in the foreign policy. 
According the typology of change in foreign policy that I follow from Gustavsson (1999), I need 
to be able to distinguish between an adjustment change, programme change, problem/goal 
change and international orientation change. These four changes represent degree to which 
foreign policy shift could occur compared to the previous foreign policy conduct.  
In adjustment change, minor changes occur at the level of effort put into policy.  This 
could be traced by looking at the “non-verbalized” records of the conduct of foreign relations by 
Ukraine with the states under discussion. Primarily, whether foreign visits to and from Ukraine 
have a remarked change in frequencies, level of representation or the content that is addressed in 
them. 
 In program change, there is a difference in means and methods while basic goals 
remain unchanged.  In operationalizing this aspect, I will look new programs and other 
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institutionalized means of cooperation or ways of contestation over new or old issues in 
Ukraine’s relationship with the EU, and the Russian Federation.  
Problem/goal change refers to a shift in goals and objectives. This will be primarily 
examined on the basis of a verbalized program as compared to the previous program. I expect to 
see new rhetoric that would explicitly present the goals and objective of new direction in foreign 
policy that does not break away from the past alliances and international commitments, however, 
which does project either higher economic, military or reputational goals in the existing 
relationship with its partners.  
 Finally, international orientation change is a fundamental change in state’s entire 
orientation toward world affairs.  In this regard, I expect to see both verbalized and non-
verbalized program evidence found in the sources specified above that would point towards a 
greater, more ontological re-orientation where Ukraine is cast in a different identity role as it 
perceives itself in global affairs. This would be reflected in texts as referencing its either a break 
from the past practices and ideological orientations Ukraine has previously had, or emphasizing a 
revived historical narrative that contextualizes newly aspired international role. 
With such elaboration of my method of inquiry and operationalization of major concepts, 
I now proceed to the empirical part of the study where I present the collected evidence by 
process tracing each entity and action in the causal mechanism:  
Figure 3.5. Causal Chain for Foreign Policy Change under Transition 
Transition (impacts the level and nature of) à Uncertainty (shortens time horizons for) 
à Foreign policy decision maker to consider voter vs. sponsor interests (sets the course for) à 
level of foreign policy change.  
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Thus, Chapter 4 looks at the first element in the mechanism, the political transition in 
Ukraine in the studied time period. Chapter 5, presents the second part of the causal chain, the 
uncertainty in the political transition. Chapter 6 follows with an examination of party substitute 
connections to Ukrainian foreign policy decision makers and the interests of the former 
potentially had in foreign policy of the country.  Chapter 7 looks at Ukraine’s relations with the 
European Union and Russia and establishes the level of FP change under President Yushchenko. 
It also deals with benefits of the Ukrainian oligarchs, the party substitutes, from the observed 
foreign policy change. It should be noted that Chapters 5 through 7 encompass the period of 
2005-2009 (occasionally referencing the second term of Leonid Kuchma from 2000 to 2004 
whenever theory demands). Chapter 8 focuses on 2010 and 2011, after which, as I show in the 
chapter, Yanukovych regime consolidated and transition came to end. This chapter empirically 
evaluates the entirety of the causal mechanism in these two years. It is, therefore a more 
condensed and driven to present results, in contrast to Chapters 5 through 7 where I spend more 
time on foregrounding each element of the causal mechanism during Viktor Yushchenko’s 




Chapter 4  
 POLITICAL TRANSITION IN UKRAINE: 
 AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION 
 
The empirical chapters that follow pursue a common goal. They purport to provide 
empirical data to the analytical discussion that preceded them. Specifically, I will present data 
that bears on the theoretical connections between transitional uncertainty that a political regime 
is facing and the subsequent changes in foreign policy choices it is prepared to make.   
The task that follows from this goal, in line with my proposition in Chapter 3, is to trace 
a causal mechanism which transmits causal forces from transitional uncertainty to an outcome 
in foreign policy change.  Hence, each of the following chapters examining foreign policy 
making of President Yushchenko and President Yanukovych respectively will examine the 
evidence for both entities and activities that make up the causal mechanism (Figure 3.5).20  
Following the operationalization of key elements in my causal mechanism outlined in 
the previous chapter, I first set to examine the transition in the Ukrainian politics as a 
background against which foreign policy decisions were considered by the Ukrainian actors in 
this context. Thus, I examine the beginning of transition in subsection 4.1 and then explore 
criteria that are crucial in determining when the transition in the Ukrainian case ended in the 
subsection 4.2. I arrive at the conclusion that because the Orange leaders were not able to bring 
																																												
20 Such approach to tracing a causal mechanism presupposes that evidence is indeed present and available for 
scientific discovery. In other words, there is an implicit assumption of ‘traceability’ of processes that are 
discoverable both in terms of the “trace” they left behind and our scientific and analytical ability to uncover them. 
This assumption is a point of methodological discussion in the field (see Walder 2015, Derek and Beach 2016) to 
which I do not return except for acknowledging the ongoing challenge. The current case under study of the 
Ukrainian foreign policy making does not suffer from lack of evidential traces, hence I bracket this methodological 
issue in the current research.  
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to fruition the changes in the functioning of the Ukrainian government institutions announced at 
the backdrop of the revolution, the transition stage was incomplete by 2010, when President 
Yanukovych took office.  This satisfies the scope condition for the historical period I seek to 
investigate in order to determine how the changes in the foreign policy of a transitioning state 
occur.  
 
4.1. Beginning of Political Transition in Ukraine: 2000-2003 
 
There were many ‘swallows’ signaling a tectonic change in the Ukrainian political life 
prior to the escalation of the seventeen-day long Orange revolution of the fall of 2004. After 
two consecutive terms of President Kuchma lasting for over a decade, there was a growing 
uneasiness as regards the increasingly authoritarian character of President Kuchma’s rule. 
Among chief concerns was suppression of the freedom of speech,21 severe political corruption 
and embezzlement,22 with widely publicized and egregious case of ordered journalist murder of 
Georgiy Gongadze. 
 Publicly exposing President Kuchma’s involvement in the murder, civil society leaders 
along with Kuchma’s political rivals launched a new campaign “Ukraine without Kuchma” – a 
goal of new quality and magnitude for Ukrainian politics. These protests of late 2000 and early 
																																												
21 For details of media intimidation and censorship, see for instance, Human Rights Watch Report of March 2003, 
Vol. 15, No. 2(D) (Negotiating the News: Informal State Censorship of Ukrainian Television 2003)available at  
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ukraine0303/Ukraine0303.pdf 
22 Especially in energy sector. For a detailed exploration, see Balmaceda (2013a, 97–117). 
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2001 saw unprecedented numbers of participants in collective action since the independence 
movement of late 1980s.23  Indeed, “Ukraine without Kuchma” involved thousands of 
protesters and was deemed threatening to the regime who continuously countered it. First, the 
protests were squelched in December 2000 when participants were barred from their original 
protest sites in Kyiv under the pretext of urban renovation project. Then, in early March 2001, 
when the protest rose again during the traditional days of Taras Shevchenko commemoration,24  
“Ukraine without Kuchma” clashed with law enforcement regiments. Arrests and court trials 
followed. 
The regime was so concerned with an imminent threat to its stability and survival that 
President Kuchma, flanked by Parliamentary Chair Ivan Plyushch and his then Prime-Minister 
Viktor Yushchenko deemed necessary to issue an address entitled “The Motherland Is in 
Danger” on February 13, 2001. This address was a rhetorical reply to a slightly earlier stipulated 
need to ‘save the nation.’ Namely, on February 9, fifteen political leaders including a former 
Deputy Premier who had been fired by President Kuchma - Yulia Tymoshenko -  formed the 
“National Salvation Forum”.25 The declared goal of this political union was to “put an end to 
the criminalized regime”; to strengthen respect for rights and rule of law; and “to return Ukraine 
to the European path of development” (February 9 - A Historical Date? 2001)  
Hence, the signs of new political forces mobilizing that signal the beginning of transition 
were present prior to the events of 2004 protests in great variety. First, it is evident in the great 
																																												
23	According to Volodymyr Chemerys, a political activist of the movement and member of the Ukrainian 
parliament in 1994 - 1998.(Chemerys 2017). 
24 Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), was a famous Ukrainian writer and dissident in Tsarist Russian Empire. 
25 Sometimes termed “Committee” rather than “Forum” in English translations. 
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increase of numbers of participants of public protests in “Ukraine without Kuchma” compared 
to other political protests of that time. 
Thus, for instance, prior to “Ukraine without Kuchma”, the protests of Donbas coal 
miners in Kyiv demanding fair wages and compensation for unpaid arrears in 1990s had a 
regionally and socially narrow base: all registered 400,000 working coalminers protests in Kyiv 
usually counted under 2,000 participants.26 In a typical pattern the miners would return to their 
work sites and the government would resume its policies similar to pre-crisis mode.  
The novelty of “Ukraine without Kuchma” and the declarations of Forum of National 
Salvation, thus, was not necessarily in the content of the slogans it propagated.  After all, heavy 
criticism against Kuchma had been leveraged during presidential campaign even prior to his 
second re-election. Neither was it in a stellar compilation of the political founders of the Forum, 
ranging in their ideological spectrum from rightist to socialist. Paul D’Anieri aptly remarks, the 
“shifting alliances” were a core feature in Ukrainian politics in these years, when political 
parties were in continuous struggle for influence against institutionally and economically 
strengthened Office of the President (2007, 115–23).  
But rather, - and secondly -  the qualitatively different character of this emerging 
tectonic shift was in the fact that new politically active generation entered in the political life of 
the country. Unlike regionally-based and issue-limited movement of coalminers, “Ukraine 
without Kuchma” started to incorporate a critically important and generationally new group into 
the public activism in Ukraine.   
																																												
26 This is not to be confused with general miners’ strikes in 1989-1991 prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union 
which were significantly more widespread both in numbers and geographical reach. 
	 57	
In the beginning of 2000s the generation of Ukrainians born in early 1980s who had 
barely experienced the Soviet system of schooling and ideological propaganda beyond their 
elementary grades, came out of age and entered their student years. This was a new generation, 
later termed “Orange.” As Andriy Kurkov, a prominent writer and analyst of Ukrainian social 
life remarked: “Kuchma never feared my generation. However, he forgot that we would have 
children and these children never knew KGB” (Gruda quoted in Kuzio (2006, 374)). And 
differently from their predecessors, the student generation of early 2000s for the first time in 
recent Ukrainian history had an option of being educated not in government funded, regulated 
and censored universities and colleges, but in its first private higher educational colleges and 
universities in Ukraine.  In fact, state accreditation of private institutions in Ukraine began in 
1995-1996. From 1997 to 2000, private higher education institutions finally gained state 
recognition and issued their first diplomas. These institutions comprised about 6% of the total 
number of educational institutions in Ukraine in early 2000s (Slantcheva and Levy 2007, 
219)27.  
The importance of this lies in the fact that it has been largely established in protest and 
social movement literature that the most likely social group to mobilize for public protests are 
students.28 And in the Ukrainian case, indeed, the age group of 30 year olds and younger were 
more likely to join the Orange revolution than other age categories (Stepanenko 2005, 612). 
																																												
27 At the beginning of the transition this student population was not economically better off than other social groups 
in Ukraine: these students either supported themselves financially by part time jobs or had extended family cover 
some of their out of town living expenses and/or tuition. Tuition rates were not prohibitive, however. During my 
time of working for the Ukrainian Catholic University, most of the students could cover their tuition through ‘work 
and study’ program at the University. Hence, the economic factor was not a driver for change in the mobilization of 
this group, but rather ideological and political factors mattered here. 
28 See, for instance, Lichbach (1998). 
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And along with small businessmen class, youth was a key social group that made the Orange 
revolution a success in terms of participation. 
Notably, in line with my argument that private higher educational institutions played a 
role in the formation of the new “Orange” generation, the premises of one the largest private 
universities in Ukraine, Kyiv-Mohyla University, or “Mohylyanka” was the initial site of young 
political activists preparing “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign. Later the Mohylianka 
meetings morphed and coalesced into a more formal “(Yellow) Pora” organization.29 
In fact, one of the proverbial slogans of the Orange revolution, “Together we are many – 
we won’t be overcome!” (“Razom nas bahato, nas ne podolaty!”) first echoed from Mohylianka 
students who stood up to guard off their dorms from police searches. These searched had 
ordered by the regime alleging “terrorist motives” to Mohylianka activists three weeks prior to 
large public protests in Kyiv. General assembly of Mohylianka’s students, faculty and staff has 
voted in favor of suspending academic studies to partake in the Orange revolution 
(Byukhovetskyi 2005). Mohylianka’s president, Vyacheslav Bryukhovetskyi made appearances 
on the stage along another president of a private university that partook in the Orange events, 
Fr. Borys Gudziak from the Ukrainian Catholic University whose students likewise were at the 
forefronts of election monitoring, protests and volunteer support during the events.30  
 Since those initial meetings at Mohylianka, Pora became one of the most active new 
civil society and political actors undertaking a variety of get-out-to-vote, voter education, fraud 
																																												
29 Interview with an Orange revolution activist, May 2013. Also, confirmed in online memoirs of another activist 
available here: http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2009/11/18/4321456/ 
30 After the Orange revolution, this cooperation in political activism of both private universities continued as they 
submitted a nomination of Viktor Yushchenko candidacy for Nobel Peace Prize and were in turn recognized in 
shared audiences with the President etc.  
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prevention and protest activities prior to and during the Orange revolution.  Eventually, after the 
revolution, Pora registered as a political party and in 2006 parliamentary elections was 3rd  and 
4th most voted party in Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk regions respectively. And in 2007 
parliamentary elections it joined other smaller parties in a political block “Nasha Ukrayina  - 
Narodna Samooborona” that won 72 seats out of 450. This, is again, a piece of evidence that the 
new political force mobilized on the horizon of the Orange revolution. 
To summarize, I traced the beginning of political transition in Ukraine in the evidence of 
an increased number of participants in political protests; and a mobilization of a qualitatively 
new social subgroup with different set of values and expectations. I now turn my attention to the 
evaluation of the criteria for the end of this political transition. 
 
4.2. Political Transition after the Orange Revolution, 2005-2009 
 
In this section, I examine the context of political transition that undergirded the foreign 
policymaking environment in Ukraine since the Orange revolution and on. Therefore, I will not 
delve into the description of the events of October 2004-December 2005 that transpired during 
the Orange revolution. Suffice it to say, the regime change did occur as the result of the Orange 
revolution (i.e. transition from one regime to another did take place). President Kuchma was 
unable to hand over power to his personally selected candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. And new 
values and practices that break away from “Kuchmism” had been formed, as I show below.  
  The end of the transition, according to my treatment of the term here, should be 
signaled in part when the new regime either establishes new, functioning institutions of 
government or reforms existing institutions to bring them into conformity with the new political 
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values. It is on this aspect of the end of transition that I focus in this section  - other criteria for 
the end of transition were either already satisfied prior to the transition or were easily satisfied 
in the early days of the transition as I mentioned in Chapter 3. I will only dwell briefly now to 
present evidence that new regime “no longer faced civil war or unrest at the level that 
threatened its existence,” per one of the criteria for transition’s end (Francisco 2000, 42) 
The Blue protests in support of Viktor Yanukovych that discounted the results were 
brewing in Donetsk until the official inauguration, collecting close to 4,000 participants in early 
January 2005 (The Meeting in Donetsk 2005). These protests nominally “threatened” the new 
Orange power in that their slogans and distributed materials called for imprisonment of Viktor 
Yushchenko and impugning him with “bringing the country to the verge of civil war” and 
“currency inflation and price increases” (ibid). However, in practical terms these protests made 
no tactical or strategical moves to contest the results of the elections and they did not attract a 
growing participation over time. 
Therefore, past the inauguration of the new President in January 2005 there were no 
actions on the part of the Blue opponents of the Orange revolution that would threaten the 
existence of the new regime. The Blue opposition activists, although with significant support 
base in the Eastern regions, mounted no collective action to present a sustained challenge. 
 
4.2.1. Declared Values of the Orange Revolution Political Actors 
 
This brings me back to the discussion of the crucial element in the understanding of 
when the transitional period ended in the Ukrainian political life following the Orange 
revolution: the examination of whether the new regime was able to institute new functioning 
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institutions of government or reform the old ones in order to bring them in conformity with the 
new set of values. Such exploration of the institution building first requires examining what the 
declared values of the Orange revolution were. I will then study the governmental initiatives, 
directives, and acts that restructured or instituted new institutions, approaches and procedures in 
conformity with the declared goals of the Orange team. 
First, in order to understand what the Orange political camp stood for,31 I examine an 
important document that emerged in less than ten days after the Presidential inauguration, and 
immediately after the new government was confirmed by the Ukrainian legislature with Yulia 
Tymoshenko at its head. This document, labeled “Nazustrich Lyudiam” (“Towards the People”) 
was voted on February 4, 2005 by Verkhovna Rada as a “Program of Activities for the Cabinet 
of Ministers of Ukraine”, a compilation of commitments for reforms and a plan of action for the 
Orange Prime Minister and her government. 
This 40-page long document of close to 10, 000 words even if themed “for the people” 
or “towards the people” is not an easy read for an ordinary citizen. Admittedly, as a relatively 
new practice, “Towards the People” in that sense was not far in terms of the breadth of activities 
it covers from the previous similar documents. Viktor Yanukovych during his Premiership 
under President Kuchma presented two documents of similar length, each of them projecting his 
government’s work for one year ahead, 2003 and 2004 correspondingly. But “Towards the 
People” discursively strikes a different tone.  The document strives to encompass not only the 
prospected activities of the Cabinet, in a purely functional sense, but rather to postulate how the 
																																												
31 This, notably is different from what the Orange protesters en masse pursued: the public good in demand was the 
reversal of the results of the fraudulent elections and the removal of President Kuchma who sanction the vote 
rigging from power.  
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new transformational changes that swept through the country in 2004 should be reflected in all 
spheres of political and social life of the Ukrainian government and the nation. The structure of 
the document showcases this well.  
Thus, for example, the contents of the Program are organized under six broad concepts 
that underpin vast areas of social life: Faith, Justice, Harmony, Life, Security and the World.  
These sections are preceded by three brief sections of ideological and value-based character as 
well: “The Ukraine We Believe In”; “The Government State We Live In” and “The 
Government State We Will Build.” These three sections make a clear break with the previous 
Programs of the Cabinet of Ministers: there are no references to other official documents that 
“Towards the People” is linked or based on, for the most part no clear numerical benchmarks to 
achieve etc., but rather an acknowledgement of the revolutionary turn in the Ukrainian politics 
and the break with the old ways of the previous regime. Hence, the opening paragraphs of the 
document declare that: 
The main motto of our Government is a free person in a just state. The highest values 
are the human development and dignity, spirituality and freedom, equality and solidarity, civil 
society and democracy, unity and law-based state, interethnic and interdenominational 
harmony, mutual respect and tolerance, justice and well-being. 
…The government state where we have been currently living has made lawlessness, 
injustice and neglect for democratic values a norm of social life. The fusion of power and 
business, corruption and bribery have become a threat to our national security. 
… We will change the philosophy of government of the past 10 years. From now on, the 
government will serve the individual, rather than people working away for the interests of the 
powerholders.(Program of Activity for the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Towards People” 
2005) 
 
What are we then to derive as “values” of the new regime, in accordance with which the 
new regime needs to reform its functional institutions in order to complete the transitional stage 
per my adopted definition?  “Toward the People” harkens back to Viktor Yushchenko’s 
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presidential candidacy electoral program that stipulates “10 Steps Towards People.” In this key 
electoral campaign document, in addition to social promises that “Towards the People” 
reiterates and elaborates, Viktor Yushchenko importantly promises to: 
“4. Make the government work for people; conduct decisive fight against corruption. 
In order to do this: 
 - to fire embezzlers and bribe-takers from their positions in executive branches and 
appoint in their stead honest professionals with integrity records; 
 - size down unnecessary government structures, decrease the number of the army of 
civil servants; the remainder of them will be provided with appropriate work conditions and 
dignified salary. A cheap government employee is too expensive for the nation. Every civil 
servant is to sign “The Honor Code of Civil Servant” and is to follow it inviolately; 
 - to clearly define the functions of the renewed government structures. The government 
state will not interfere into the lives of people where they are able to fare much better without 
it;...”(Yushchenko 2004) 
 
Most of these initiatives are also echoed in “Towards the People” Program, even if not 
collected under one comprehensive list.32  
Yushchenko’s inaugural speech highlights these values as well. It first pays tribute of the 
victory of democracy and emphasized the unity and respect for diversity. He then proceeds to 
paint the picture of prosperous new Ukraine, where “no one is going to be left disadvantaged” 
and “the government will give its budget to the people to the last penny. The pensions, aid and 
other social programs will continuously grow. Healthcare of all and the protection of mother 
and child will be the highest priorities of the work of my government” (Yushchenko 2005). This 
goal is inextricably tied to increasing the budget while “decreasing the taxes, but these shall be 
paid by all” (ibid). Directing all these funds into the appropriate social programs is predicated 
																																												
32 For instance, the anti-corruption measures and judicial reform are dealt with under the “Justice” part of the 
document, whereas administrative reform (the reform of civil service) and regional policy are treated in the 
“Harmony” part. 
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on “leading the economy out of shadow” and “destroying the system of corruption” so that “the 
state budget shall not a ‘feeder’ anymore” because the “public offices will be occupied only by 
those whose expenses equal the declared profits.” All in all, the President promised to create “a 
democratic government that is honest, professional and positively patriotic” where “the wall 
that separates a civil servant from people will be destroyed. A renewed government will know 
its duty and will work for the benefit of citizens and the country” (ibid). 
Thus, the inaugural speech could be summarized by two mottos: “We shall become a 
prosperous country” and “We shall become an honest country.” However, the implication is that 
the honesty of the government is tied to the kind of the state budget management that is no 
longer embezzled but directed to people’s needs. In that sense, the prerequisite values of the 
Orange camp could be summarized to be the fight against the corruption (which includes 
persecution and punishment of those public officials who abused power); optimization of 
obtuse and redundant government structures (includes sizing down personnel and clarifying 
missions); and professionalization of the civil servants (includes honorable and efficient 
conduct of public administration and decoupling personal political and state interests).33 
In order to underscore that these values were indeed new in the Ukrainian political 
system, it is worth noting that until the Orange leaders took over, no previous regime elevated 
the fight with corruption and government restructuring to the level of primary governmental 
tasks in its Cabinet program or in their electoral campaigning documents. In 2004, according to 
																																												
33 Other presidential agenda items included for instance, more funds and functions for local self-government; re-
privatization of embezzled state assets; re-fitting the Ukrainian army; and bringing to prominence de-Sovietized 
historical events and public figures. However, these issues were less central to the core of restructuring the state 
government itself as they had to do more with a new focus in a particular domestic policy area.  Therefore, I do not 
address them here as they do not relate directly to the subject matter. 
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Transparency International, Ukraine was at one of the most corrupt countries in the world, 
holding 122nd seat out of 146 states. Furthermore, under Kuchma regime there was no target 
agency or similar government body that would consistently and systematically handle 
allegations and investigations of corruption. For instance, one of Ukraine’s all time largest 
embezzlers, Petro Lazarenko, Kuchma’s Prime Minister in 1996 and 1997, was eventually tried 
on these charges in the US since the Ukrainian legal and administrative system was not able to 
handle cases such as his. Finally, the rise of the Ukrainian oligarchs dealt in later chapters, was 
precisely due to the fact that government turned a blind eye to a wide range of rents, self-
enrichment schemes and other practices inconsistent with good governance. 
Thus, Orange leaders’ declared commitment was to decriminalize and re-structure 
government to be largely free from corruption, egregious money-syphoning inefficiencies and 
dishonest underpaid civil servants. This is the template of basic values of the new Orange 
regime that rose to epitomize in its work the popular demand for a just and free state. And it is 
against this set of values that I will now examine the successes and failures of the Orange 
regime to implement them. This will allow me, according to my theoretical framework to 
identify when/whether the transition period in Ukraine ended. 
 
4.2.2. Orange Promises Kept and Broken: Unfinished Reforms, Incomplete Transition 
 
In order to see how Viktor Yushchenko’s and the Orange government implemented the 
values from their electoral promises and post-revolutionary commitments to bring old 
government institutions in conformity with these values, I will examine the several aspects of 
the Orange team’s governance under President Yushchenko and his Prime-Ministers. First, I 
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will study how Viktor Yushchenko himself applied these values and principles to the 
government structure most immediately available to him -  the Office of the President of 
Ukraine.  I explore how the declared value of optimizing the work of government agencies by 
re-structuring and downsizing the personnel to the essential ‘few’ but ‘professional’ cadres, free 
from corruption charges was put in practice by the President at this basic level.  
Secondly, I will look at the Orange government’s team efforts ‘to break the wall 
between the government and the people’ through the initiative of establishing the “civic 
participation boards” on the basis of several government agencies. I will examine the work 
record of some of these boards and argue that their functions were perfunctory and not 
impactful to the degree necessary to bring the bureaucratic machinery of the state in line with 
the goals and promises of the Orange leaders.  
Thirdly, I will survey how the Orange regime attempted to implement the value of 
honest and professionalized governance through the civil service reform in Ukraine during the 
years of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency. I will note some the existing initiatives, the level of 
political will and the general context of political competition between the Prime Ministerial 
Office and the Office of the President that largely hijacked any effective initiatives in this 
regard. 
Finally, and inextricably connected with the previous point, I will assess how President 
Yushchenko and the larger team of Orange leaders pursued a critical value of integrity in the 
conduct of government affairs by persecuting officials with history of embezzlement, corruption 
and other state affairs-related crime – a concern featured prominently on the agenda of the 
Cabinet of Ministers and on the “10 steps” of the President, and likewise very critical for the 
Orange voters as well (Stepanenko 2005). All in all, the presented evidence will allow us to 
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discern whether the new Orange regime had a record of abiding by the declared values and 
reforming the government institutions accordingly. A successful record in these reforms would 
indicate that the transition stage was complete under President Viktor Yushchenko; whereas 
failure to institute at least functional new or newly reformed institutions that align with the 
declared values would be considered as an evidence for an incomplete regime transition in the 
years of Viktor Yushchenko’s term of 2005 – 2009. 
As a related point, I would like to note that this exploration is not a comprehensive 
assessment of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency: indeed, I do not examine how other electoral 
promises were or were not kept, or whether in totality of the performance of the Orange 
government over these years was deemed satisfactory either by citizens or experts. My sole goal 
at this point following the theoretical path outlined in Chapter 2, is to establish whether or not 
the transition period was complete and in this sense my only preoccupation in this section is to 
determine whether or not the government institutions were properly (that is following the 
declared values of the new regime) reformed or new ones introduced. 
 
4.2.2.1.   Reform of the Presidential Administration in Ukraine 
I start by looking at how Viktor Yushchenko practiced the values of the Orange regime 
in the work of his own Office of the President officially termed the “Administration of the 
President of Ukraine” (APU). My reason for examining primarily the work of APU rather than a 
vast array of other ministries and other Ukrainian government agencies is two-fold. First, this 
agency was closest and most immediately accessible to the President himself. He encountered 
the work of the APU employees on a daily basis in his press preps, analytical notes, advising, 
liaison with other state agencies and so forth during his term in office. In other words, he was 
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able to interact in APU’s diverse departments directly and had an opportunity to evaluate their 
missions firsthand on the basis of the services that the APU provided.  
The second reason for examining APU primarily, is that shortly after he took office, 
President Yushchenko faced a different political system from the one he was ushered into. 
Indeed, on December 8, 2014, in the heat of the enfolding Orange revolution on streets of 
Ukraine, President Kuchma signed into law a piece of legislature that was hastily adopted by 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “as a packet” (i.e. without itemized discussion): the Law of 
Ukraine #2222-IV, or the Law of “Four Twos.” Under the provisions of this Law, significant 
amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine were introduced. These amendments were 
negotiated between President Kuchma, Prime-Minister Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor 
Yushchenko the day prior, on December 7, 2004. The Law #2222 provided the basis for a 
constitutional reform in Ukraine that would shift the political system of the country from a 
strongly semi-presidential to what could be best termed as quasi-parliamentary state.  
The initiation of a constitutional reform in the middle of the ongoing revolution, 
confusing as it may seem, had strong political roots in the years prior to the events of the fall 
and winter of 2004. Under President Kuchma the political power had been largely consolidated 
in the top executive office, which allowed for the greater abuse of power by the President. This 
became the main point of contention for the anti-regime protests of “Ukraine without Kuchma” 
and the Orange revolution. The Orange leaders saw in the upheaval of the revolution an 
opportunity for a structural change in the Ukrainian political institutions, a way to shift the 
centrifugal forces of power away from the presidential office to a more democratic 
parliamentary system.  
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At the same time, President Kuchma had sensed his eventual demise from power due to 
sinking political approval in the wake of the Kuchmagate scandal. So in 2002 and 2003 he 
started to advocate for a parliamentary system himself, fearing that his future political 
opponents may wield that strong power against him in a multitude of unpredictable ways (Kuzio 
2015, 65–66). As the gains of the Orange revolution were closely within grasp, both sides 
capitalized on the opportunity and found a point of convergence on various constitutional 
aspects. 
As a result, the Law #2222 stipulated a number of new and important provisions. First, 
the Government of Ukraine, i.e. the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine with its head as the Prime 
Minister of Ukraine, was now to be formed by the parliamentary majority in the Verkhovna 
Rada, rather than staffed by the President and then approved by Rada. The only exception was 
the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense. Their candidacies 
became the prerogative of the President, whereas the rest of the Cabinet composition was now 
determined by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister candidacy now had to be formally 
proposed for approval to Rada by the President. However, this candidacy had to be "in 
accordance with the submission by majority party coalition” from Rada to the President.  The 
appointment and dismissal of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister became a prerogative of the 
parliament and the members of the parliament had their terms extended by one year to a total of 
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five years. The appointment of local heads of regional administrations, the top executive at 
oblast level, however, was still preserved for the President.34 
On one hand, these changes presupposed a more representational model of governance 
with a parliamentary appointment and oversight of the Cabinet of Ministers. On the other hand, 
since party lists were closed, a selected minority of insiders could compose party lists, which in 
the Ukrainian context meant a wider opening for oligarchic influences.  
Further, the Government, formed according to such procedures, previewed a possibility 
of cohabitation by the President and Prime-Minister under the scenario where both canidates are 
elected coming from the opposing political platforms, a practice well familiar to the students of 
politics of France, Finland, Georgia, Romania etc. However, under the Law #2222 the 
cohabitation was further complicated by the fact that some Cabinet members were implicitly 
pro-Presidential while others pro-Prime-Ministerial candidates, following form the procedure of 
their appointment. This would leave a Cabinet of Ministers theoretically more prone to 
deadlocks and vagaries of political play based on the subordination issues. 
 I explore these developments in further detail in the next section of this chapter while 
discussing the institution building during Orange presidency years. For now, suffice it to point 
out in line of my argument, that the Law of Two Fours came into power on January 1, 2006, 
almost a year after the inauguration of President Yushchenko and it left the President unable to 
manage the work and reform of the Cabinet as he had the opportunity the year before. President 
																																												
34 For more on another aspect of political system change in Ukraine, the electoral rules change from 2000 – 2006, 
see Erik Herron (2007), State Institutions,	Political Context and Parliamentary Election Legislation in Ukraine, 
2000–2006. 
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Yushchenko on various occasions voiced his complain and criticism about the divested powers 
once the Law came into force (Kuzio 2015, 66).  Unable to annul them and stifled by his power 
struggles with his own Prime Ministers Yulia Tymoshenko, he went insofar as to dissolve the 
parliament in April 2007.   
This only goes to show that in reality, since 2006 Viktor Yushchenko was unable to 
have working relationships with - to say nothing of reforming of - the Government structures 
that were under the control of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Studying whether the new 
regime was able to put new values in practice by looking at the work of the government 
agencies in the middle of the power struggles between the President and the Prime Ministers 
would give us an inaccurate picture due to the effect of the constitutional reform.   
For instance, Yulia Tymoshenko was in office for short eight months with her first 
cabinet. She was succeeded by the Orange opponent Viktor Yanukovych, whose goals and 
ideological positions were opposed to the Orange revolution that had defeated him in 2004. 
Yulia Tymoshenko’s second tenure as a Prime – Minister, from December 2007 to March 2010 
was even more marred with deep-seated rivalry and open animosity with the President. There 
were accusations of “hysteria,” assassination and intimidation attempts, along two votes of no 
confidence to her Cabinet.  Most importantly, the global financial crisis put Ukraine in the 
category of states most acutely hit. In other words, downsizing and optimizing the work of the 
government structures35  was hijacked by the political struggles, in addition to being 
unavailable to the Orange President due to the new distribution of powers. 
																																												
35 It is worth to consider whether optimization of the work of government should be solely attributed to Orange 
values, or rather whether it was an outcome of some other external pressures of the day. In this sense, my goal is not 
to investigate the causal primacy of different factors that may have played a role in why the Ukraine was 
undertaking reform, but rather to determine what kind of reforms the Orange team pledged (values as evident from 
	 72	
Therefore, I now turn to survey how President Yushchenko’s own agency, APU, was 
reformed.  The evaluations of the reorganization efforts in this agency gives me a perspective of 
looking at how the government body that was completely within Presidential authority 
throughout the whole time of his term was/was not the embodiment of the promised changes by 
the Orange regime. 
Thus, one of first official documents issued by Viktor Yushchenko as a newly elected 
president was a decree to rename the APU that carried a negative connotation from the previous 
regime. The official name for the Office of the President was now the Secretariat of the 
President of Ukraine (SPU)36.  With it came certain structural changes delineated in the decree, 
including several names changes for services and departments at SPU. Admittedly, however, 
the first SPU did not differ greatly from the APU under President Kuchma. It got rid of four 
departments, yet acquired five new ones, with functions not too different from the APU.  
Furthermore, this document did not stipulate how many Vice-Secretaries and their immediate 
subordinates the head of the SPU would have, which left a loophole for getting into SPU as 
many dubiously qualified candidates as one wishes. 
 This was corrected the following month, when a new structure of the SPU was rolled 
out with high hopes and reports that Ukrainian alumni of world’s best colleges and universities 
– “from Harvard to Oxford” – are to join the team, per invocations during the Orange 
revolution. In fact, it became a popular belief among the early supporters of the Orange regime: 
“Yushchenko is hiring a new team, unbiased graduates from Western schools!” “The time is 
																																												
pre-tenure, electoral documents and initial government programs) and whether it was able to bring them into a 
reformed way of working for government agencies. 
36 The official and full text in Ukrainian is available here: 
http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/111/2005/print1108499668631614 
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now to rebuild Ukraine!” was the refrain I often came across in the circles of young 
professionals in Washington, DC during that time. However, the recruitment path that one 
would take in order to join the Presidential team was very convoluted: there were no available 
positions announced with any sort of official recruitment processes. 
A story of a colleague that I worked closely with, who did make it into the SPU is 
illustrative in that sense. This person was singled out during one of the meetings Yushchenko 
held with representatives of the Ukrainian colleges and universities that took active part in the 
revolution. She was presented by a president of a college as someone who successfully 
organized a large-scale volunteer project to unite Eastern and Western Ukrainian communities 
when the Orange revolution was drawing to an end, and the rift between the two opposing 
political cultures in the regions was very evident.  Without hesitation, the President stated that 
she would be guaranteed an employment in his administration.  
Several weeks afterwards, this person was contacted by an SPU human resources 
specialist for an interview. The offer came for her join the Presidential team on a newly created 
position for liaison with civil society organizations, a position that had never existed at APU. 
Whereas one can commend the ingenuity and flexibility of the Orange SPU HR team, this was 
also indicative of a deep lack of strategic managerial vision of how this government office was 
going to be organized.  
The career path of this young professional exemplified further difficulties of 
reorganization of SPU as well. There was no guidance as to what the position entailed, no 
benchmarks for progress assessment or identifiable goals. In fact, in the first weeks after the 
appointment, this young woman puzzled her co-workers almost into intimidation: how could 
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she rise so fast as to take a position in the Office of the President without notable political 
connections? Such hire was indeed, an unseen practice and a rare exception.  
This person realized very soon that, in order to do anything effectively as an outsider she 
had to understand the competing currents, camps and alliances within the SPU at work. The 
main modus operandi she deciphered during her career at SPU in 2005-2006 was the so called 
principle of “dostup k telu” or “access to the Body” (in Russian).  This principle was a living 
vestige of the previous regime that thrived well in the new Orange administration.   
The “access to the Body” meant that whoever had more of private time with the 
President was deemed to be in a more powerful standing vis-à-vis other staffers, even if 
institutionally speaking such power was not invested in one’s official position.  In this sense, it 
was not so important whether one’s title was Vice or First Vice Secretary of State or simply an 
unpaid Advisor: the power and influence of Advisors sometimes eclipsed those with official 
positions.  
I had a chance to meet with one of such advisors in winter 2006 through a common 
friend. Our interview was brief and courteous. The message that stayed with me after this 
conversation was more disturbing than the larger process of being interviewed for an important 
job itself. What emerged in our candid exchange was that despite the Orange efforts to ‘bring in 
the new blood,’ the working environment remained the same: “the old system has a way of 
sucking you in.” Old bureaucratic procedures, stifling blue tape, very slow way of hashing new 
ways for new initiatives, turf war and lack of delegation among staff was still the defining 
characteristics of the SPU work despite almost a year by since the Orange team took power, 
according to the advisor. 
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So even though there were several new individuals hired without ideological agenda of 
their own to pursue within the administration, they typically did not last for long in the new 
administration. This was also corroborated with another episode from the career of an individual 
that I knew to work at SPU. This young professional got a job through the same advisor-
recruiter in the “Analytics Department” of SPU at that time. The job consisted in compiling the 
pertinent economic data of the day for the review of the President in order to keep him current. 
Even though such work did not require any explicit political ‘alliances’ within SPU to fulfil 
one’s job, this person nonetheless did not stay with the team and decided to leave the post. 
The next strategy for this Presidential advisor-recruiter was to hire groups of those who 
could form in his words “a critical mass.” This turned out to be an even more formidable task.  
It required finding people with similar values and career aspiration who, in addition, could form 
a personal bond in order to withstand the pressures of the job together. The premise and the 
process of such hiring procedures only goes to underscore how fundamentally inefficient the 
SPU was from its early days and on.  
The subsequent years of the Presidential administration attest to the deepening of these 
processes, especially starting with the difficult cohabitation period of Viktor Yanukovych as a 
Prime-Minister of Ukraine from August 4, 2006 to December 18, 2007. The rifts within the 
SPU grew after the Orange camp lost majority in the parliament during that time. The President 
needed influential connections within his own administration to be able to interact with the 
Cabinet that now reported to Viktor Yanukovych.  According to the reports of insiders of the 
SPU, after the Blue camp overtook the Orange parties in the parliamentary elections, President 
Yushchenko struggled to keep his political influence relevant with the newly shifted balance of 
powers. Repeated reshuffling of the higher rank staffers in his office became customary. 
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According to some reports, dozens of staffers from the “Halychany” faction37 were 
asked to resign or became alienated from the “Body,” dozens of new official figures were either 
appointed or started to have access to the “Body” and a new shadow Cabinet of Ministers was 
formed in order to counteract Yanukovych moves.  The flow of people and the issues to be 
solved in the Soviet- style “access to the Body” style was so huge that the office door of the 
newly appointed Head of the SPU, Viktor Baloha in September 2005 was literally never closed. 
It was done on purpose,  “in order not to waste time on manipulations with the door handle” 
(Chyvokunya 2006). 
Such hectic and disorganized environment, with high turnover, lack of team spirit 
between the competing faction, missing clarity in hiring procedures and continuous reliance on 
“access to the Body” persisted until the final days of President Yushchenko in office. This is 
well evidenced by the number of orders and decrees and official appointments issued over the 
term of the Orange leader. Thus, only for 2005 I found five documents issued by the President 
regulating the number of staffers, renaming departments and re-ordering the functions of 
different departments. By comparison I have found that under the previous regime, President 
Kuchma would issue one decree related to APU per year, sometimes skipping a year or two in 
this regard.  Whereas one may attribute such volume of document flow as an evidence for 
genuine effort to reform SPU, the nature of these changes and the quality of SPU as an agency 
testify to the failure of reform. Thus, in five years of his tenure, Viktor Yushchenko changed 
five heads of SPU, which naturally introduced a disruption in the work of the agency that relied 
																																												
37 Halychany is a collective name for those coming from the part of the Western Ukraine with L’viv, Ivano-
Frankivsk and Ternopil oblasts that form Halychyna, or Galicia, a historic region in Ukraine. Halychany faction in 
SPU was headed by Ivan Vasyunyk. 
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on modus operandi to approve every small or big bureaucratic move with the top chief of the 
agency.  
In another example of such SPU inefficiencies, Viktor Baloha, resigned in 2009 citing 
the fact that Yushchenko had surrounded himself with unprofessional ‘god fathers’ and ‘friends’ 
[or advisors as I have shown in his early presidential years of 2005-2006]. Without 
appointment, these individuals tried to command the work of SPU with no official authority to 
do so (Baloha on Yushchenko and Tymoshenko 2009). 
This point is well connected to the further evidence on the inability of the regime to keep 
to their value and promise of ridding the government from corruption by persecution of the 
officials accused of bribery that I discuss below. 
To summarize, the lack of clear hiring procedures, the strong bureaucratic principle of 
the “access to the Body” along with the inappropriate amount of outsider’s influences on SPU 
work rendered the government reorganization efforts of the Orange regime fruitless. Based on 
the evidence presented above, Viktor Yushchenko’s failed to reform and optimize the work of 
SPU, the very government agency that was directly and fully under his authority. Overall, this 
testifies to the lack of the necessary criteria for the completion of the transition period under 
Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency. 
 
4.2.2.2.   “Civil Society Participation Boards:” Bringing Government Closer to People 
In the previous subsection, I have shown that the during the years of the Orange regime 
a critical value of re-organizing and optimizing the work of government agencies failed to 
materialize at the level of the presidential administration office. To develop my argument 
	 78	
further regarding the (in)completion of transition in Ukraine during the tenure of Viktor 
Yushchenko, I will now examine evidence on another value of the Orange revolutionaries: 
bringing power closer to people and putting it at their service, thus “breaking the wall” between 
the authorities and ordinary citizens. In this subsection, I will briefly look how the Orange 
regime tried to achieve that through the initiative of establishing special boards with 
representatives of civil society. Their role was to advise and otherwise participate in the work of 
different agencies, the so called “Civil Society Participation Boards” (CSPB). 
Whereas I use the term CSPB here as an acronym, it should be noted that these boards 
did not bear any common official title. Depending on their host institution, they functioned 
under different names of Public Collegium, Public Council or Public Hearings, etc. Summarily, 
they were reflective of the Orange regime’s desire to institutionalize a connection to their voters 
and general public. CSPB would engage those groups and individuals who previously for 
political reasons had been on the margins of governance yet possess policy expertise or could 
contribute to the public oversight over the work of certain government agencies. 
 This initiative had some symbolic predecessors in the previous regime, such as the All-
Ukrainian Student Council under the auspices of the President of Ukraine and All-Ukrainian 
Public Council. The latter was created under Kuchma administration in the wake of the spring 
2001 protests. Its work, although promulgated by the Presidential support, was not of any 
substantive impact. The Presidential Decree #244 of April 11, 2004 stipulated that the 
recommendations of the All-Ukrainian Public Council were “to be studied” by the “government 
bodies.” However, there was no provision that any concrete agency would actually incorporate 
the advice from this Council in their work. This was fully reflective of the policy of Kuchma’s 
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regime aimed to exclude and intimidate civil society members from any affairs related to 
governance. 
President Viktor Yushchenko took these incipient efforts of ‘democratization’ of the 
government activities to a new level. The first step in that direction was the institution of the so 
called “Presidential Public Hearings” decreed on September 15, 2005. The decree ordained the 
First Presidential Public Hearing had to take place in November 2005 to commemorate the first 
anniversary of the Orange revolution. This had to be done in only two weeks from the document 
signature. The decree also foresaw that such hearings should be an annual practice and that the 
Cabinet of Ministers should prepare a plan of incorporating public oversight into the work of 
government by January 1, 2006. The process of bringing down the wall between the public and 
the government had not been institutionally implemented until the end of the first year of the 
Orange regime. But furthermore, after January 1, 2006 when a new distribution of powers 
between the President and the Prime Minister was ushered in, the initiatives of reform to bring 
the public into the work of the government started to be hijacked in the contention between 
Viktor Yushchenko and his then Prime- Minister and rival Viktor Yanukovych. 
The Presidential hearings were little more than a forum in which ideas and grievances 
were aired. There was no procedure in which “public” in the wider sense of the word was truly 
involved: the speakers were selected by invitation only. They were widely televised and 
included well known Ukrainian figures of authority in science, culture and religion, (e.g. 
Oksana Zabuzhko, a writer; Vira Nanivska, an analyst; human rights lawyer Yevhen Zakharov, 
etc.). The potential opponents were also invited, such as Kuchma’s son-in-law and an oligarch 
Viktor Pinchuk. These hearings were widely televised and speakers were expressing their 
opinions without the kind of censorship which previously characterized Kuchma’s controlled 
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Ukrainian media outputs. Nonetheless, there was a sense that these hearings were more 
symbolic and public relation-focused in nature rather than directed to achieve any concrete 
outcomes.  
Perhaps, the very name “Presidential Hearings” conveys the nature of this initiative in a 
succinct way: these were hearings, not elaborations of a course of action. The thematic working 
groups in the second half of the hearings were encouraged to submit their recommendations to 
the Final Document of the Hearings. Yet such document never found its way to online to wider 
public.  The hearings were also supposed to be followed by a series of regional ‘public 
hearings’ held in the same format. Notwithstanding such intention, the second wave of hearings 
never truly took off for budgetary and other reasons38. Furthermore, some participants 
underscored that the format of the Hearings with the Yushchenko presiding over them gave him 
the podium to promote himself to the point that it felt more like “hearing from the President” 
rather than “hearing by the President” (Yushchenko Took Counsel from the Intellectuals 2005) 
Furthermore, even though the Presidential Hearings were mandated to be held on annual 
basis, this practice did not stay. The Second Presidential hearings were reported to be in 
planning by SPU for summer 2006 and at that time they were to be focused on those issues that 
were politically most pertinent to the President in the context of the redistribution of power. 
SPU declared that the Second Presidential Hearings would address the issues of “configuration 
of power, the cooperation of branches of government in the new conditions as well as the 
problems of power coalition”(Matviyenko Says What Yushchenko Is Afraid of 2006). 
																																												
38 For instance, the first oblast (regional) level took place in Poltava three years later, in 2008, when Presidential 
popularity was already sinking and executive power diluted:  
http://misto-tv.poltava.ua/news/1644/  
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However, none of these plans came to fruition as the SPU and the President got further 
embroiled in power struggle with the Premier. No further Presidential Hearings followed either. 
In contrast, Prime Minister Yanukovych held his own “Uriadovi” Hearings or 
Governmental Hearings on May 7, 2007. This was similarly to the Presidential Hearings a 
televised event, and perhaps only that qualifies it as ‘public’ since there was no other public 
participation in the event. Furthermore, the key participants were the First and the Second 
Presidents of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, the former Speaker of Rada 
Volodymyr Lytvyn, current speaker Oleksandr Moroz and other prominent figures. No 
representatives from the President or from the opposition took part in these hearings that were 
to tend to the problems of the political crisis in Ukraine. This was a reaction to Viktor 
Yushchenko’s two earlier Decrees that disbanded Rada and called for snap elections. In an 
effort to bring Mr. Yushchenko to accountability for this action, the Government Hearings re-
iterated that presidential elections should take place at the same time as parliamentary snap 
elections (Government Coalition Held “Public Hearing” 2007).  
Thus, the mechanism of public hearings, originally introduced a new way of 
communication between the wider public and the state, essentially turned into a method of 
projecting one’s own political agenda, on both sides of the political spectrum. The hearings 
largely failed to achieve its stated goal of “bringing the wall down” between the government 
and the Ukrainian people. 
This was not the only decreed institutional method through which the Orange regime 
tried to bring the voters closer to the governing practices of state agencies. Of note is a belated 
initiative of Yulia Tymoshenko’s Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to introduce a new way for 
civil society organizations to monitor the government activities through the conduct of “expert 
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analyses” of a given state agency. This regulation by the Cabinet of Ministers from November 
5, 2008 while not mandating that government agencies should have a long-standing platform of 
cooperation with members of civil society, nonetheless provided a mechanism through which 
activists and experts could request to audit an agency of interest. The decree obliged the latter to 
comply without much delay, from 7 to 20 days depending on the nature of the information 
request. The results of the civil society monitoring and audit analysis were to be published on a 
special governmental web portal.39While such initiative was a welcome step, however, there 
were no expert analyses conducted and published until after 2010. 
To summarize, the CSPB did not provide a stable and workable mechanisms for 
bringing the public closer to the work of the Ukrainian government, even if conceived in their 
nascent form as Presidential Public Hearings or “expert analyses” by the Orange regime. 
Rather, these initiatives were either hijacked by political agenda of the organizers or were 
introduced with delay and overall yielded no impactful results in the years of 2005-2009. This 
evidence, similarly to the lack of reform of APU, testifies strongly to the incompletion of the 
transition period during the Presidency of Viktor Yushchenko. The Orange team once again was 
not able to bring the existing government structures in line with the declared new values of the 
Orange revolution. 
  
4.2.2.3.   Professional Civil Service of Ukraine: The Reform That Never Took Off 
One of the most deeply ingrained vestiges of the Soviet system that was carried into the 
independence years of the Ukrainian state was the management of all affairs related to civil 
																																												
39 The portal is accessible in Ukrainian here: http://civic.kmu.gov.ua/consult_mvc_kmu/news/article 
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service. Indeed, under the Soviet law, the government was the exclusive employee of everyone 
from a peasant on a collective farm to a top administrator, and some great popular expectations 
were still strongly in place in 1990s and early 2000s as regards the state being both a ‘provider’ 
and a trough for embezzlement.40 In addition, the independence years were also characterized 
by a deep mistrust by general public towards those who were supposed to serve the state and 
society and were paid by the government.41 Hence, the electoral promise of the Orange team to 
bring civil service in line with the “service” part of the vocation was a very appealing 
proposition to a Ukrainian voter in 2004. 
However, the process of civil service reform during the years after the Orange revolution 
could be best described as a movement without any progress. Much evidence showcase that 
well. First, one of the indicators that the reform of civil service of Ukraine was neither seriously 
intended nor effectively achieved is that the total number of the state employees was not 
lowered and professionalized, but, to the contrary, was growing with each year of the Orange 
regime. Thus, in 2005 the Ukrainian state employed 1,028 900 of civil servants, but in 2006 
their number grew by about five thousand of additional employees. The year after that added 
another three thousand jobs. And in the further year the increase was even more rapid, coming 
																																												
40 Recall that former Kuchma’s former Prime Minister, Petro Lazarenko was named “one of the top 10 corrupt 
officials” in the recent history by Transparency International, having embezzled at least $114 millions from the 
Ukrainian government. For more, see: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/business/international/a-ukrainian-
kleptocrat-wants-his-money-and-us-asylum.html?_r=0 
41 For instance, the Ukrainians consistently believe that “mafia” and “businessmen” are the most influential groups 
in the society of 2002-2010, with a growing importance of political parties, leading over the civil servants by 10% of 
responses. See Amdjadin (2011, 546) published in Ukrainian online:  http://i-soc.com.ua/institute/soc-mon-
2011.pdf. Also, the analysis of these processes in 2013 for further reading is available from VOA news here: 
http://ukrainian.voanews.com/a/nation-vs-gov/1601885.html 
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to a total of 1, 067 500 state employees. This figure finally grew to by another ten thousand civil 
servants 2009.42 
Even if the number of the civil service employees grew, one could argue that their 
professionalization could have been bettered in terms of training, implementing a code of honor 
promised by the Orange leaders or otherwise have a major human resource management reform 
in the government sector. However, this was far from being the case. First, there was no new 
Code of Honor of Civil Servant put in practice as the Orange regime promised. Instead, the civil 
servants were still guided by old mechanisms of accountability that were left from the Kuchma 
regime. There was a General Set of Rules for the Behavior of Civil Servant issued by the Main 
Department of Civil Service of Ukraine (MDCS) on October 23, 2000 that remained in place 
until a later half of 2010 when an update version of that document appeared after Viktor 
Yanukovych took power.  
Furthermore, the official oath any civil servant was required to take before assuming 
his/her duties had already been a part and parcel of hiring procedures for over a decade. 
Instituted by the Law on Civil Service of 1993, the oath did not change or was not otherwise 
enforced in any increased manner by the MDCS that was officially in charge of monitoring the 
ethical aspects of civil servants’ behavior. MDCS role in monitoring claims against civil 
servants was carried out by its Anti-Corruption Department at that time. These functions 
significantly overlapped with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior that likewise 
were institutionally charged with fighting the corruption. In essence, the Anti-Corruption 
																																												
42 These numbers are taken from the official statistic tables of the Ukrainian government available in Ukrainian here: 
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua. These figures do not include employees of public education and healthcare sectors in 
Ukraine, which are also government paid jobs. 
	 85	
Department continued to serve an underdeveloped role with its limited resources (about 30 
employees) that were not sufficient to effectively monitor the ethical concerns of over 10,000 
civil servants. 
Secondly, MDCS was technically equal in its authority to the level of a ministry. As 
such was beholden to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and to its technical head - the 
Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers with the Prime- Minister as the ultimate political chief. In 
contrast, the system of education, training and professionalization of the civil servants was 
conducted primarily under the auspices of the National Academy of Public Administration of 
Ukraine (NADU) with its four semi-autonomous regional institutes in Kharkiv, Dnipro, Odesa 
and L’viv that altogether made a national system of public management and policy research and 
education in Ukraine in the early 2000s. The problem consisted in the fact that the NADU and 
its four institutes was directly positioned under the auspices of the Office of the President of 
Ukraine. This caused serious divisions and conflicts in the coordination of work between the 
agency that managed all civil servant affairs, MDCS, and NADU that was responsible for the 
preparation of the cadres for civil service. NADU needed a functionally sufficient budget to be 
able to provide quality education, however, this may not have been necessarily on the priority 
list of the Cabinet of Ministers and so forth. 
 MDCS and NADU were quick to serve their principals’ goals even if it meant the 
detriment of each other’s ability to naturally complement their missions. For instance, during 
my work on public administration reform and civil service reform in Ukraine in 2006-2007, 
while international sponsors tried to organize an event or a study visit, the representatives of 
MDCS could be in protest if the number of NADU participants exceeded their own. And the list 
of similar small wars was seemingly endless. Finally, MDCS under the leadership of Mr. 
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Motrenko in 2008 established a new, parallel educational institution, called School of Senior 
Civil Servants. 
The fact that Tymofiy Motrenko, the head of MDCS was able to hold the office from 
2003 to 2011, having been a former Vice- Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine under 
Kuchma is illustrative of another core problem of the civil service of Ukraine that was not dealt 
with properly by the Orange team, despite their declared desire to reform the civil service. The 
issues of fusion of political and career positions in civil service were often hard to disentangle. 
There was no clear classification as of early to mid 2000s of the civil servant posts that needed 
to be rotated with the ascend of new team of political power holders after an election cycle and 
between those career civil servants who were professionally employed for their expertise in the 
sectorial ministries.  
 Another compounding factor was that the salaries of the middle of the line civil servants 
(without going in too much details about the ranks and the step system of civil services in 
Ukraine) were roughly approximate to 150 USD per month. The main salary base was low 
compared to numerous lucrative ways in which bribes and other malfeasance allowed civil 
servants to supplement their income. Further, the bulk of income in civil service were bonuses 
and premiums on that salary base, sometimes constituting 60 to 80 % of their total monthly 
wages. What such kind of salary structure imposed on a professional civil servant was the 
continuous strife to “please” their higher rank bosses who doled out the bonuses. Consequently, 
the quality of civil service sometime was not as much prioritized around the areas of possible 
improvement, alternative ways of conducting affairs, critical thinking, etc., as it was focused 
more on doing exactly what the superior commanded to do. 
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In other words, playing into post-Soviet mentality of the strong leadership and ‘nanny 
state,’ was also the inadequate fusion of political and expert dimension of civil service 
exacerbated by unfair and disadvantaging structure of payments and salaries for lower to 
middle-rank employees. Some of these issues (among many others that I bracket here for the 
sake of brevity of the current argument) were rightfully recognized by several key civil service 
reformists, including Motrenko himself. For instance, in breaking with the old system he 
founded a more institutionally nimble Centre for Support of Civil Service Development in 2004. 
The Centre still formally functioned under the MDCS, although it possessed more flexibility in 
hiring and firing procedures, payroll issues, ability to interact with foreign aid agencies and 
work without direct “government plans.” The Centre was also the main proponent of the draft of 
the new Law on Civil Service on Ukraine that could have potentially addressed the systemic 
malfunctioning in civil service of the country described above. However, the Law, for the lack 
of political will on the part of the Orange team being pushed to the margins of political struggle 
between the President and his Prime-Ministers, never saw the light of day, until well after the 
Orange team left the power, in 2011.43 
In summary, the civil service reform was strongly in the focus of the rhetorical values of 
the Orange leaders prior to their taking the office, but the revolutionary regime failed to bring 
the existing institutions of public management and civil service in line with its declared values. 
 
4.2.2.4.   “Bandits – Behind the Bars!” or Not? A Highly Visible Failure 
																																												
43 The most current version of the law was adopted with much public pressure in December 2015. For some 
preliminary analysis in English, see http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/12/12/ukraines-revolutionary-civil-service-
law/#arvlbdata 
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Here I consider the final piece of empirical data for the analysis of the incompletion of 
the transition stage in Ukraine during the Orange regime. This incompletion is due to the failure 
to bring old institutions in line with the new values or the failure to establish new functional 
government institutions.  The evidence I present here comes from the further analysis of how 
the declared value of pursuing justice through the persecution of corrupt and criminalized 
government officials did not correspond to the measures and initiatives of the Orange regime to 
implement them. 
One of the most memorable slogans of the Orange revolution was “Bandytam – 
tyurmy!” or “Bandits - Behind the Bars!” Announced at the backdrop of the electoral campaign 
of Viktor Yushchenko in 2004, this motto had an immediate sway with the pro-Orange 
supporters. One of the strong reasons for the decriminalization of the Ukrainian government and 
for the fight with corruption was the very core mobilizing events surrounding the protest 
movement of the Orange revolution. As such, “Ukraine without Kuchma” was born in protest to 
the assassination of Georgiy Gongadze who was ordered for killing by the top government 
officials under Kuchma, with his history of treating the law enforcement as a means of 
intimidation of his political opponents.  
The second event cutting to the deeply rooted need for decriminalized power was the 
case of poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko himself during his electoral trail. The world media was 
full of “before and after” graphics of Yushchenko suffering from a concoction of dioxin 
smuggled into his food.  The dose of dioxin surpassed the norm by thousand times, sending him 
into condition close to death and scarring his appearance for the rest of his life. His opponents 
perhaps hoped that such event would probably chain Yushchenko to a hospital bed (if not 
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worse).  The Orange revolutionaries were repulsed and indignant with the degrees of 
debasement such underhanded tactic demonstrated on the part of their criminalized enemies. 
Furthermore, the narrative of banditry and lawlessness that was routinely attributed by 
the Orange movement to their Blue contender was pervasive. There were discussions and 
reiterations of Viktor Yanukovych’ criminal record for robbery in 1967 (and his incarceration 
for half a year) and for beating in 1970. The Orange folklore abounded in jokes, cartoons and 
spoofs showing Profesor (as he wrongly spelled on one of the forms) and his gang beckoning a 
well-known Soviet comedy. Thus, the theme of preventing criminals from usurping power was 
front and center in the discourse of the Orange goals and aspirations. 
Closely tied to these were the expectations conveyed in the values of the Orange 
revolution that the Ukrainian state would become a corruption-free state at all levels, from the 
school desks to the top officials. In fact, Yushchenko himself attempted to embody that 
principle with another famous slogan: “Tsi ruky nichogo ne kraly!” – “These hands never stole 
a thing!”  This latter became a point for popular jokes and caricatures showing him stealing in a 
variety of different ways, such as with his feet etc. Or later, the phrase was reformulated in 
popular media in a humorous way to jokingly describe Viktor Yanukovych’s motto to be “Tsi 
ruky kraly, i nichoho!” – “These hands did steal, and not a thing!” implying his corruption with 
impunity. 
With already extremely low levels of trust to the government officials, as mentioned 
before, much public expectation was placed into this dimension of the Orange agenda. From my 
experience of living in Ukraine at that time and communicating with diverse representatives of 
the Ukrainian society, in the first year of the Orange regime the fear of being persecuted for 
corruption was so large, that in fact the cash amounts of bribes doubled because the perceived 
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risk associated with taking them and being caught. To aid that perception were not only Orange 
slogans, but also some unexpected and quite nonstrategic moves by the Orange regime that 
gained public resonance.   
Thus, for instance, in July 2005, just a few months after assuming his powers, Viktor 
Yushchenko signed a decree to abolish the entire agency of the Traffic Control Police of 
Ukraine. It was done allegedly due to a personal encounter with an unprofessional traffic 
controller on his travel.  This was an unexpected move even for his own Minister of Interior, 
Yuriy Lutsenko, formally in charge of the Traffic Control police as a component force in his 
Ministry. But furthermore, this demonstrated a lack of strategic planning for such institutional 
overhaul that took place as a result of a personal experience. Finally, this also gave rise to 
popular rumors and fears that anyone could be fired or hired at the will of the President who, 
seemingly from this event, would not stop from such drastic measures. 
The Traffic Control Agency in the modern Ukrainian folklore is ridiculed for its 
stereotypically corrupted, lazy and obese officers who always prey for bribes. So, the abolition 
of this agency was also a popular move that secured public support Yushchenko’s image as a 
strong President ready for brisk action. However, no consistent anti-corruption policy was 
implemented during the Orange presidency. This is corroborated not only with a weak and 
stalled civil service reform as I delineated above. Oleh Havrylyshyn (2016a) convincingly 
demonstrates in his recent work on the political economy of independent Ukraine, using macro-
data of World Bank and Transparency International, as well as micro analysis of the Ukrainian 
business interactions that level of corruption during Viktor Yushchenko’s tenure was 
unchanged. Additionally, the Law on Foundations for Prevention and Fight Against Corruption 
#1506-VI was adopted very late during the Orange regime tenure, on June 11, 2009. 
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Finally, further evidence for the inability to harness the criminalized fusion of General 
Prosecutor’s office, law enforcement and well-off power holders was the failure to bring to 
justice the very perpetrators that were central to the Orange revolution’s emergence and 
resurgence. The case of Georgiy Gongadze was stalled on March 4, 2005 with a mysterious 
death by two gunshots (into his head) of a major witness to the case, Yuriy Kravchenko, 
deemed to be a strong lead to Kuchma’s involvement into the case. March 4, 2005 was the date 
when Kravchenko was supposed to testify in the court on the case.  Accusations about bribery 
by Kuchma’s circle to stop investigation into his own involvement in the murder of Gongadze 
abound in the Ukrainian media. Indeed, the family of Georgiy have stood by a conviction that 
the ultimate criminal in this case was the former president of Ukraine. Instead, three lower-rank 
officers were jailed in 2008, and only in 2013 a higher rank official who testified to Kuchma’s 
involvement was jailed as well.44 
Even less impressive is the record of the investigation of Yushchenko’s poisoning case. 
With fits and starts from December 2004 up until present, and with several changes of the main 
investigators, the case has effectively stalled.45 Most recently, the cause for such lack of 
progress was named to be the absence of lab works to be submitted by Viktor Yushchenko 
himself. Presently, as of late 2016, no suspects were named despite the fact that Yushchenko 
claimed that he knew who ordered his poisoning.46 
																																												
44 Ukrayinska Pravda, the online news media founded by Georgiy Gongadze in 2000 keeps a detailed chronicle of 
the Gongadze case development, in Ukrainian here: http://www.pravda.com.ua/tags/sprava-gongadze/ 
45 See for instance, the comments on the case by the head of detective team, Mr. Holomsha here in Ukrainian: 
https://www.unian.ua/politics/1000637-golomsha-sprava-pro-otruennya-yuschenka-ne-ruhaetsya.html 
46 Most recent update on the case from October 2016 could be found here: 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/10/7/7122975/ 
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To sum up, the overall record of de-criminalization and of anti-corruption campaign by 
the Orange regime was meagre at the very least, compared to the vast amounts of either ill-
investigated or stalled cases due to political considerations, including the most prominent ones 
of Gongadze and Yushchenko himself. Several analysts and historians of the modern Ukraine 
go as far as to suggest that the Orange leaders with corruption record themselves were not eager 
to prosecute their enemies for the fear of equally exposing themselves.  Leonid Kuchma in his 
memoirs claimed that the Orange frenzy with “Bandits – Behind Bars!” was a mere show (here 
as quoted in Kuzio (78, 2015): 
“I remember the election speeches of Yushchenko and his team at numerous meetings. 
Even on television advertisements. They all began and ended with the same thing: the 
authorities are bandits, away with the authorities! But Yushchenko told me during the 
presidential campaign: “Do not give it any significance. Do not take it to heart. This is 
politics.” I did not respond to this but felt that the whole thing was rather comical.” 
 
Whether or not Yushchenko as well as the rest of his Orange camp were serious about 
implementing the decriminalization and anti-corruption measures or used them merely for the 
purposes of self-promotion remains open to discussion. What is clear and what bears on to the 
current research, is that corruption levels remained unchanged. It is likewise important to note 
that large non-strategic firing moves brought popularity but lacked on-the-ground change in 
public service for ordinary citizens. And finally, it is significant that the largest and most 
publicized cases involving major political leaders against whom the Orange revolutionary 
fought remained unscathed. These pieces of evidence speak to the failure of the Orange regime 
to bring the government institutions in line with the declared Orange values of decriminalization 
and anti-corruption fight.  
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	 4.3. Conclusions on Political Transition in 2000-2009 
  
I started my analysis of the transitional period with an examination of how the early 
beginnings of this stage were signaled in years preceding the Orange protest movement. This 
came in the form of the mobilization of a distinctly new group political activists, not rooted or 
raised in the Sovietized educational establishments. Such protesters came to the fore in the 2000 
movement “Ukraine without Kuchma.”  Political activists eventually presented themselves for 
elections as in the new party “Pora.” Thus, the political transition in Ukraine started prior to the 
revolutionary events themselves, as my analytical framework from Francisco (2000) suggests.  
 Further, in subsection 4.2 I surveyed the criteria that would define the end of the 
transition period in the Ukrainian case.  I presented evidence demonstrating that the opposition 
movement subsided and presented no credible threat to the new regime. I noted that wide 
international recognition for the Orange successors of power was secured at the inauguration, 
coupled with the pre-existing relations with IMF and World Bank. Nonetheless, a significant 
piece of the puzzle was still missing to define to the end of the political transition in years of 
2005-2009. In order to complete transition, the Orange regime was required to either establish 
new, functioning institutions of government or reform of the existing institutions bringing them 
in conformity with new political values. I have shown the Orange leaders failed at this task 
leaving the country still in the vagaries of transitional stage. 
 I studied the values that the new regime strove to achieve for new ways for 
government institutions to work drawn from the materials from the Orange camps’ electoral and 
post-electoral programs. I identified the three themes that related to the restructuring of the 
government institutions: optimization of the work and mission of government agencies; 
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reformed civil service corps; and fighting with corruption. I then investigated the record of the 
Orange regime reform on these accounts. First, I noted the lack of consistent reform of the 
Office of the President itself that was apparent with incoherent hiring, training and development 
strategies. This was the institution that the President was directly familiar with and uniquely 
responsible for.  The lack of reform in this regard is a strong evidence for a failed optimization 
of the existing government institution in line with the goals of the new Orange leadership. 
 I also brought on board the second piece of data that showed how the Orange regime 
was ineffective in putting in practice its commitment to bring optimized government services to 
the level of ordinary citizens. The weak and unsuccessful performance of public hearings, 
public monitoring boards and other similar mechanisms that eventually were hijacked as a 
political public relations tool by the contenting sides in the turf wars between the President and 
his Prime-Ministers. 
Added to that, I provided a detailed survey of the civil service ‘non-change’ or a 
movement without a progress, as I termed it. Here, I showcased a deeper lack of political will to 
reform one of the most crucial aspects of the post-Soviet governance in Ukraine: its army of 
civil servants.  I furnished an analysis based on my personal professional experience and the 
examination of important political initiatives and legislative acts during that time. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly for the Orange voters, the anti-corruption levels 
in Ukraine during the term of the Orange regime did not decrease. The key ‘bandits’ from the 
group of corrupted power holders who were to be put behind bars per Orange slogans, were still 
conducting business as usual. And as my further analysis of the Ukrainian oligarchic interests in 
later chapters later shows, it continued to have a significant impact on Ukraine’s domestic and 
foreign policies.  
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Altogether, I conclude that this important evidence convincingly show that the transition 
while starting in Ukraine in early 2000 was still proceeding in 2010 when a new president, 
Viktor Yanukovych, took power. Having analyzed the scope condition of political transition, I 
now turn my attention to the next operationalized concept in my causal mechanism: the political 
uncertainty.  
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Chapter 5  
 POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION 
 
Political uncertainty is the central concept in the causal mechanism of transition and FP 
change. Drawing on a cognitivist theoretical perspective, discussed in Chapter 2, I treat 
uncertainty as an analytical confusion arising from a wealth of information confronting a 
decision-maker. As a result, he or she is unable to disentangle the causes and consequences of 
political processes surrounding him/her and his/her own political decisions. In Chapter 3, I 
underlined that while it is not feasible to observe uncertainty directly, there is an observable 
variation in in the contextual conditions of transition that generate multiple sources and varieties 
of information that leaders face. Therefore, I use proxy measures that take probe of these 
transitional conditions and arrive at an estimate of the level of political uncertainty based off the 
level of complexity of the situations that the decision makers are functioning in. I remind the 
reader that I derived a simple additive formula of the four variables contributing to political 
uncertainty (identified by Jung and Deering (2015):  
Pace of Political Transition + Political Competition + State-Building+ Economic 
Downturn à Level of Uncertainty 
I will examine each one of them as applied to the case of Ukraine in 2004-2009 in the 
following subsections of this chapter. I will also assign each element as HIGH, MODERTE or 
LOW, with a numerical equivalent of 3, 2, or 1 correspondingly (or 0 in the absence these). I 
derive an overall score for the level of uncertainty during the Orange term. In the final 
subsection I will summarize the results. 
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5.1. Pace of Political Transition: An Unexpected Revolution? 
 
In this subsection, I deal with the pace of political transition. As mentioned before, 
according to Jung and Deering (2015) who build their argument from the theoretical 
propositions of Shugart (1998), political transitions could proceed either gradually or abruptly. 
An abrupt transition, according to the authors, leads to higher levels of political uncertainty 
since the lack of time forces politicians to re-evaluate their political chances in a faster-paced 
environment. In contrast, a more gradual transition provides an environment where some 
longer-term options for political behavior could be estimated, thereby lowering uncertainty.  
 Even though Jung and Deering (2015) apply such reasoning to the institutional design 
process in democratizing nations, their logic is applicable to my line argument as well: an 
abrupt, unexpected change places all actors in a situation where very new, previously 
unanalyzed information becomes suddenly available to decision makers on a number of 
changed aspects of social and political life. Therefore, in my argument, the increase of new 
information in abrupt transition is what gives rise to a cognitive uncertainty in decision making 
process as well. To the contrary, a gradual change allows key actors to better analyze the 
trajectories of change and possibilities of the development of the political situation, in a way 
making them analytically more prepared to face a new regime change when it occurs. Thus, I 
take Jung and Deering (2015) proposition to distinguish between abrupt and gradual pace of the 
transition and I apply it to my research purposes to abrupt or gradual regime change proper47. 
																																												
47 Admittedly, the pace of political transition could be conceptualized as a variable with levels that exhibit more 
variety than simply ‘gradual’ or ‘abrupt.’ In fact, one can surmise that the ‘gradual’ transition by an inherent logic 
contained in its own definition imply that states may tend to vary in how quickly they adopt fundamental changes 
that create a new political order. Matthew Shugart (1998, 16) for instance, for ‘gradual transition’ cites the examples 
of Russia, Brazil and Ukraine, the states that clearly show vast differences in their pace of change and the resulting 
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To see whether regime change in Ukraine was abrupt or gradual, I turn my attention to 
several observations to help me to discern the pace of the transition. The first one is an 
estimation of whether the major actors in the process, such as the Orange leaders, the old regime 
adherents and the wider public were expecting the changes as these developed in time, or 
whether the victory of the Orange team was not easily predictable. Secondly, I will look at the 
timeline of events to determine whether the events of the Orange revolution developed in a 
rather precipitous way, or whether they were more protracted in time thereby giving diverse 
actors more time to consider options for their political strategies and behavior. 
I begin with the civil society activists’ views. In my interview with a Pora member, the 
interviewee related the failures of the “Ukraine without Kuchma!” as a bitter learning 
experience. After the violent confrontations with the law enforcement and arrests in the March 
2001 events, the activists felt defeated in terms of their existing strategies of opposing the 
regime. There was a clear message from the regime that it was ready to go to any length in 
terms of physical harm to the activists. The lack of public support from “Kyievliany” or Kyiv 
dwellers that were the primary group that Mohylyanka was hoping to mobilize was also another 
disheartening aspect for the protest organizers. In that sense, when transition started in early 
2000s, the activists hoped for political and ideological reasons to achieve success, but the 
																																												
political order. This discussion of the gradual pace in transition intellectually deserves to be placed in the on-going 
debate of the third-wave democratization (Huntington 1993), its reversal, and the variety of gray-zone cases 
differently labelled as ‘delegative democracy’(O’Donell 1994), ‘competitive authoritarianism’(Levitsky and Way 
2002) and so forth. 
For the sake of the argument of this research, however, it is not as important at this point to put a right label 
on the resulting regime (democratic, entrenching authoritarian etc.) as it is to observe how the transition started and 
ended and within that timeframe to make an assessment of whether its proceedings were abrupt or gradual – in other 
words, whether regime change was a rather largely unexpected event (abrupt) or  whether it has lagged in time over 
a longer period and the changes consistent with the values of the resulting regime have been under implementation 
to different degrees prior to the pivotal event of the change of power.  
 
	 99	
realistic chances and expectations of success were small based on their experience of the 
previous campaign.  
As for the larger public support for the Orange cause, similarly it was far from a given 
throughout the time of the transition. In spring 2001, when Yushchenko was ousted from the 
post of Prime Minister as a result of a no confidence vote, he was leaving with a sense of deep 
professional accomplishment (Yushchenko 2014, 248). He also boasted a soaring approval 
rating of 29.9%  of full support and 27% of partial support, according to the Kyiv-based 
Razumkov Center surveys.48 That public support, however, went down to 23.9% of full support 
by the end of the year, and was at its lowest in September 2003 at 18.6%. The fluctuation of 
these ratings was in the range of low 20s % for the most of 2003, and was again, only 19.6% 
when Yushchenko hit his electoral campaign trail. It grew, however to 27.1% by the time the 
active stage of the protest was brewing in October 2004. And that was still lower than his initial 
approval rating leaving the Premier’s seat three years prior.  
Thus, the Ukrainian public was not uniformly and firmly convinced of Yushchenko’s 
performance throughout the years preceding the outbreak of the Orange events. In fact, David 
Lane (2008) argues even further showing that not only the Ukrainians at different points in 
2003, 2004 and 2005 in their majority were not ready to engage in politically active behavior, 
but that there was much divisive rather than unitive process in the society surrounding the 
events of the late fall of 2004.  
As for the other prominent actors,  Hryhoriy Nemyria, a close ally of Yulia Tymoshenko 
and a member of her government in 2007- 2010, colorfully characterized the protest events as 
																																												
48 All data from the survey is available in Ukrainian at the Razumkov Centre website: 
http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=89 
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“The Orange Revolution: Explaining the Unexpected.” In his piece for the volume 
Democratisation in the European Neighborhood (2005), he started his analysis of the events by 
saying that few experts expected or predicted anything of the sort that the Orange revolution 
was in the Ukrainian context of 2003-2004.  
Further, even the leaders of the Orange camp themselves were not calculating the size of 
the public protest and thus did not adequately prepare for the massive strikes they themselves 
called for. After Viktor Yushchenko issued a general call for protest on November 21, 2004 to 
prevent fraud in the elections and on November 22 and 23, there was no appropriate ways to 
accommodate for the basic needs of food and shelter for the protesters. In the lack of the well-
organized infrastructure for the protests, the volunteer movement among Kyievliany and 
especially a small business supplying food, warm clothes and other items in subzero 
temperatures gripping the Ukrainian capital in late November – early December of 2004. 
Despite the on-going discussion of how much Western meddling and financial 
‘sponsorship’ was directed to the Orange leaders and the general organization of the protest 
movement, prominent researchers of the events underline that overall, the massive unfolding of 
the Orange revolution throughout Ukraine was largely unexpected to the leaders themselves. 
“The Yushchenko team weren’t secretly preparing for revolution,” Andrew Wilson contends in 
his monograph (2005, 123). And Adrian Karatnycky concurs by quoting Yulia Tymoshenko’s 
own predictions of what was going to happen: “There will be several days of protest, and they 
will crack down… We are not adequately prepared for this” (2005, 42).  
Further, due to the drastic nature of the growing protest and hastiness of the moment, the 
afore-mentioned agreement on the constitutional reform from December 6, 2004, became a 
point of multiple regrets for Viktor Yushchenko. On numerous occasions he mentioned that he 
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was not able to foresee the difficulty that the new redistribution of power between the 
Parliament, Premier and the Presidential Office would generate for him as a new top executive 
of the state (Yushchenko 2014, 475–76).  
Finally, a relatively short window of time, in which the revolution erupted and subsided 
is yet another supporting piece of evidence that the transition was abrupt thus shortened the time 
horizons for the involved actors to elaborate their decision making options. The active stage of 
the revolution was essentially less than one month: from November 23 when the protests started 
to December 26 when the rerun of the 2nd round of the presidential election took place. But even 
then, it was arguably shorter, since the agreement between the parties was reached on December 
6, as mentioned above.  Beyond that, one may even go as far as to say that November 29 was 
effectively a turning point of victory for the protesters who secured the support of the Supreme 
Court of Ukraine when it cancelled the fraudulent results of the 2nd round. 
Because the active eruption of the Orange revolution lasted for slightly less than a month 
in addition to a lack of revolutionary expectations of success, I conclude that the regime change 
from Kuchma the Orange government was abrupt. Such abrupt pace of the democratic transition 




49 To clarify, Ukrainian transition indeed was a protracted phenomenon, lasting from 2000 and not complete by the 
end of Yushchenko’s term in office. However, the character of the regime change was abrupt rather than gradual 
because of none of the fundamental changes needed in order for Ukraine to transition from Kuchmism to a new 
order were in place prior to the revolution itself, i.e. no efforts to implement the values of the Orange movement 
were put to practice to reform the existing Kuchma government before to the revolution itself.  It is due to the 
unexpected manner in which the old regime was overcome by Orange protest that such pace could be characterized 
as abrupt, in my analysis. 
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5.2. Political Competition Under President Kuchma: Representation or Mirage? 
 
The second element in scoping the political context in which transitions occur, 
according to Jung and Deering (2015) are estimates of the political competition that existed 
under the regime prior to the political change. The theoretical reasoning behind such proposition 
is that the political actors who are engaged in competitive race for elective offices have a better 
understanding of their own relative electoral support in a changing environment. Such 
understanding aids them in their ability to better analyze and predict their own political chances 
from previous public approval track in future. By contrast, if under authoritarian regime 
political competition is restricted, political actors have less experience to draw on to estimate 
whether certain policies, issues or ideologies are approved by voters.  
In the Ukrainian case, I will take measure of the political competition that existed from 
the first time when President Kuchma took office in July 1994 until the end of the Orange 
revolution in December 2004. As specified in Chapter 3, I use Varieties of Democracies dataset 
that allows me to extract individual indicators and components for my variable of interest, 
rather than use an aggregate estimate for the democratic standing of Ukraine in the entirety of 
its political processes. In particular, in order to estimate levels of political competition, I track 
the Freedom of Association Index from this dataset.50  
The following graph summarizes this index’ levels, with confidence intervals, on the 
scale from 0 to 1, where 0 describes no freedom of association and 1 refers to the full freedom 
of association: 
																																												
50 Description of indicators and levels of measurement are included in the appendix as well as available online at 
www.v-dem.net. 
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Figure 5.1. Ukraine’s Freedom of Association Index, 1994-2004 
 
If I were to paint the picture of the Ukrainian political competition under Kuchma 
regime solely relying on this one indicator, then we may easily conclude that no significant 
changes occurred during his tenure as far as the political life of parties and civil society 
organizations are concerned. In fact, towards the end of his tenure in the Presidential Office, the 
freedom of association increased, as shown by the curve on the graph, approaching 0.8. 
This index, however, is a composite score of several constituting measures, and if traced 
individually, they tell us a slightly different story. Take, for instance, such component of the 
index as the official ban on political parties. Indeed, on one hand, there was, in fact, no ban on 
political parties after the Communist Party of Ukraine was officially reinstalled to its political 
rights in 1993, a year prior to Leonid Kuchma taking office. Hence, Ukraine measured almost a 
perfect 4 (no ban on parties) score on that account by the end of Kuchma’s term. Likewise, if 
we are to look at the administrative barriers for parties to form, Ukraine’s record from 1994 to 
2004 (with the Communist party re-entering the political life in 1993-1994) remains largely 
solid at 3.7 points out of a 4-point scale (where 0 means parties are not allowed, and 4 means 
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that there are no substantial administrative barriers to forming a party) as shown in the graph 
below: 
Figure 5.2. Components of the Freedom of Association Index (1) for Ukraine, 1994-2004 
 
Similarly, not only were the parties not banned and administratively found it easy to 
form, but the consecutive parliamentary elections in Ukraine showcased a growing number of 
them participating in competitive race for offices, as the figure above demonstrates.  
And yet, the Ukrainian story of political competition during Kuchma years is far from 
being that simple. In fact, if one does not look closer at the political processes that were taking 
place in this developing party system during the selected time period, one risks missing an 
important piece evidence to the contrary. Political competition during that time even if 
nominally was put in practice Ukraine, in effect was a mechanism for Kuchma to manipulate 
democratic election processes and maintain the authoritarian control by the executive over the 
legislative branch. 
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When Leonid Kuchma took on the Presidential Office, the Ukrainian electoral system 
was a compilation of disarrayed rules. The majoritarian run-off formula used in 1994 elections, 
for instance, left 57 districts completely without a representative (by August 1994 estimates).  
Seeking to correct incongruities of such system, the new Rada was in favor of elaborating a new 
law to replace the Law of Ukraine on the Election of People’s Deputies from November 18, 
1993. In its political struggle with growing powers of the executive, it finally reached a 
Constitutional Agreement in June 1995 that the future electoral system will be mixed, allowing 
for both parties and individual representatives to compete.  
 But it took an uphill battle between the Rada and the President over 13 hearing attempts 
on the draft law for it to finally be adopted in October 1997. The Law instituted that 450 
parliamentary seats were to be divided into 225 plurality districts and another half to be 
contested through list proportional representation with a 4 % threshold. This threshold reduced 
the number of parties from 30 competitors to 8 winners, but left a total of 24% of votes 
unrepresented because of their preference for parties that did not manage to overcome the 
threshold. In all, by some estimates close to 15 million votes were left unrepresented after the 
parliamentary elections of 1998 (Shveda n.d.). 
What the Law of 1997 did encourage was the further multiplication of new parties that 
now could be controlled without much public involvement, since the law also mandated a 
closed party list. Several parties were specifically created to carry - Trojan horse-style - the 
presidential agenda into Rada, including for instance the National Democratic Party of Ukraine 
(NDU) and the reformatted Social Democratic Party of Ukraine, United (SDPU (o)). Overall, 
from the time of the consensus around the Constitutional Agreement emerged until the Law of 
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1998 lost its force in 2001, sixty-three currently existing parties were originally registered. 
These 63 parties constitute 34% of the total number of parties in present day Ukraine.51 
Whereas such proliferation may project a sign of vibrancy of the developing party 
system in Ukraine, the resulting political outcome, paradoxically, testified to the increased 
executive dominance. Thus, under mixed member system, even though the opposition forces 
collectively received 53,7% of votes, and pro-Kuchma parties (NDP and SDPU(o)) got only 
9.02%, the parliamentary majority that eventually was formed in Verkhovna Rada was 
distinctly pro-presidential.52 This became possible due to many techniques of cooptation and 
sometimes threat. It was also because single-member district winners, accountable to their votes 
and seeking perspectives of re-election, were not capable deliver any “pork” or special projects 
for their respective districts, unless they cooperated with the regime in the heavily controlled 
Kuchma system. 
Such weakened legislative influence over the political process spurred Rada to 
reconsider the Law on Election in 2001-2002. While the majority of Rada blocs were in favor of 
fully proportional system, the parliament of Ukraine kept adopting diverse legislative acts that 
the President vetoed. He, understandably, was in favor of the mixed system that had allowed 
him up until then to both control the single constituency candidates and to run party business 
according to his agenda due to the influence over the closed party list.  The resulting 
compromise was almost the identical mixed system with a 4% threshold in the Law on Election 
from March 31, 2002. Similarly to 1998 elections then, in 2002 SDPU(o) and “For a United 
																																												
51 Per data available at the official registration site of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, accessed on May 4, 2017 at 
http://old.minjust.gov.ua/31094. 
52 The official results of the elections are available at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/ 
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Ukraine,” a new party loyal to the President, collectively received only 18.94%, whereas the 
opposition parties obtained 57.68% of votes, yet again, the parliamentary majority that emerged 
was pro-incumbent. 
Thus, with no ban and little administrative obstruction to the formation of new parties, 
we see parties emerge and disappear on the political horizon on Ukrainian party system very 
rapidly during these years. But, the freedom of association under Kuchma also served as vehicle 
for the political actors with vested interests to promote their influence at the expense of 
particular election system in Ukraine. 
 This is further confirmed by the following consideration of other components from the 
Freedom of Association Index of the Varieties of Democracies dataset for that time.  
Figure 5.3. Components of the Freedom of Association Index (2) 
 for Ukraine, 1994-2004 
 
 
 As Figure 5.3 shows, the opposition parties in Ukraine were far from being fully 
independent (perfect score of 4) from the cooptation by the ruling regime. Hovering above the 
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score of 2, this component measure indicates that only some opposition parties were 
autonomous. And knowing the Ukrainian context I could go into further detail of which parties 
and how were coopted by the regime. But for the reasons of brevity for the moment I refer the 
reader to the episodes of Kuchma dominance over parliament described above, as well as to the 
work of prominent scholars of the Ukrainian party system, such as Erik Herron (2005, 2002, 
2007) for further detail. 
 Further, the scores of civil society organizations (CSO) entry and exit as well as level of 
CSO repression underscore what Levitsky and Way (2002) would describe as ‘competitive 
authoritarianism.’ In competitive authoritarianism, the regime both allows a degree of political 
competition on one hand, yet monitors and manages the role and work of parties and CSOs on 
the other.  I observe a graduate decline in CSO’s ability to function due to repression by the 
government throughout the first several years of Kuchma’s presidency, and a sharp worsening 
of the situation in 1999 and 2000 when Georgiy Gongadze and other Kuchma opponents raised 
alarm to his authoritarian tendencies. After that, CSO repression was moderate (an average of 
2.2), which indicates that in addition to material sanctions, the government engaged in legal 
harassment (detentions, etc.) or other administrative means (blocking local or international 
partnerships, etc.). Indeed, this score corresponds well with the story of the protest movement 
and government repression that I delineated earlier in this chapter. 
 In summary, while Ukraine’s overall score on the Freedom Association Index remained 
moderately high and stable (an average of 0.74 on a 0 to 1 scale), the outcome of the electoral 
system changes made a political competition in practice more restricted than such record may 
indicate. Newly formed political parties and single-member district representatives were quickly 
coopted or coerced to cooperate with the regime, leaving them far from being fully autonomous. 
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The civil society under Leonid Kuchma’s second term faced intimidation and harassment, in 
addition to the persecution of Kuchma’s political opponents, including Yulia Tymoshenko and 
Viktor Yushchenko among others, and of CSO representatives, such as Gongadze. Kuchma 
regime regularly monitored and intimidated CSO engaged in political activism. 
 Such mixed record of political competition in Ukraine before 2004 is more akin to a 
mirage in terms of policy representation of the Ukrainian citizens. In fact, frequently during that 
time the elected parties and representatives switched their ideological and policy positions 
caving in under the pressure from the executive on Rada.53  Therefore, on one hand the 
Ukrainian political elites had experience in competing for offices and gauging their individual 
and party support by the Ukrainian voters. On the other hand, an amount of repression from the 
executive branch significantly hampered the political actor’s clarity as to possible compromises 
under Kuchma’s presidency. Therefore, I assign MODERATE (a score of 2 points) for the level 
of my component of Political Competition in the model that estimates the transitional 
uncertainty. 
5.3  State Building after the Orange Revolution: High-Stake Battles for Institutional 
Changes 
 
In this subsection, I undertake a deeper analysis of the state building processes54 that 
were under way in Ukraine from 2004 to 2010. The importance of this component that 
																																												
53 More on the types of representation (descriptive, electoral and policy) could be found in Soroka and Wlezein 
(2010), whereas an interesting discussion of “promiscuous power sharing” in developing democracies is further 
analyzed by Slater and Simmons (2013). 
54 Jung and Deering (2015, 64)use “state building” in the meaning of institutional design and institution building, 
which aims to “establish a wide array of political and economic institutions” for state governance. Hence, I use state 
building and institution building interchangeably in this project. 
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contributes to transitional uncertainty, according to Jung and Deering (2015, 64) comes to the 
fore when treated in conjunction with another concurrent process - democratization. In the 
words of the authors, uncertainty “will be much higher where democratization coincides with 
state building, than in cases without this additional burden.”  
In line with Jung and Deering’s argument, but more adapted to my model of political 
uncertainty where its components are described in levels of HIGH, MODERATE, LOW and 
NONE, I posit that the coincidence of state building and democratization is going to contribute 
to HIGH levels to transitional uncertainty. Conversely, the absence of both democratization and 
state building will have no effect on uncertainty. Between these, the levels of uncertainty can be 
estimated by how the levels of democratization and state building combine in the matrix shown 
below. Here, the cells adjacent to HIGH (e.g. SOME state building and LARGE 
democratization) translate into MODERATE levels of uncertainty. The absence of either state 
building efforts or democratization contributes to LOW levels of democracy.  
Table 5.1.  Transitional Uncertainty Levels from State-Building and Democratization 
 
As for democratization, I define LARGE democratization as a year-to-year change in 
democracy index score at any point in the studied period (2005-2009) that is greater than any 
such change in previous recent time (1991-2004). I define SOME democratization as change in 
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a year-to year democracy index score that at no point over the studied period (2005-2009) is 
greater than the greatest year-to-year change in the previous recent period (1991-2004). Here,  
by “change” I mean numerically positive rise in the index value.  In other words, on the index 
scale from 0 to 1 (where 1 is a full democracy in the Varieties of Democracies dataset), it is a 
change in the direction from 0 to 1, since democratization is an increase in that direction. 
According to such operationalization, I can estimate the level of democratization in 
Ukraine in 2004-2010 from the Varieties of Democracies dataset looking at how the index for 
Liberal Democracy changed in this country from 1991 to 2009 - from the time Ukraine became 
a sovereign state to the end of the Orange revolution regime term. The following figure 
summarizes the fluctuation in this index graphically: 
Figure 5.4. Liberal Democracy Index for Ukraine, 1991-2009 
 
 
More specifically, in the period of the Yushchenko’s tenure in office, from 2004 to 
2009, the Liberal Democracy index grew by 0.197 from being at 0.268 in 2004 to 0.465 by the 
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end of 2009. Any other similar period of change in the levels of this index is observed from 
1991 until Leonid Kuchma took power in Presidential Office in 1994, from 0.320 to 0.431. 
However, the magnitude of the change in 1991-1994 period is equal to 0.111, which is smaller 
than the change during the Orange team regime. Therefore, the democratization in this period 
under study is to be characterized as LARGE in terms of its change from 2004 to 2009. 
As for the state building, likewise I need clear posts as to what would constitute larger or 
smaller progress in this process. Here, I am guided by Arend Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) five 
characteristics of the arrangement of executive power, party system and interest groups. These 
characteristics make what Lijphart terms as “executive-parties” dimension, a dichotomous 
contrast between majoritarian and consensus models of democracies. The five characteristics 
are as follows: 
1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinet versus executive 
power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions. 
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive-
legislative balance of power. 
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems. 
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation. 
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups versus 
coordinated and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at compromise and 
concentration. 
These five characteristics are useful for my estimation of state building efforts since they 
describe the core foundational institutions that need to be established for a democratic state to 
‘work.’  Admittedly, Lijphart singles out these five characteristics in order to describe “patterns 
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of democracies” in states that have been democratic for more than twenty years. I take his 
theoretical propositions and adjust them to my analysis. I am able to do so for two important 
reasons. First, these five characteristics in Lijphart treatment are “all variables on which 
particular countries may be at either end of the continuum or anywhere in between.”55  
Therefore, such approach allows me to theoretically conceive of a gradation and a possible 
position change by a transitioning country along the vectors of any of these five components. 
Secondly, the five characteristics of democratic arrangement of the state institutions are 
applicable to transitioning Ukraine since I am dealing here with democratization combined with 
state building. Therefore, a change of position along the executive-party dimension is applicable 
to a transitional state that is attempting to structure its governing relations according to a 
democratic pattern.56  
																																												
55 Arendt Lijphart also distinguishes another important dimension on which institutional arrangements in a state 
could be characterized by: federal-unitary dimension.  Whereas it is theoretically relevant to the transitioning states 
to decipher the five characteristics that make this dimension – unitary vs centralized government; unicameral vs. 
bicameral legislature; flexible to change vs. rigid constitutions; presence or absence of judicial review; and the level 
of dependency of central banks on executive – Ukraine in the period of 2004-2014 did actively experiment with any 
changes on this dimension. But it theoretically conceivable that these may apply to other states undergoing 
transition, as is for instance the case of Ukraine after Euromaidan revolution of 2014 where decentralization, 
independence of the central bank and bicameral legislature discussions and reforms are undergoing. Similar to 
executive-party dimension, then other research dealing with transitional state building may use an additional rubric 
on federal-unitary dimension to give a full picture of how a given country has moved in one or another direction on 
this dimension. The analytical framework in Figure 5.5. could also be applied to determine how large such state 
building efforts are. 
56 At this point it is important to reflect on other theoretical possibilities in which state-building and democratization 
may or may not occur in a transitioning state.  Consider, for instance, a transitioning state in which state building 
occurs without democratization. In other words, it may be a transition to a new regime that is growing in its 
authoritarian practices and actively rearranging state institutions at the same time to fit its new values; or a regime 
that has a democratization record at the same levels as the one it has replaced, but moving slowly in state-building 
projects etc. In either of these scenarios or other combinations of democratization and state-building records, Table 
4.3 will help an analyst to determine whether uncertainty is high, low or moderate in such situations. The five 
characteristics are conceptually relevant since states still aspire to build state that would resemble democratic 
characteristics, with the exception of cases when transition takes place from one kind of authoritarian rule to another 
(e.g. monarchy to theocracy etc.). Otherwise, Lijphart’s characteristics are still useful. Consider, for instance, a new 
regime that is not democratizing (democratization = NONE) that may decide to consolidate executive powers over 
legislature and eliminate multi-party system. These changes then can still be analyzed against the five characteristics 
of Lijphart to determine the level of state-building (e.g. state building = LARGE) and get a score of 1 in terms of the 
impact on transitional uncertainty, according to Table 4.3. The theoretical principle at works here is that it is the 
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Lijphart (1999, 2012) executes a quantitative analysis of the thirty-six states reducing 
their ten-year record on these characteristics to a summarized comparison.  But since I do not 
pursue comparison between states in the current research and without the same quantitative data 
available, I reserve the quantitative analysis of Ukraine’s state building efforts for my future 
research. For now, I will provide a qualitative examination on how much the Ukrainian political 
system shifted on each of the characteristics.  
Thus, adapting Lijphart’s framework, if I observe a change on this executive-party 
dimension from being on one side to shifting to be predominantly on the other side of the 
spectrum, then I consider the State Building efforts to be LARGE (a score of 2). If the change 
happens largely towards the consolidation of the institutional arrangement solidifying the 
existing position (i.e. moving a state that is already on the “executive” side of the spectrum 
towards further “executive” end of the dimension), then the State Building efforts could be 
deemed as SOME (a score of 1). Similarly, if such change constitutes a move towards the 
opposite end but without crossing it to be more “executive” vs “party” divide, then the state 
building efforts are moderate as well. This could be graphically presented as follows: 
Figure 5.5. Executive-Parties Dimension Shifts and State Building Levels 
 
																																												
combination or both democratization and state-building that makes transitional uncertainty higher or lower, per Jung 
and Deering (2015). 
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In other words, it is the change in the position relative to one spectrum vs. another that 
determines the magnitude of the state building efforts.57 The theoretical reasoning behind this is 
tightly linked to my cognitivist treatment of uncertainty. Indeed, if a decision maker considers 
new information in an already familiar institutional setup, then previous experience with such 
setup is available to him/her bringing more clarity in the decision-making process. If, however, 
a new layer of information about a different institutional setup is included in the calculation of 
decision making options (e.g., now the system is more “parties-” oriented rather that 
“executive”), then the informational flow is larger and possible outcomes of one’s decisions are 
analytically more obscure. 
 Hence, I proceed to examine the state building efforts in Ukraine in 2004-2009 under the 
Orange leadership studying the country’s institutional setup at the beginning of this period, in 
2004 and compare it to the setup by the end of 2009, looking at five characteristics presented 
above. 
 Similar to Lijphart, I start with the analysis of the number of parties in the electoral 
system in Ukraine over the selected time period (characteristic 3). Following the formula by 
Laakso and Taagepera (1979) that Lijphart uses for his research, where the reciprocal is taken of 
the sum of the squared proportion of received votes by parties, I use the data collected by 
																																												
57 It is possible to argue that not only the direction of the change, but also the distance between the starting point and 
the end (the size of the arrow) is of essence in order to distinguish whether state building efforts were HIGH or 
SOME. However, without precise quantitative measures, it would not be possible to make such estimation. Since my 
analysis here is focused on the qualitative analysis of the major thrust of change, I will use the direction of the 
change only at this point, since it is consistent with the cognitive approach to decision making taken here, leaving 
quantitative elaboration to future research.  
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Michael Gallagher on the effective number of parties at the electoral level (ENP).58 The 
effective numbers of parties for Ukraine for the selected period, thus are as follows: 






What we see from this table is that Ukraine, having introduced the fully proportional 
party list system with a 4% threshold, moved from a proliferation of parties during Kuchma 
tenure with an effective number of 6.98 in 2002 to 3.85 in the snap parliamentary elections of 
2007.  Hence, technically speaking, even though still firmly multiparty Ukraine moved closer to 
a smaller ENP on this characteristic. However, this change in number should be taken with 
much caution in as far as the move on this vector, since the independents were not allowed to 
compete and the elimination of single-member district races constrained very small party groups 
from entering the race as well. Thus, the change in this number is less of a reflection of the 
actual decrease in political parties in Ukraine as it is of the ability of the political system to 
provide political space for less numerous political groupings59. 
As for the concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinet versus 
broad multiparty coalitions (characteristic 1), Ukraine moved in the same direction in this 
regard, during the Orange years of 2005-2009. To start off, under President Kuchma, there were 
																																												
58 This data is available at: 
www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf 
 
59 I thank Erik Herron for this important observation. 
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seven Cabinets of Ministers. Coming out of the early 1990s, the Cabinet of Ministers largely 
functioned under the Soviet system of law until Ukraine adopted its Constitution in 1996.  But it 
was not until 2000, that the Law of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic of 1978 was finally 
supplemented by the Temporary Provisions on the Work of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 
and finally abolished by the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in December 2006. 
Hence, under this disarray of outdated legal provisions, the Cabinet of Ministers did not 
necessarily function as a parliamentary coalition-formed body normally would in more 
advanced democratic states.  
For instance, when Leonid Kuchma took over, he ‘inherited’ the Cabinet of Ministers 
headed by Vitaliy Mosul, with whom he had difficulty agreeing on a set of market reforms. 
With no clear mechanism of firing and resignation of Prime Ministers, President Kuchma 
finally sent Mosul “on vacation” (or “u vidpustku”) by a presidential order. Then Rada sent 
Mosul “on retirement” by its own resolution shortly thereafter. In the same vein, in the absence 
of the clear demarcation of constitutional norms and prerogatives between Rada and the 
President, the subsequent Prime-Minister, Yevhen Marchuk was not only a head of the Cabinet 
of Minister, but he also ran for a single-member district seat several months after his 
appointment, and a year after that, in 1996, he emerged as a leader of a parliamentary faction, in 
addition to holding a Prime Ministerial position. 
In other words, the relationships between the Cabinet, the Parliament and the 
Presidential office in the 1990s were not as straight as in Lijphart’s conceptualization suggested 
for democracies: elections-à coalition-àcabinet, but exhibited reversed and convoluted 
processes. Finally, after the legal system stabilized with the adoption of the Constitution of 
Ukraine of 1996, as well as a range of new laws regulating these relations and functions, the 
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first registered coalition agreement in Rada appeared on September 27, 2002, about two years 
prior to the Orange revolution. This coalition agreement was signed by ten parties and blocs, as 
well as non-affiliated members of the parliament. Hence, if estimated against the first 
characteristic on Lijphart’s executive-parties dimension, this record on Ukraine’s part was far 
cry from “one-party” coalition. And the cabinet that was subsequently formed was also a result 
of a consensus and an equilibrium between the appointees of the coalition party-signees and the 
so called “quota of the President.”  
After the Orange revolution, this practice of coalition agreements continued, albeit in a 
modified form. Following spring elections to Rada in 2006, on June 22 three Orange camp 
parties signed the minimal winning coalition. However, it lasted a little over two weeks and fell 
apart. The Socialist Party switched sides and signed a new coalition agreement with the Party of 
Regions and the Communist Party. In this way, the Socialist party solidified the majority of 
votes with the Party of Regions, a frontrunner and a largest seat winner in the elections. Hence, 
a new majority coalition was formed on July 7, 2006. It formed a new Cabinet with Victor 
Yanukovych as Prime Ministers a month alter. 
This movement along the executive-party dimension from broad multi-party coalition 
toward the concentration of executive power in the hands of a single party majority that we see 
from 2002 to 2006 continued at even deeper levels after the snap elections of 2007.  About three 
years after the revolution, on November 29, 2007 the Orange forces finally signed a coalition 
agreement. It followed a tumultuous short premiership of Yulia Tymoshenko in 2005 and a 
difficult cohabitation of the Orange president and the Blue Prime-minister in 2006 and 2007. 
Yet, this was as close to single party rule as Ukraine came in its modern history. There were 227 
signatories, one vote over the necessary majority of 226.  The Orange coalition, however, was 
	 119	
not very stable and faced the Party of Regions with 175 seats and the Communists with 27 
deputies, a total of 202 sets. That left the Orange coalition insecure without the backing of 
another smaller party. Just two and a half weeks later, a new coalition agreement was signed 
between Nasha Ukrayina (Viktor Yushchenko’s party), Batkivshchyna (Yulia Tymoshenko’s 
party) and the Bloc of Lytvyn (named after its leader, Volodymyr Lytvyn). 
In sum, during the Orange presidential term, the Ukrainian political system moved from 
a multi-party coalition formed in the Parliament in 2002 to a more numerically consolidated 
coalition of two or three parties. This was indubitably due to the change in the electoral system 
to fully proportional representation. Such important reconfiguration put Ukraine closer to the 
“single-party majority cabinet” end on the first characteristic as opposed to the previous multi-
party coalition governments under President Kuchma.  
A significant shift also occurred in Ukraine as regards to the second characteristic 
singled out by Lijphart on the executive-parties dimension. As I have previously elaborated, the 
semi-presidential system of government that solidified in Ukraine during Kuchma’s regime was 
renegotiated in December 2004 in the heat of the Orange revolution. The new arrangement of 
powers took significant prerogatives away from the President and moved them to the 
Parliament. These changes took force in 2006. The presidential authority was very limited to 
only being able to bring to the consideration of Rada the candidacy of the Prime-Minister. The 
coalition of parliamentary majority submitted the Prime-Minister candidacy to the President. 
Once the Prime Minister was appointed by Rada, according to these new constitutional changes, 
Prime Minister formed his/her own Cabinet, with the exception of the Minister of Defense, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, which were left to 
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the Presidential prerogatives.  The Cabinet was to be officially appointed and dismissed by 
Rada.  
In practice, what it meant for the work of the government, is that since 2006 it was the 
Prime Minister who had powers of forming new institutions, reforming or liquidating the 
existing ones and the President had no oversight over these processes. If previously President 
Kuchma could cancel acts and ordinances issued by the Cabinet, President Yushchenko could 
only stop them by bringing into question their constitutionality through the submission of the 
corresponding plea to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.  
Viktor Yushchenko in his rocky cohabitation with Viktor Yanukovych, and then no less 
problematic power struggle with his political competitor from the Orange camp, Yulia 
Tymoshenko, filed dozens of complaints with the Constitutional Court that took months to 
consider them. In response, the President attempted to reform the Court albeit without success 
(Nayem and Leshchenko 2007). By the end of 2006, Rada overcame a Presidential veto and 
adopted a new Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Yushchenko opposed this law since 
it would strip him of powers to propose the candidacy of the Prime Minister, and two other 
ministers as it had been previously established  (Yushchenko Turns to Constitutional Court re 
the Law of Cabinet of Ministers 2007). Not satisfied with such outcome, Yushchenko picked a 
battle against the Constitutional Court in 2007 by forcing three judges to resign from their 
duties and calling into question the legitimacy of the Court. He entrusted the General 
Persecutors’ Office a mission to evaluate Court’s activities for alleged conflict of interest. 
The climax of such sharpened edges between the branches of power became an attempt 
by Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych to secretly join forces in order to push through 
Rada a new constitutional change that would not only weaken the Presidential authority. The 
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change would see the President voted into Office by Rada, rather than national elections.  
However, the exposure of this secret document left a bitter foretaste with the Ukrainian voters 
who were about to cast a presidential ballot the following year and who viewed Yulia 
Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych as ideological opponents, not secret allies.  
In sum, these excerpts from the Ukrainian political life exemplify, however 
fragmentarily, a general thrust of changes from a continuously weakened Presidential institution 
to a more strengthened legislative branch. Viktor Yushchenko himself later acknowledged in his 
memoirs the inability to achieve many important electoral goals due to the reconfiguration of 
powers in favor of the Parliament (Yushchenko 2014, 475–76). 
Finally, as for the fifth characteristic in Lijphart executive-parties dimension, the system 
of interest groups in Ukraine is neither pluralist nor necessarily corporatist. In fact, due to the 
oligarchic influences on the Ukrainian politics that fused political, financial and media 
resources in conglomerates of power, such system is far from the democratic patterns that 
Lijphart detects in his thirty-six countries of study. There were calls of disaggregating political 
and oligarchic control of power in the Orange slogans and government programs, but such 
separation was never implemented. I discuss this in more detail in the following Chapter where 
I analyze the domestic party substitutes’ interests that led to a specific set of foreign policy 
options that the Ukrainian political leaders had to consider. 
Summarily, the characteristics that made “executive-party” dimension in Ukraine in 




Figure 5.6. Ukrainian State Building, 2004-2009 
 
As we see from Figure 5.6, there was a significant movement on different characteristics 
of the executive-party dimension of the political system in Ukraine, especially as regards 
electoral system and executive-legislative balance. I argue that these changes pulled the state to 
being closer to the “parties” pole, thereby shifting Ukraine’s position more firmly across the 
threshold into this direction.60 This, according to my classification presented in Figure 5.4 could 
be characterized as LARGE state building efforts for Ukraine in 2004-2009.  
 Taking values on the scale of democratization and state building as being LARGE 
during the Orange presidency years of 2004-2009, I conclude that these two processes in such 
combination contributed to HIGH levels to the transitional uncertainty in Ukraine (a score of 3). 
																																												
60 Whereas I do not operate with precise quantitative estimations in this model that would allow to point the exact 
magnitude of change by assigning specific weights to different characteristic, this could foreseeably be another 
direction to explore for future research. At this point, I look at large patterns in place to identify a predominant effect 
of a change in qualitative, descriptive terms.  
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Having thus estimated the pace of political transition (ABRUPT - 3), the level of prior political 
competition (MODERATE – 2 points), and the scale of state building (LARGE -3), I now turn 
to examining how the final component of economic downturn contributed to the level of 
uncertainty during the Orange regime years of 2004-2009.  
 
5.4. Economic Downturn: An Assessment of the Orange Government Years	
 
The last component that contributes to the levels of transitional uncertainty, according to 
Jung and Deering (2015), is connected to the economic performance of the country. To be more 
precise, the authors posit that uncertainty “will be higher” if the country faces “severe economic 
downturn” (ibid, 64).  More specifically, they operationalize this variable by looking at the rate 
of growth of GDP per capita summarized in three-year data points. Since they deal only with 
country-year data points, the numerical estimate for their dataset is derived from a three-year 
average for the year prior to the regime change. Such three –year average, according to the 
authors allows both to avoid a problem of missing data and to get a more accurate estimate 
since such countries “tend to experience highly fluctuating economies year by year.”61   
Although Jung and Deering (2015) stop in their measurement of the economic 
performance to the year prior to the transition, analytically it is important to consider GDP 
measures over the whole period during which I examine other components contributing to 
																																												
61 As for the correlation of economic performance and democratic regimes, there is a long-standing discussion on on 
the causal direction and effect of these two variables. For a start, see Przeworski (2004); Boix and Stokes (2003); 
and Ross (2006). Acknowledging this debate in comparative literature, I analyze the economic factors as they have 
their own independent effect on transitional uncertainty following  the operationalization principles from Jung and 
Deering (2015).  
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uncertainty throughout the transition period. This also is consistent with my cognitive 
conceptualization of uncertainty, where information about economic data for a decision maker 
does not stop to enter into the decision making process at a particular point (i.e. a year of the 
transition only), but rather is available in its complexity throughout the time of a leader’s tenure.  
Therefore, I draw data on Ukraine’s GDP growth rate per capita from World Bank 
economic databank, graphically summarized as follows: 
Figure 5.7. Ukraine’s GDP growth per capita, 2002-2010 
 
Source: World Bank Data 
Having aggregated this data in three-year periods, I derive the following set of numbers 




Table 5.3. Three-year averages of GDP growth rates per capita, 2002-2010 
	













2002-2004 9.832  2.03 4.467 4.959 1.876 
2005-2007 6.676 3.112 5.398 7.415 2.874 
2008-2010 -2.317 - 0.695 4.126 4.256 0.259 
Source: World Bank Data 
As we see from the table above, Ukraine entered the transition period with 
comparatively high growth rate, overtaking its regional average by over 7% and likewise being 
far ahead of the countries in a similar economic grouping (lower middle income, by World 
Bank designation). The first three years of the Orange regime such growth somewhat abated, 
dropping by almost one third from the previous average. However, it was still comparatively 
twice the size of the average for the region and 1.278% higher than states in a similar economic 
condition, coming close to the levels of growth exhibited by upper and middle income states for 
the same time period. However, the following three years were extremely hard for the Ukrainian 
economy.  
As the global financial crisis hit economies around the world, with a world GDP per 
capita growth rate dropping to an average of meager 0.259%, lower and middle income states 
sustained smaller losses in comparison to upper and middle income states. Europe and Central 
Asia were affected more than any of these categories, with their GDP rate of growth per capita 
going to the subzero estimates. Ukraine, in this crisis underwent one of the worst economic 
episodes in its modern history. Starting comfortably at 8.55% growth rate per capita in 2007, it 
measured -14.42%, a drop of 22.967 points. These rapid fluctuations of economic performance 
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put Ukrainian leaders, already faced with significant democratic and state building challenges in 
yet further precarious position when it came to making decisions about important domestic and 
foreign policies. I characterize such economic downturn as SEVERE (3 points) since it the 
informational flow from such drastically changed economic conditions imposed a considerable 
strain on decision makers considering their course of action domestically and internationally.  
 
5.5.  Transitional Uncertainty: A Summary Assessment 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I have reiterated the model to estimate the level of 
transitional uncertainty. I proposed to look at several factors that contribute to the complexity of 
social and political processes taking place during the regime change. I also pointed out that I 
would not be able to directly observe and test the levels of uncertainty that political decision 
makers were operating under. Instead, I relied on Jung and Deering’s factors that contribute to 
uncertainty to measure by proxy the levels of this component of the causal mechanism. To 
encapsulate, I devised the theoretical model that describes the levels of uncertainty as follows: 
Pace of Political Transition + Political Competition + State-Building+ Economic 
Downturn à Level of Uncertainty 
Having looked closely at each of these factors, I have determined that the pace of 
political transition in Ukraine connected with the Orange revolution was HIGH due to the 
abrupt and unexpected developments with the regime change. The political competition that 
existed prior to the regime change, during Leonid Kuchma’s presidency was MODERATE. As 
democratization was LARGE in Ukraine during the initial Orange government years, it also 
combined with LARGE scale state building processes, yielding a HIGH score for the level of 
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this factor. Finally, Ukrainian economic performance steadily declined and then dropped greatly 
due to the world financial crisis of 2008, resulting in HIGH economic downturn for this 
country. 
Put together, these scores yield the following assessment of the level of transitional 
uncertainty in Ukraine: 
Level of Transitional Uncertainty in Ukraine, 2001-2009 
3 + 2 + 3+ 3 =11 (out of 12) à  HIGH   
In this Chapter, I gave a thorough treatment to the political, economic and social 
processes that were underway in Ukraine during the transition. I presented the picture of a 
highly uncertain environment in which political decision makers functioned. In order to 
understand how this uncertainty exerted influence over the choices for political action available 
to the leaders at the helm of state, I will now examine those domestic considerations that were 
non-compensatory for the political actors involved. In the next chapter I will look at the 
domestic audience with whom Ukrainian transitional leaders were most concerned to cut their 
losses in order to preserve their political and other influence in the system, the party substitutes. 
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Chapter 6  
 ORANGE LEADERS 
AND PARTY SUBSTITUES 
 
In Chapter 2, I dwelled on how the political context of transitional states that has a set of 
distinct characteristics from what scholars typically assume for stable and democratically 
advanced states. We know from research, for instance, that political parties in developing 
democracies form party systems with volatile dynamic (Kreuzer 2016; Tavits 2012). They are 
also not necessarily organized along social cleavages (Kitschelt 1995), and are characterized by 
weaker voter attachments (Dalton and Weldon 2007). Further, once in office  such parties may 
pursue “promiscuous power-sharing” with unlikely coalition partners (Slater and Simmons 
2013). Additionally, we know from Brader, Tucker and Duell (2013) that party-voter policy 
congruence is very sensitive both to the longevity, incumbency and ideological clarity of parties 
in both developed and emerging democracies.   
In Chapter 2 I also emphasized that under such conditions, political actors may not 
expect to engage in repeated interactions (e.g., elections) and seek to maximize their payoffs in 
a single-shot game. In other words, uncertainty “may lead party elites to emphasize short-term 
gain from holding office over longer–term preferences for maximizing votes”(Lupu and Riedl 
2013, 1352).  “Party substitutes” emerge in such conditions to offer political actors the 
necessary political and financial support (Hale, 2005). Akin to machine politics, the fused 
financial, industrial and political influence of ‘party substitutes,’ such as financial-industrial 
groups in Russia, according to Henry Hale, allows political leaders in power to conceive of their 
professional career and personal well-being beyond the reliance on party-voter linkages.   
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I combine these theoretical insights on party system development with the poliheuristic 
assumption that in foreign policy decision-making, it is the domestic dimension that is non-
compensatory, i.e. cannot be reduced or substituted by any other advantage on a different 
dimension of a decision (i.e., economic benefit, military advantage, etc.). To reiterate, each 
foreign policy decision contains first and foremost domestic considerations that are of political 
value to the decision maker. When I combine these two theoretical points - that the domestic 
politics comes first in foreign policy decision making; and that transitional uncertainty spurs 
actors to resort to party substitutes -  I arrive at an analytical model of the process of foreign 
policy changes. Namely, depending on whether leaders face high uncertainty and adjust to their 
party substitutes’ interests, or, if they consider first and foremost voter preferences when 
uncertainty subsides, a foreign policy change may occur due to a difference in the preferences 
between and among party substitutes or voters. 
In Chapter 5, I have established that the transitional years of the Orange regime were 
indeed characterized with high political uncertainty. According to the logic of the causal 
mechanism delineated in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.4), it follows that it was largely political interests 
of party substitutes rather than voter preferences that were considered by the Orange leaders in 
the foreign policy decision making of 2004-2009. In order to provide empirical grounding for 
that assertion, in the following Subsection 6.1 I examine what party substitutes were present in 
Ukraine during those years. I will also look at how different Ukrainian decision makers were 
linked to these party substitutes and what interests the party substitutes pursued in Ukraine. In 
the subsequent Chapter 7, I will focus more specifically on the foreign policy behavior of 
Ukraine during these years. I will trace how these policies were linked to the abovementioned 
interests of the Ukrainian party substitutes.  
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6.1. Party Substitutes in Ukraine: Emerging Role of Oligarchs 
 
In Henry Hale’s work (2005), party substitutes are analyzed from an economic 
theoretical standpoint, where individual political actors are ‘buyers’ and parties are ‘sellers’ of a 
particular commodity: electoral votes. Hale innovatively resolves the puzzle of conflicting 
evidence on the strength and weakness of the party system in Russia. He proposes a concept of 
“party substitutes” on the electoral vote market. Party substitutes are the suppliers of the 
commodity with the ability to deliver votes to individual candidates bypassing parties, due to an 
array of organizational, material and reputational resources at their disposal. In the Russian 
context, party substitutes are financial and industrial complexes or local governor political 
machines, according to Hale.  
Applying this approach in the concrete conditions of transitional uncertainty where time 
horizons for political actors are significantly shortened in decision making, I theorize that 
transitional leaders turn to party substitutes for the same organizational, material and 
reputational resources, as Henry Hale suggests. However, their goal is not necessarily 
reelection, but continued political relevance, reputation, safe exit and/or political immunity. 
In the Ukrainian context, party substitutes are primarily oligarchs whose financial, 
industrial and media resources have been underwriting many political events and processes for 
the past twenty-six years of independence. Indeed, due to the significant influence of these 
financial magnates on the Ukrainian politics and a high level of corruption that accompanies it, 
the country’s current political system has been variously described as “oligarchate,” 
(Havrylyshyn 2016b, 201) or “piranha capitalism” (Markus 2015).  Such system it characterized 
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by massive practices of embezzlement, insider’s trading and corrupted privatization maneuvers, 
including armed violence and raider attacks on competitors (Aslund 2005b; Avioutskii 2010; 
Puglisi 2003). Ukraine arrived at the dawn of the 21st century with a well-defined (even if not 
well exposed to the public) circle of business elites that had formed strong links to Kuchma 
regime. The latter granted them tax breaks, law evasion protectorate, insider privatization 
opportunities and direct budget subsidies among else, in exchange for cuts from rent-seeking 
activities and loyalty to the regime (Havrylyshyn 2016c, 207–16).   
This group accumulated their initial wealth from the rocky Ukrainian privatization 
(popularly dubbed “prykhatization” or grab-ization). This took place to to their privileged 
access to government resources stemming from the links to the Communist party or other 
position of power in the old Soviet system of governance. However, as large state-owned 
enterprises and companies remained few and far between in the late 1990s, and the initial 
competition between major Ukrainian business players stabilized, the major concern for the 
oligarchs became the ability to protect their assets and their rent-seeking mechanisms from 
unpredictable state intrusion, re-privatization and other pressure from the government. 
 Notoriously cumbersome and seemingly unending Ukrainian state regulations on 
anything from fire safety to high taxation rates gave much trouble to small or medium business 
in Ukraine and privileged the consolidation of big business. However, these regulations also 
made big business theoretically almost always liable for some kind of violation of a given code, 
and thus required a “krysha” (or ‘roof’ in Russian), a protection from local or national 
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authorities.62 The fate of above-mentioned Mr. Lazarenko and the jailing of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky in the neighboring Russia were alarming examples for the Ukrainian oligarchs. 
Beyond personal and familial connections to the ruling Kuchma regime, one of the ways 
to receive krysha, and even a further assurance of non-intrusion on the part of the government, 
was to obtain the legal indemnity and immunity as an elected official. Such right was 
guaranteed under the Constitution of Ukraine of 1996 and was further expanded in the Law on 
the Status of a People’s Deputy of Ukraine.63 First introduced as early as 1992, this Law saw 
fifteen various amendments adopted by Rada prior to the Orange revolution. The degrees of 
widening and narrowing the scope of the deputies’ immunity underwent the scrutiny of the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine six times in the same time frame.  
President Kuchma took the issue of immunity further. To curb the influence of Rada, 
Kuchma put the question of deputy’s immunity before the Ukrainian voters in a national 
																																												
62 This, in passing, is also a reason for some of the major retail businesses from abroad to stay out of Ukrainian 
market. For instance,  IKEA was did not want to enter Ukrainian market because of did not want to be embroiled in 
corrupt business practices and Ukrainian ‘byzantine bureaucracy’ and never For more details, see for instance: 
http://www.worldbulletin.net/europe/165278/ukraine-wants-ikea-store-symbol-of-anti-corruption-fight 
In addition, prior to the Orange revolution Ukraine scored 58.70 on the World Bank measure of Starting business, 
and only slightly improved that score the following year of 2005 to 61.68. The “Starting Business – Distance to 
Frontier” measure is summarized on by the World Bank as “The distance to frontier score aids in assessing the 
absolute level of regulatory performance and how it improves over time. This measure shows the distance of each 
economy to the “frontier,” which represents the best performance observed on each of the indicators across all 
economies in the Doing Business sample since 2005. This allows users both to see the gap between a particular 
economy’s performance and the best performance at any point in time and to assess the absolute change in the 
economy’s regulatory environment over time as measured by Doing Business. An economy’s distance to frontier is 
reflected on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest performance and 100 represents the frontier. For 
example, a score of 75 in DB 2016 means an economy was 25 percentage points away from the frontier constructed 
from the best performances across all economies and across time. A score of 80 in DB 2017 would indicate the 
economy is improving. In this way, the distance to frontier measure complements the annual ease of doing business 
ranking, which compares economies with one another at a point in time.” Source: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/distance-to-frontier	
 
63 The Ukrainian language version of the Law is available here: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2790-XII 
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referendum in 2000. Eighty-five percent of the cast ballots were in favor of curtailing the 
Ukrainian deputy immunity. For various political reasons that I am not going to elaborate in 
current discussion, the results of the referendum were never put in practice.  
By contrast, the updated Law of 2001 extended the rights of Rada members. Previously 
Rada deputies were not to be prosecuted for their political statements and votes in the 
legislature, as is the parliamentary norm in democratic states. According to the new Law’s Part 
II, Article 17, they were now granted an unlimited access to the territory or any state or local 
government or private agency, enterprise or other facility. Additionally, they had a right to 
demand an immediate rectification of any identified violation of the Ukrainian law, under the 
threat of legal or criminal responsibility of those who refuse to do so. In effect, what it meant 
was that Rada deputies could have access to any entity in Ukraine without regard to the form of 
ownership or the level of state secrecy. In addition, they were under the protection of the 
Ukrainian Constitution if they inflicted any damage on it.  
All of this, as it may be surmised, was an extremely attractive option for oligarchs who 
needed to protect their assets and the rent-seeking mechanisms that generated them. Thus, the 
Ukrainian parliament saw a consistent representation of oligarchic interests in its own ranks. By 
2002, out of 450 Rada deputies, 300 were dollar millionaires (Bayrachny quoted in 
Havrylyshyn (2016, 214)). Alsund (2009, 65) estimated that nearly 20% of seats were 
controlled by oligarchs by 1994; whereas after the election of 1998, there were at least 28% of 
seats serving the interests of this groups (Puglisi 2003, 109).   
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Such direct influence on the decision-making process in the Ukrainian context means 
that the fusion of political and financial interests contributed to a cyclic interest loop between 
oligarchs made and politicians,64 as pointed out by Melnykovska and Schweikert (2008, 9): 
“They [oligarchic clans] are mainly interested in accumulating wealth and capturing new 
markets. However, the oligarchic clans also are different from a classic business entity in the 
way they use the strategy ‘power-money-power’ for wealth accumulation. Namely, access to 
state power enables the oligarchic clans to secure their economic interests and make profits, 
which they use to broaden their political power. A symbiosis of politics and business does not 
involve just a simple patronage connection. Besides lobbying, networking and bribing to 
influence politics, the oligarchic clans aim at assimilating the political elite. The assimilation of 
clan’s members in politics and vice versa is a common phenomenon in Ukraine.”  
In fact, Leonid Kuchma himself, looking back at his years in office, acknowledged that 
during his presidency years, “Our main common failure was the failure to separate power from 
business” (Kuchma 2009). 
Having emerged in the early 1990s  as a result of state privatization process (Kudelia 
and Kuzio 2015), and undergone fierce, at times violent competition65, the Ukrainian oligarchs 
had achieved a relatively established system of power balancing vis-à-vis each other and the 
government by the end of Kuchma regime (Balmaceda 2013b, 99). They primarily pursued 
accumulation of wealth to begin with, and in the context of vast corruption, found ways to 
protect their rent-seeking mechanism through personal connections to Kuchma regime and/or 
																																												
64 We may also observe another way through which oligarchic-political interests were connected: the political 
appointments to executive offices of either oligarchs themselves (e.g. Mr. Poroshenko as a Minister of Foreign 
Affairs under Yushchenko’s presidency and as a Minister of Trade and Economic Development under Yanukovych 
presidency; or Mr. Kolomoisky as a regional governor under more recent Poroshenko government) or those closely 
linked and beholden to them. For more details, see: 
http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2015/03/150326_oligarch_ukraine_map_vc) 
65 The practice of the so-called reiderstvo or ‘raidership’ or violent takeover of some companies by armed groups to 
force the change of ownership between oligarchs is further explored in Matthew Rojansky’s "Corporate Raiding in 
Ukraine: Causes, Methods and Consequences," Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 22.3 
(2014): 411-443. 
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through deputy’s indemnity and immunity.66 
The impending end of the turbulent second term for President Kuchma was foretelling a 
major upset in such comfortable relationship between the oligarchs and the regime. Part of the 
reason for the oligarchic concern was that Kuchma’s prospective successor, Viktor 
Yanukovych, in contrast to the incumbent President, favored a very clear and undiversified 
regional oligarchic connection with his home base of Donetsk. As a former governor of the 
region, he, along with other individuals involved in heavy industry business and mining in 
Donetsk, worked to strengthen the Party of Regions. The party’s support continued to rise from 
1998 on. In 1998, the Party of Regions won two seats in the parliamentary elections. In 2002 
elections it saw a thirteen-time fold increase. And it claimed 186 seats in elections of 2006. 
Hence, the prospect of one ruling oligarchic clan from Donetsk was unsatisfactory to other 
wealthy Ukrainian magnates (Radnitz 2010). Already after 2000, under the premiership of 
Viktor Yanukovych, there was a clear preference pattern in awarding privatization deals with a 
bias towards those who consolidated their support behind Yanukovych proper (Pleines 2008).  
When a relatively popular alternative to Yanukovych came forth in the form of the 
opposition movement headed by Viktor Yushchenko, many oligarchs put resources in support 
of this political opportunity, far surpassing the level of financial support from any other sources, 
including foreign (Way 2005). These oligarchs were not united in a single coalition. But as the 
																																												
66 Other ways and means by which Ukrainian oligarchs have been connected to political powerholders are explored 
in more detail in Avioutskii (2010). Avioutskii emphasizes the regional origin and character of the Ukrainian 
oligarchic clans, the level at which the original links between big business and politicians are inseminated.  
Havrylyshyn (2016), however, argues that Ukrainian oligarchs have overcome the regionalization of capital and 
influence by the end of Kuchma regime, and it is therefore more fitting to analyze them for my period of study on 
the national (Rada and other state institutions) rather than regional levels. 
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opposition movement started to grow, they pursued interests that united them for the time being 
in such critical juncture as a pending transition of power (Gould 2011; Kudelia 2012). 
To summarize, initially the dubitable privatization transactions and illegal rent-seeking 
schemes drove the new class of oligarchs to seek out “krysha” through close and strong 
connections with the government. They found a way to secure their profits through personal 
connections and further proceeded to solidify their influence through the bribed executive 
appointments, the parliamentary seats with coveted immunity and with further ways to 
influence policy outcomes to their own favor. By the beginning of the Orange revolution, the 
Ukrainian oligarchs accumulated political experience and financial resources and had the ability 
to reverse the power relationship with the government. Not only were they uncontrolled by 
Kuchma any more, but this group was in a position to offer material, organizational and 
parliamentary support to a prospective politician in order to boost his/her changes for political 
success. 
 Such was the emergence of the political influence of party substitutes in Ukraine. If 
early on the oligarchs pursued politics for security and profit reasons, now politicians were 
seeking oligarchic support for political boost. Viktor Yushchenko secured the support of Kyiv-
based chocolate magnate Petro Poroshenko’s. Yulia Tymoshenko was backed by her 
Dnipropetrovsk connection, the oil and banking mogul Ihor Kolomoiskyi (Havrylyshyn 2016d, 
215). In certain ways, the financial capital and the networks that oligarchs generated during the 
1990s were turned to serve the rising politicians in exchange for continued securities of their 
rent-seeking channels and guarantees of immunity from prosecution. In this way, the declared 
values of the Orange revolution, such as “Bandits – Behind Bars!” and other promises of 
ridding the Ukrainian government of bribery and corruption were to a degree self-defeating 
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from the very beginning. The Orange politicians had the backing of certain oligarchs who 
supplied them organizational and material resources in exchange for the non-execution of the 
Orange threats. The following subsection will trace the development of the oligarch-power 
relations during the Orange regime and look at the interests that these party substitutes had in 
regard to the Ukrainian foreign policy. 
 
6.2. Oligarchs and Orange Government: An Unsevered Tie 
  
The rise of oligarchic influence in the Ukrainian politics, briefly surveyed in the 
previous section, showcased that these actors were part and parcel of the Ukrainian political 
scene as parliamentarians, top executives, and otherwise. By the beginning of the Orange 
revolution they actively sought to reshape the political system by using their wealth of material, 
organizational and other resources. It is the task of this section to follow the development of 
oligarchic ‘agenda’ during the Orange regime years.  By looking more closely at how the 
oligarchy developed in this time frame, I will also determine the foreign policy interests that this 
group pursued. 
  There is relatively little information on the activities of the Ukrainian oligarchs in the 
1990s, due to the secrecy of their activities and lack of reliable media coverage. The problem of 
the informational scarcity on this issue is aggravated by the fact that it has become a customary 
practice for the Ukrainian oligarchs to buy major media and news outlets and use them to 
promote certain ideological positions, policies and party images, while sheltering their owners 
from unnecessary exposure (Dresen 2011; Fedets 2015).  When the Kuchmagate cast a dark 
shadow on the regime, the oligarchs were readier to come out of shadow and into domestic and 
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international spotlight since it became clear that Kuchma himself could be also be targeted for a 
wrongdoing in the media. 
In 2002, for the first time the Polish journal WPROST listed three individuals from 
Ukraine in its 100 Richest Eastern and Central European People list. The list included Rinat 
Akhmetov, a metallurgic and energy sector magnate; Viktor Pinchuk, pipe, a metallurgy and 
media/consulting entrepreneur; and Viktor Medvedchuk, a banking and consulting oligarch.  
Together these three individuals amassed 3,800 million USD in 2002.67 And like no other from 
a wider circle of Ukrainian noveau riches who were still operating in shadow at that time, these 
three individuals had a very strong personal links to the top governing officials in the country 
and beyond. Viktor Pinchuk married Kuchma’s daughter. Viktor Medvedchuk had Vladimir 
Putin and Svetlana Medvedeva (wife of the Russian Prime Minister) as godparents for his 
daughter.  Rinat Akhmetov was closely linked to Viktor Yanukovych, then Prime Minister 
under Kuchma.  
This was only the first sign of the growing oligarchic wealth that started to venture into 
the East European and Western public scene. The same list compiled by WPROST in 2003 
included three more new entries from Ukraine: Ihor Kolomoiskyi, Serhiy Taruta and Oleksandr 
Yaroslavskyi, who totally added another $3,050 million to the publicly known assets 
accumulated in Ukraine. Having surveyed the Ukrainian wealthy in 2004, Forbes World’s 
Wealthiest list for 2005 - for the first time -  included some Ukrainian oligarchs as well 
(Akhmetov, Pinchuk and Taruta).  
																																												
67 These rankings are available here: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20081216111454/http://najbogatsieuropejczycy.wprost.pl/?b=-1&e=37 
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After the Orange revolution, both the number of publicized oligarchs and their wealth 
continued to grow. By 2007, a year prior to global financial crisis, WPROST already listed 24 
Ukrainians, constituting close to a quarter of its register of the wealthiest Eastern and Central 
Europeans. Forbes, in its turn, for the same year showed the increased number of the Ukrainian 
wealthiest in the world ranking. There were seven individuals and the lowest personal wealth in 
this group belonged to Konstantyn Zhevago who reportedly had a net worth of 1,000 million 
USD.   
Not only did Western (Forbes) and Eastern European (WPROST) outlets start to follow 
the Ukrainian wealthy. With the liberty of speech and general democratization efforts on the rise 
during the years of the Orange regime, the Ukrainian media got to reporting their own estimates 
of the oligarchic wealth in the country as well. Thus, in 2006, a Ukrainian magazine 
Korrespondent, in partnership with the newspaper Kyiv Post and Dragon Capital, a financial 
consulting firm, published its first list of thirty wealthiest Ukrainians. The bottom position in the 
list (the ‘poorest’) was held by 177 million USD machine-building business owner. Only a year 
later, this list was expanded to fifty individuals, where the assets of the 50th were estimated to be 
at $228 million.68 The same year, another Ukrainian edition, Focus, revealed a much more 
expanded list of one hundred Ukrainian millionaires and billionaires, whose total wealth added 
together constituted $70 billion USD,69 surpassing the net worth of the world’s richest Bill 
Gates for that year.70 
																																												
68 For a full coverage in Ukrainian, see: http://ua.korrespondent.net/business/293562-parad-milyarderiv-zhurnal-
korrespondent-oprilyudniv-rejting-50-najbagatshih-ukrayinciv 
69 A summary of the report can be found in Russian here: http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2007/03/23/3219968/ 
70 Bill Gates’ fortune was estimated by Forbes to be at $56 billion in 2007 according to Forbes: 
https://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/10/07billionaires_William-Gates-III_BH69.html 
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The following year of 2008, such tendency of growing exposure continued. By the 
estimates of the same journal, Focus, the list of the Ukrainian richest reached one hundred and 
thirty, and the lowest assets holder was worth $130 million. And in 2009, this journal found one 
hundred and fifty millionaires in Ukraine, growing to two hundred individuals by the end of 
Orange regime in 2010. WPROST, Forbes and Korrespondent continued to publish their 
updated lists throughout these years with the unshrinking number of Ukrainians as well. 
Whereas the methodology and the pool of candidates that these various rankings differ, what is 
important to note is that from 2002 to 2008, such growth in numbers was stable within each 
respective ranking.   
An important question that such observation of growing publicity surrounding the 
Ukrainian wealth generate is - why do we see such rates of growth over the short span of few 
years? Clearly, this is not an indication that dozens of freshly-made Ukrainian millionaires were 
minted per year. Indeed, such fortunes would be hard to make over such a short time span by 
any sound business estimates. the history of the capital owned by these moguls confirms their 
long presence on the Ukrainian market. The answer to that question goes to the very essence of 
the new kind of relationship fostered between the oligarchs and the Orange regime. By exposing 
the nature of such relationship, we could gain an understanding of the newly reformatted 
connections between the Orange political elites and oligarchs, as well as the particular foreign 
interests that the latter pursued and wielded over the former.  
Several contextual conditions prepared a new relationship between business and 
government elites in Ukraine after the Orange revolution. On the political side, the inability of 
government to assuage public discontent following the Gongadze case, Kuchmagate and 
Yushchenko’s resignation after his largely successful monetary reform of 1996, revealed a deep 
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crisis in the current authoritarian-leaning system that routinely handled viable opposition by 
resorting of extra (or semi)- judicial violence. To a degree, as a reaction to such tendencies, 
there was a growing consensus among the business and political elites that more power and 
authority should be shifted to the parliament. Rada, with 450 offered a more diversified field for 
competing oligarchic influences than a single-handed decision making process by the President.  
This, as I discussed, was finalized in the agreement signed in the heat of the revolution between 
the Orange leaders and the outgoing regime, shifting the institutional setup of Ukraine form the 
semi-presidential to parliamentary model. 
 Furthermore, as the ‘grand-balancer’ Kuchma was preparing to leave the office, his 
prospective successor,’ Viktor Yanukovych, indicated that only certain oligarchic groups would 
be privileged. In this context, many Ukrainian oligarchs found it to be more profitable to put 
their stake with the opposition camp under the leadership of Viktor Yushchenko. Petro 
Poroshenko, a chocolate magnate, appeared at the front stage of the Orange protests; whereas 
others preferred less public gestures that involved backdoor negotiations and material support.  
Lucan Way (2008) estimated that Yushchenko’s presidential campaign cost over  $100 million 
that went to fund “nearly ubiquitous banners and logos; transport for poll observers and 
thousands of $300 video cameras to record violations on election day; enormous video screens 
and other equipment for rock concert–like demonstrations all over the country in the aftermath 
of the fraudulent election; and tents, camp kitchens, and other equipment to facilitate the 
occupation of central Kyiv” (2008, 65). Such influx of capital was from the large and medium 
Ukrainian business elites, the author argues, and Western funding for exit polls and other 
training programs pales in comparison, according to the author.  
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My interview with a Ukrainian activist also confirms that the aid from the West was 
primarily received through Western NGOs support to conduct trainings with their Serbian and 
Georgian counterparts, rather than direct financial contributions. Other insiders’ reports that 
look back at these events years after they took place also confirm that Western partners 
provided training, advising and analytical support rather than direct funding (Stetskiv 2016). 
With a history of buying deputy votes in Rada and experience of negotiating for key 
governmental appointments, some oligarchs approached Viktor Yushchenko early on after his 
resignation as a Prime Minister with proposals  of supporting his candidacy by ‘delivering’ him 
close to 10% of votes in Donbas region (Stetskiv 2016).This is the way in which these 
oligarchs, as predicted by Henry Hale (2005), were acting as party substitutes, promising votes 
in a system that was based on their connection to voters through the control over voters’ salaries 
and employment. Indeed, such tactic of voter pressure, intimidation, ballot stuffing and 
falsification to boost the electoral results to a desired number was later used by Kucha regime 
and his entourage in 2004 elections, sparking the onset of the active stage of the Orange 
revolution amid the accusations of electoral fraud.  
After the victory of Viktor Yushchenko, the Ukrainian oligarchs were in a waiting mode 
to see what his eventual policy toward big capital elites was going to be.  Certain oligarchic 
opponents that had lined behind Mr. Yanukovych were afraid of retributions. In fact, after 
Yushchenko left Presidential office, a former Orange colleague accused him of receiving bribes 
in cash from the very oligarchs who supported Yanukovych and Kuchma in return for security 
guarantees, which allegedly he agreed to provide to them (Tomenko 2012). 
Contrary to the Orange slogans promoting the cleansing of government from corrupted 
influences, none of retributive actions was put in practice. Rather, Viktor Yushchenko shied 
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away from the same role that Kuchma practiced in his relations of monitoring and arbitrage of 
oligarchs. On their part, the waiting mode for oligarchs was exacerbated by several extenuating 
circumstances. In the first few years of his presidency, Viktor Yushchenko underwent 26 
surgeries under general anesthesia to relieve him of the debilitating poisoning effects 
(Yushchenko 2014, 323). Secondly, the time of convalescence for Mr. Yushchenko during the 
first three months of his presidency combined with his extensive official visits abroad. 
According to some reports, it is both these personal and logistical reasons that combined to the 
general reluctance of Viktor Yushchenko to assume the same ‘arbiter’ role for oligarchs that 
Kuchma had previously held (Stetskiv 2016). 
Finally, as a matter of larger institutional change, the oligarchs were aware that the 
office of the President will shortly be stripped of the powers that made President Kuchma such 
an effective arbiter. As the shift towards parliamentarian republic rather than presidential one 
was looming in on the horizon of 2006, the newly vested Premiership and Rada were become 
more relevant in oligarch’s calculations of power and influence.  
Hence, a large majority of the oligarchs received a message that no arbitrage, balancing 
or punishment would be disbursed from Yushchenko’s office. Meanwhile, the Prime-Minister 
Yulia Tymoshenko, a former oligarch herself, conveyed another position early in her 
premiership in 2005. She stated that oligarchs are not to be jailed or persecuted, but rather that 
their capital needs to be “legalized” in Ukraine and fill the government coffers.  “I believe that 
oligarchs are not to be jailed but they are to be forced to share,” she said on record in April, 
2005 (Tymoshenko 2005). 
 In such way, this group of party substitutes received both assurances that no persecution 
for malfeasance or wrong political support was going to threaten their personal or their business 
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security at the beginning of the Orange regime. They were encouraged to come out of shadow, 
and become more publicly visible and engaged. In terms of their relative influence vis-à-vis 
each other or the rest of the government, the oligarchs were left to settle their affairs without 
Yushchenko’s direct interference, except for only a few that were connected by their rent-
seeking to him personally.  
In an effort to make oligarchs come out of shadow and ‘share’, the Orange regime 
introduced special quarterly meetings with Ukraine’s richest, although not everyone accepted 
the invitation or showed up to the meetings at Yushchenko’s request (Yushchenko Plans to 
Meet with Oligarchs Quarterly 2007). Further, the Ukrainian oligarchs were encouraged to 
become active contributors to government’s projects through charitable donations and other 
mechanisms.  A recently publicized document by the Zakarpattya Regional Administration head 
showcased corruption surrounding the Orange Presidential project “The Hospital of Future.” 
This was an innovative modern pediatric project, sponsored through “Ukraine 3000” Fund 
headed by the First Lady. The fund collected over $44 million by direct contributions from 
oligarchs themselves or their enterprises and funds (Moskal 2016).  Certain journalistic 
investigations show large mismanagement and misappropriation of these funds, which allegedly 
lined the pockets of the Orange leaders, and indeed, no clinic has been built yet (Private Clinic 
Instead of “The Hospital of the Future” in Ukraine 2016). 
Another similar “social responsibility project” by the President to bring oligarchs on 
board included an orphanage project “Give Warmth to a Child” headed by Yushchenko’s 
daughter, where the Ukrainian oligarchs of different political and regional ilk were among the 
constant financial contributors. They were personally hosted by the President for fundraisers 
(Leshchenko 2007). And in 2008 the President issued an official Decree # 61 on the 
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composition of the National Council on Charity “Give Warmth to a Child” that included Viktor 
Pinchuk, Petro Poroshenko, Dmytro Firtash, Serhiy Taruta and other prominent oligarchs,71 
who allegedly each received a region to ‘curate’ and sponsor for this project on continuous basis 
(Oligarchs Are Not Happy with Yushchenko’s Daughter 2008). 
From this brief illustration, we see that despite the Orange threats, very early on after the 
revolution, the Ukrainian oligarchs received personal and business security from the Orange 
camp. After oligarchs’ major concern for security and continued profit-making was satisfied, 
they waited on the ‘arbitrage’ from the top executive office, however, instead they were left to 
vie for relative economic influence and advantage vis-à-vis the government and between 
themselves. When it came to the engagement with political system, the oligarchs were 
encouraged to come out of shadow, which explains their growing number in both domestic and 
foreign wealthy lists. In addition, these business elites were given a new role of “socially 
responsible actors” that provided them a direct line of connection to President Yushchenko and 
his family.   
Finally, oligarchs’ parliamentary influence was slated to grow with the constitutional 
reform of 2006 that shifted Ukrainian electoral system to a closed list fully proportional set of 
rules. This institutional rearrangement provided incentives for oligarchs to engage not only as 
individual deputies but more importantly as the forefront sponsors, leaders and managers of 
political parties. Rinat Akhmetov, for instance, became a Rada deputy in 2006 and then again in 
snap elections of 2007 as a #5 and a # 3 on the party list of the Party of Regions respectively. 
																																												
71 Available in Ukrainian here, with a list of the oligarchs and other contributors as Council members: 
http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/612008-6986 
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To summarize,  the oligarchic influences were strong and privileged under President 
Kuchma, who had a balancing effect on oligarchs with a constant threat of authoritarian 
crackdown. Yet the oligarchic influence under the Orange regime not only remained strong, but 
it further expanded in both economic and political realms. This was done through the 
encouraged quasi-transparency, ‘social responsibility’ projects and direct involvement in party 
formation, organization and legislative activities without proper governmental vigilance as to 
their potentially harmful business or political practices. The political-oligarchic tie was not only 
unsevered during the Orange regime, but it further strengthened party-oligarchic-parliamentary 
dysfunction in Ukraine. 
 
6.3. Viktor Yushchenko and Oligarchic Foreign Interests 
 
As demonstrated above, Ukrainian oligarchs under the Orange regime became more 
publicly prominent and increasingly significant domestic political actors. In line with the 
poliheuristic approach adapted for the transitional politics, when it comes to foreign policy 
making, these oligarchic party substitutes were the domestic audience that the state leaders 
primarily considered in their foreign policy making. Thus, I now devote my attention to the 
foreign policy interests of oligarchs. I will then trace such interests to the Ukrainian foreign 
policy behavior in Chapter 7.   
The theoretical literature on the role of large business elites tends to hold a uniform view 
of their presumptive interests. Predominant economic models see large business groups as 
profit-driven rational actors who get involved in democratization in order to protect their own 
business interests (Bartell and Payne 1995). Coase theorem implies that new capital owners will 
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require good institutions to get security for their property rights. This approach treats oligarchs 
as a largely uniform group of actors who -  under similar conditions -  behave in comparable 
ways.  
Indeed, on one hand, as I observed, the structural constraints of the initial privatization 
dynamic in Ukraine, along with the consolidation of authoritarian power under Kuchma and his 
exit/power handover, equally pushed the Ukrainian oligarchs to seek indemnity, ‘krysha’ and 
other colluding mechanisms with government officials and institutions (e.g. parliamentary seats, 
etc.). In addition, certain economic preconditions affected many Ukrainian oligarchs in similar 
ways: domestic sources of privatization dried up by the early 2000s; no more hyperinflation was 
there to speculate on; and a more developed banking system and monetary reforms were in 
place instead. Further, the global financial crisis of 1997 that hit Asian markets and spread to 
Russia and Brazil, did reverberate in Ukraine exacerbating fiscal policy deficiencies (Petryk 
2006, 10–11). All these conditions affected the oligarchic wealth in comparable ways.  
In addition, many oligarchs faced analogous challenges of (re)establishing markets for 
their post-Soviet products that either did not meet Western quality standards or were produced 
with outdated technologies and intense labor, making them less competitive in world markets. 
Some scholars, in view of such common political and economic challenges, view the Ukrainian 
oligarchs as a group that pursues a common goal - internationalization and globalization of their 
business practices and diversification of their capital  (Melnykovska and Schweickert 2008).  
Others scholars are much less willing to treat oligarchs and their interests as a uniform 
block (Avioutskii 2010; Kudelia 2012; Matuszak Sławomir et al. 2012a). They emphasize that 
oligarchs with diverse business connections and interests pursued varying position on Ukraine’s 
domestic and foreign policies.  So far, in the current research I have approached the oligarchic 
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elites in Ukraine as one group albeit with some notable regional (Donetsk or other) or party 
affiliation differences (Orange supporters vs. Party of Regions). This is a standard approach in 
describing early, pre-Orange history of oligarchy in Ukraine.72 
However, as the dynamic of the relationship between the oligarchs and the Orange 
leaders became more solidified (i.e., no persecution; no arbitrage; more publicity; more ‘social 
responsibility’ and tacit support from the Orange camp), and the oligarchs switched more of 
their efforts towards party formation and management, distinct domestic and foreign policy 
positions became more apparent between various oligarchic groups. It would be neither possible 
nor productive to outline positions of each member of over two hundred Ukrainian millionaires.  
In addition, the global financial crisis significantly reduced the assets of many Ukrainian 
wealthy (Aslund 2015). And certain oligarchs coalesced around ‘clans’ headed by more 
prominent leaders (Matuszak Sławomir et al. 2012a). So, I find it more expedient to study their 
foreign policy positions by looking at major subgroups within the Ukrainian oligarchy that were 
directly connected to the foreign policy decision makers at that time.  
Thus, there were three central foreign policy makers: the President, the Prime-Minister 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in the Ukrainian political system of that period. 
As the 2006 constitutional reform left the prerogative of appointment and dismissal of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs with the President, during the transition, the Ministry as a 
government structure often acted as an arm of the President in matters of foreign policy. Hence, 
in this analysis I need examine the foreign policy interests of those oligarchs that President 
Yushchenko cultivated. I will analyze Viktor Yanukovych’s oligarchic ties in Chapter 8. 
																																												
72 See, for instance, Havrylyshyn (2016d), Solonenko (2014), Aslund (2015). 
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As for Viktor Yushchenko, his major oligarchic connections included first and foremost 
his political ally and future Minister of Foreign Affairs (2008-2011), Petro Poroshenko 
(Matuszak Sławomir et al. 2012a, 21). Yushchenko is also the godfather of Petro Poroshenko’s 
two daughters. Poroshenko’s major assets have been in food and auto industry as well as media. 
His business constitutes 25% of all Ukrainian confectionary branch73, with main export markets 
in Russia, Kazakhstan and Moldova, but also the EU members Lithuania and Estonia, as well as 
the US and with manufacturing plants both in Ukraine, Russia and Lithuania. His TV channel, 5 
Kanal, became a loudspeaker for the Orange revolution, broadcasting live coverage of the 
protests around the clock, which might have been an additional reason to dissuade Kuchma 
regime form cracking down on the protesters. 
Poroshenko’s main business and therefore political interests have been double-edged. 
On one hand, his major confectionary business exports are oriented, among others, toward 
Russia.74 His other business in shipbuilding (Kyiv-based “Kuznia na Rybalskim” plant) and 
Sevastopol Shipyard thrives on favorable relationships with Russia as well, having had the 
Russian Black Sea fleet in the Crimea as one of its major shipyard customers (until the 
annexation of the peninsular and nationalization of the major enterprises in the Crimea by 
Russia in 2014-2015).  
On the other hand, protecting the Ukrainian food markets from Russian competitors by 
not allowing the Ukrainian business to be consumed by Russian investors and owners has also 
																																												
73 According the official statistics by Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine: 
http://www.ukrexport.gov.ua/eng/ukr_export_exporters/?act=view&id=58&country=ukr 
74 Of particular note are the trade wars between Ukraine and Russia, and the 2013 “chocolate war” that exposed the 
vulnerabilities of Poroshenko’s company, Roshen, to the pressure from the Russian government. For more, see for 
instance: http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2013/08/12/389401/ 
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been an important priority for Poroshenko business as well. Further,  with his extensive 
marketing network for selling his products abroad, Poroshenko falls into the mold of those 
oligarchs that Melnykovska and Scheweickert (2008) describe as a potential advocates for pro-
Western, pro-EU positions due to financial globalization pushing Ukrainian oligarchs to pursue 
more globally oriented, rather than regionally bound foreign policy views. In the end, the most 
desirable balance for Poroshenko at that time was not to upset the favorable trade relationship 
with Russia, while looking to expand towards new markets in Europe and larger abroad. 
The second powerful oligarchic formation supporting and receiving favors from 
Yushchenko during his presidency was an infamous entity RosUkrEnergo (RUE). Much ink has 
been spilled on this controversial intermediary that was set up in 2004  and until 2009 
functioned as an exclusive importer of Russian and Turkmen gas to Ukraine (Aslund 2015; 
Balmaceda 2013a; Kuzio 2015; Matuszak Sławomir et al. 2012a). Even more whirlwind of 
publications and discussion was generated on this subject in the Ukrainian media.  The two 
equal stakeholders in RUE were the Russian state enterprise Gazprom and Dmytro Firtash, a 
Ukrainian oligarch (through his consortium GDF Group). In effect, instead of direct Gazprom 
supplies to the Ukrainian state company, Naftohaz, RUE extracted rents through artificially 
regulated prices, a mechanism which over a span of five years cost Ukraine 2,668 million USD 
in losses and eventually became a legal case matter in both Kyiv and New York.75 Kuzio (2015, 
396–97) convincingly shows how RUE was connected through GDF Group to Leonid Kuchma, 
who continued to have an influence in post-Orange Ukraine. Matuszak (2012) delineates that 
connection further and shows RUE’s two-folded influence on both Yushchenko and 
																																												
75 According to a recent estimate of the Ukrainian Minister of the Interior Arsen Avakov: 
https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2015/06/26/548408/ 
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Yanukovych camps.  Both authors list Yushchenko’s reluctance to press the investigation of 
illegality of RUEs deals launched by Yulia Tymoshenko as well as certain Firtash-connected 
appointments as clear signs of Yushchenko’s involvement with RUE.76 
Firtash’s major business interests are inextricably linked to trading in gas and 
manufacture of nitrogen fertilizer. He holds a near monopoly with 4 out of 6 Ukrainian plants in 
this industry.  The profits from the nitrogen fertilizer business are directly linked with the prices 
of the gas, since these fertilizers use it a raw material. His firm Ostchem also has holdings in 
titanium ore production in the Crimea and through other partners he controls Inter TV, one of 
the most popular TV channels in Ukraine. In short, during the Orange regime, Firtash and RUE 
are inextricably linked through their rent-seeking mechanisms to predominantly Russian 
influences. This is because this business favors strong connections between the buyer, i.e. the 
Ukrainian state and the supplier, i.e. Russian Gazprom of its ultimate product of the Ukrainian 
energy dependence, the natural gas. 
Ihor Kolomoiskyi was another Ukrainian oligarch who supported the Orange leaders. 
According to his own statements, ended up contributing $5 million to the Orange camp before 
																																												
76 Yulia Tymoshenko’s oligarchic connections were more sophisticated, as she attempted to purge some of them 
(RUE) out of the position of political influence since they threw their weight behind her contenders. For instance, 
she opened a re-privatization of a Ukrainian enterprise Kryvorizhstal, the largest Ukrainian steel company owned by 
two Kuchma-tied oligarchs, Akhmetov and Pinchuk. In 2004 at the stacked-card auction Akhmetov and Pinchuk 
bought Kryvorizhstal for $800 millions. Shortly after her appointment in 2005, Tymoshenko issued a government 
order for its resale and finally, in a widely televised auction the enterprise sold for $4,5 billion to Mittal Steel 
company from India.  
  In the middle of the Ukraine-Russia gas war 2009, without Yushchenko’s agreement she flew to Moscow 
and in talks with Mr. Putin renegotiated the gas agreement between Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftohaz, 
albeit at a price that was not favorable for Ukraine in a long-term perspective, but which nonetheless excluded RUE 
from any intermediary role. The gas deal was later used as grounds for President Yanukovych to open a case against 
Tymoshenko for “abuse of office” and it subsequently led to her second arrest (the first was by President Kuchma in 
2000) and imprisonment from 2011 to 2014. She was rehabilitated in 2014 by Supreme Court of Ukraine following 
the Euromaidan revolution. In a more recent development on the 2009 gas deal with Russia, on May 31, 2017 
Stockholm International Arbitration tribunal ruled in favor of Ukraine’s not paying for undelivered gas worth $34.5 
billion provisioned by the gas deal. https://www.ft.com/content/47bcd385-9eca-309b-b018-18423a05b11c 
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the regime change. His financial support grew, however, once Yushchenko team was installed 
in office: in parliamentary elections of 2006 and 2007 he personally contributed to “Our 
Ukraine” campaign (Yushchenko’s party) a total of 40 million dollars (Kolomoiskyi 2008). 
 Ihor Kolomoiskyi’s major business assets totaled $1,6 billion in 2017 according to 
Forbes estimates. He accrued most of his capital through Privat Group that is largely invested in 
banking, petrochemical industry, domestic airlines and media. The major foreign policies could 
also be deduced from a range of business interests Kolomoiskyi holds. Some key revenue 
producing assets under control of Privat Group are located in the Southern parts of Ukraine, 
including three ferroalloy plants (in Zaporizhzhia, Nikopol, Stakhanov) and Kremenchutsk oil 
refinery. Thus, it has been speculated by some Ukrainian experts that building a strong political 
counterweight to Kyiv in the Southern part of Ukraine, similarly to Donbass area would be 
politically beneficial to Kolomoiskyi. However, in contrast to separatist aspirations in the East 
of Ukraine, Kolomoiskyi had conflictual relations with some Russian oligarchs who made their 
way into the Ukrainian market to the point of drawing Mr. Putin’s attention to his ‘schemes.’ 
The latter called him a swindler and scammer, whereas Kolomoiskyi referred to Putin as a 
“schizophrenic” (Levinski 2014). 
 Overall, Kolomoiskyi domestic air business interests would be strongly challenged by 
competition from the low-cost European airlines, which logically would prompt him not to 
favor certain terms of the Association Agreement with the EU that was in preparation during the 
transition. But this Ukrainian oligarch eventually took a very strong anti-Russian position, 
vividly expressed in the ongoing armed conflict in the East of Ukraine. In particular, he voiced 
support to build a wall on a porous border between Russia and Ukraine; funded far-right 
political party “Svoboda;” organized a voluntary armed regiment that he sponsored in order to 
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fight on the Ukrainian side of the ongoing conflict; and finally, suggested that assets of the 
Russian oligarchs who support the break-away republics should be nationalized and shares 
turned over to the Ukrainian soldiers who fought in the East. And as an appointed governor of 
Dnipropetrovsk in 2014 he petitioned for parts of Donetsk oblast to be joined to his region. 
Thus, Kolomoiskyi foreign policy interests could be summarized as in general oriented towards 
minimizing Russian financial and business and political presence and pressure on Ukraine. 
To encapsulate, a brief examination of Viktor Yushchenko’s connections to oligarchic 
circles shows that even though there was a protectionist stance as far as Ukrainian producers 
were concerned (e.g. Poroshenko), the major thrust of business relations was directed towards 
favorable trading and cooperation with Russia while at the same time seeking to expand their 
products to other, new markets. A foreign policy confrontation with Russia, would hugely 
disrupt the existing rent-seeking mechanism that connected the Ukrainian oligarchs and the 
Ukrainian politicians, whereas further trade liberalization with the EU was most economically 
favored interest of the Ukrainian rich. 
 In summary, in this Chapter I have delineated the early emergence, rise and further 
incorporation of oligarchic groups into the Ukrainian political system throughout the 
transitional period. I outlined the general interests of this politicized business group as a whole: 
seeking increased revenues, protection and influence in the corrupt business-government-
business circle. Further, I specified the connections that the Orange leaders had to several key 
oligarchic figures. I concluded that based off of their primary business interests, in their 
predominance, the Ukrainian oligarchs tied to Yushchenko were in favor of keeping working 
and stable relationship with the neighboring Russia, whereas they were also increasingly more 
interested in expanding to new markets, with the EU prominently on the horizon.   
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Chapter 7  
UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 2005-2009 
 
In Chapter 2 dealing with theoretical foundations of the current research, I have 
discussed some of the challenges that the foreign policy analysis as a field faces. Among them 
were the necessity to integrate multiple levels of analysis of foreign policy (actor, group, state 
and international) in a comprehensive theoretical framework; and the need to shed more light on 
political contexts of foreign policies in non-Western and non-great power states. My research is 
posed to make a mid-range theoretical contribution to these challenges as I decipher the 
Ukrainian foreign policy in the transitional years after the watershed Orange revolution. 
In this sense, the Ukrainian foreign policy and its changes in transition years is my 
explanandum. It needs to be noted, as Breuning (2007, 7) aptly observes, that “foreign policy 
analysts do not always seek to explain the same thing.”  She remarks that at times, when foreign 
policy is the focus of the explanandum, ‘choices,’ ‘decisions’ and ‘behavior’ could be easily 
used interchangeably, and yet there is a marked difference. Whereas foreign policy options refer 
to a range of possible choices, foreign policy decision is “the option that was chosen, i.e. the 
choice” (ibid). Foreign policy behavior is the acting out of the decision, which “consists of the 
actions taken to influence the behavior of an external actor or to secure a benefit for the country 
itself” (ibid).  Yet, what also needs to be emphasized, she continues is that “much still can 
happen between the making of a decision and its implementation” (e.g. bureaucratic blocking or 
ignoring orders etc.), which means that at times “observed foreign policy behavior is not always 
exactly what the decision makers indented.”  Furthermore, once a decision is taken and foreign 
policy behavior ensues, the resulting outcome may not necessarily align with the state’s 
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intended goal, because “foreign policy outcome” is yet a further abstraction and a result of 
interaction of two or more states. 
This is an important point to bear in mind as I proceed to examine the empirical material 
pertaining to the Ukrainian foreign policy and its changes in recent transitional years. In the 
empirical Chapters 4-6, I have focused on the foreign policy decision making as a process, 
influenced by variety of individual-level factors (e.g. shortened time horizons for re-election), 
group-level factors (role of parties and party substitutes) and state level factors (state building 
and democratization efforts etc.). In my analysis, all these factors had their place and impact in 
the causal mechanism that I elaborated based on poliheuristic theoretical foundation.  
In Chapter 7, my focus is different. I now proceed to examine the foreign policy as 
behavior exhibited at the state level. It should not be confused, however, with foreign policy 
outcomes, in line with the above discussion of by Marijke Breuning. Indeed, after policy 
options are formulated and decisions are made, an implementation stage ensues where actors 
strategically act or refrain from particular actions resulting in a behavior pattern.  I treat such 
behavior as “strategically relational” where actors pursue attainment of their goals intelligible 
when analyzed in relation to their proper context (e.g. other actors) (Brighi 2013). This goal-
oriented foreign policy behavior does not necessarily result in the desired foreign policy 
outcome, since its effects may be counteracted, mitigated etc. by other actors involved.  
 To underscore, my explanandum - the foreign policy behavior -  are “those actions, 
which expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and 
pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are 
directed towards objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – 
	 156	
which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy” (Carlsnaes et al. 
2002, 335). 
In this line, I will look both at the stated goals as well as actions pursued by the official 
representatives of the Ukrainian government. In other words, the empirical material I deal with 
are both “verbalized” and stated goals in official documents, communications, etc. and “non-
verbalized” actions - delegation visits, foreign trade inflows, cooperation projects, economic 
activities in energy sectors etc, as I clarified in Chapter 3.  
Thus, this Chapter will proceed as follows.  First, in subsection 7.1. I set the contextual 
background by examining the foreign policy in final years of Kuchma’s presidency. This 
purview is necessarily brief since it primarily serves to provide a backdrop for further analysis 
of the subsequent foreign policy of the Orange regime. In subsection 7.2 I will proceed to study 
both verbalized and non-verbalized foreign policy behavior of the Orange government and 
establish the level of change in the Orange foreign policy compared to the previous regime. 
Finally, I process trace the party substitute interests in the pursued foreign policy behavior in 
subsection 7.3 and show how oligarchs in question primarily benefitted from such policies. 
 
7.1.  Background: President Kuchma’s Foreign Policies - “Ukraine is Not Russia” 
 
President Kuchma took over the leadership of the Ukrainian state when it was in a very 
precarious international position. Ukraine, situated on the proverbial borderlands of both the 
expanding European Union and the increasingly internationally assertive Russian Federation, 
had a difficult lot of potential cooperation and threats.  
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In 1997, one of the key elements in solidifying Ukraine’s official international position 
was the signature of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Partnership between the 
Ukraine and Russia by President Kuchma and President Yeltsin. In this treaty, the post-Soviet 
border between Ukraine and Russia was officially recognized and the respect for territorial 
integrity between the two states was clearly articulated.  However, the limbo of this mutual 
recognition dragged for almost another two years until the Russian Federation Council, the 
upper chamber of the Russian legislature, ratified the treaty in 1999. The Council also noted that 
the Treaty was a subject to a successful ratification of the concurrent agreements on the status of 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet that had been signed by the Presidents a few days prior to the 
Treaty itself.77  
With that, a major contention surrounding the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was 
being settled.  The final solution was Ukraine’s leasing the naval base to the Russian Federation 
until 2017. Nonetheless, territorial disputes simmering in the area continued. In 2003, a conflict 
over the Tuzla Island positioned in the Kerch Strait between the Ukrainian and Russian borders 
erupted when the Russian authorities started a dam construction in proximity of the island. The 
construction froze only a hundred meters short of the Ukrainian border patrol line, and initiated 
a vigorous array of diplomatic exchanges and military movements.   
At the same time as Kuchma worked to solidify Ukraine’s international position vis-à-
vis its Eastern neighbor, he strategically intensified efforts to reach out to the European Union.  
Only a few months after the 1997 treaty with Russia, Ukraine held its first Ukraine-EU summit 
																																												





that was soon followed by the first meeting of the Council on Cooperation between the EU and 
Ukraine. It was in the format of this summit that Ukraine first pronounced its wish to become an 
associated member of the EU. Kuchma further increased his diplomatic efforts to reach out to 
the EU by issuing a Presidential decree on “The Strategy of Ukraine’s Integration to the EU” in 
June 1998. The response from the EU followed as the EU Summit in Vienna met and decided to 
develop its own response strategy on Ukraine. The EU partners announced the beginning of the 
free trade discussions with Ukraine at the EU Summit in Koln in 1999, and finally produced 
“Common Strategy on Ukraine” by the end of the same year.  
Similarly, Ukraine-NATO relationships saw a number of milestones during the same 
time. In 1997 Ukraine signed a Charter on Distinctive Partnership with NATO and established 
its first diplomatic mission to this organization. The following year the NATO –Ukraine Joint 
Working group was established. In 1999, in the middle of growing tensions between NATO and 
Russia over Kosovo, a new NATO Liaison office opened in Kyiv. Following that, three hundred 
Ukrainian soldiers along with their Polish colleagues took part in NATO-led peacekeeping force 
in the Balkans the same year. 
  On the wings of such foreign policy steps towards closer relations with the EU and 
NATO, Kuchma ran for his second term in office in 1999 as a pro-European and Western-
oriented candidate, in stark relief to his major Communist opponent. Such foreign policy 
positions turned out to be not consistent with the preferences of the Russian Federation for the 
Ukrainian foreign relations. Under the ascending Premiership of Mr. Putin, for the first time in 
2000 “the geopolitical issues were linked to economic ones”:  in the middle of negotiation for 
oil supply cuts from Russia, President Kuchma was pressured to “re-adjust” his western vector 
of Ukraine’s foreign relations and give more weight to cooperation with Russia (Sherr 2009, 
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171) .  This was further underscored by the Russian pressure on Kuchma’s government to 
dismiss a very pro-EU active Foreign Minister, Borys Tarasyuk in order to assuage Moscow 
concerns (ibid). 
As the domestic crisis over Kuchmagate tapes gripped the country in 2000 and the 
subsequent waves of the anti-government protests ensued, the Ukrainian President found 
himself to be also facing an increasing international isolation: the tapes allegedly exposed his 
tacit agreement for Ukraine to supply intelligence equipment to Iraq, which went against the 
ongoing efforts by the US and the UK to disarm Iraq of its nuclear potential and biological and 
chemical weapons.  President Kuchma’s visit to NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002 
underscored the Western states’ dissatisfaction with Ukraine’s foreign dealings. Kuchma had 
been asked not to attend, but he arrived at the Summit regardless. So, for the first time in the 
Summit’s history the organizers changed the seating of the heads of states according to French, 
not English alphabet in order to prevent seating the Ukrainian president between the UK and the 
US leaders. This was widely seen as a sign of diplomatic ostracizing of President Kuchma.78  
Similarly, the EU-Ukraine relations suffered a setback with little or no progress made 
in 2002-2004 (Zagorski 2004). On one hand, EU was more vociferously articulating its 
discontent with growing authoritarianism of Kuchma regime (Tolstrup 2013). On the other 
hand, it was also due to an averted focus on the greatest enlargement in the EU history -  ten 
new members were to join the Union in 2004. 
																																												
78	New York Times, November 23, 2002  
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 In this context of growing isolation, Kuchma developed another orientation for 
Ukraine’s foreign policy: the regional international cooperation to the exclusion of the 
traditional great powers. Thus, during the 55th Session of the UN General Assembly in New 
York, he worked with the leaders of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova to form a new 
international organization “for democracy and economic development.”79 Several months later, 
in April 2001, these leaders were invited to Ukraine to sign the GUAM (after the first letters of 
the participating states)80 founding document, the Yalta Charter. The Charter delineated trade, 
transportation and security issues areas of cooperation between the states. The energy security 
was also paramount, since all participating states, with the exception of Azerbaijan, were energy 
dependent on Russian gas and/or oil. Some analysts suggested that such organization was a 
statement to move away of Russia’s proverbial “sphere of influence” and pursue policies 
without supervision or participation of this regional hegemon (Alyson Bailes, Baranovsky, and 
Dunay 2007, 180). 
Thus, Kuchma’s presidency showcased a foreign policy with a variety of highs and 
lows, with fundamentals of cooperation and some simmering contention. Forging its stakes as 
an independent international actor, Ukraine established key framework documents and 
mechanisms for its relations with multiple regional and international players – from Treaty of 
Friendship with Russia to strategic agreements with NATO, EU and GUAM, to highlight a few. 
Kuchma’s foreign policy approach, thus, was often described as “multi-vector,” i.e. pursuing 
multiple foreign policy orientations that might be deemed inconsistent due to the ideological 
aspirations that cannot be logically combined, such as allegedly selling Kolchuga radar systems 
																																												
79 This is taken from the Organization’s motto. 
80 Uzbekistan was a member from 1999 to 2005. 
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to Iraq and courting NATO cooperation at the same time. Kuchma, in fact, prided himself on 
such “multi-vectorism,” considering it in hindsight to be “an important achievement” of his 
presidency (Kuchma 2006). 
However, such approach, turned out to be ineffective as far as the desired foreign policy 
outcomes.  Towards the end of Kuchma’s term, cooperation with EU and NATO was stalled. 
The US was open about its hopes for a more reformist next leader. And Russia challenged the 
Ukrainian economic and state sovereignty with gas and oil supply cuts and the Tuzla Island 
incident. Kuchma simultaneously sought to rectify these by seeking NATO Membership Action 
plan in 2004 and by sending the third largest military contingent to the US-led coalition forces 
in Iraq. Concurrently, Kuchma invited Russian politicians (e.g., Mr. Putin) to throw their 
support behind his protégé, a Ukrainian presidential hopeful, Viktor Yanukovych.  
Kuchma courted the Russian policymakers with his 2003 book entitled “Ukraine is Not 
Russia,” printed in Ekaterinburg by a Moscow publisher (Kuchma 2003).  At the book launch in 
the Russian capital, he attempted to smooth out sharp ethnic and international angles in the 
ongoing Russian –Ukrainian relations, albeit in his characteristic multi-faceted and multi-
vektorial style. “A Russian democrat ends where the Ukrainian question starts” he quoted on 
one hand, but also reassured that “Any Ukrainian President will be Russia’s man in Kyiv, 
because other kind of man Ukraine will neither understand and nor accept” (“Ukraine is Not 
Russia:” What Leonid Kuchma Wrote About 2003). 
 This quintessential definition of Ukraine as a country and state from the negative, as in 
the title of the book -  in other words of what Ukraine was not, rather than what it essentially 
was or, furthermore, could aspire to become on international arena -  is a good metaphor 
summarizing Kuchma’s foreign policy. In 1994-2004 Ukraine managed to solidify its initial 
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recognition as a fully-fledged actor in post-Soviet international relations, distinct from other 
post-Soviet states. Yet it failed to define what precisely Ukraine sought as an international actor, 
i.e. what single-focused foreign policy goals it preferred, especially in the context when the EU 
was unprecedentedly enlarging on its borders, and Russia was seeking to play a role in 
Ukraine’s domestic politics. Such was the foreign relations background against which the 
Orange president succeeded Kuchma and thus set out to fashion his own, new foreign policy 
that I analyze below. 
 
7.2.  “The European Ukraine” of President Yushchenko: Between Words and Deeds 
 
When Viktor Yushchenko took power in January 2005 he was widely seen as a pro-
Western candidate, with both EU and US global leaders cheering for his candidacy (albeit very 
cautiously on the part of EU81). The Russian media, to the contrary vilified him as “a puppet of 
the West.” Indeed, the presidential campaign and the Orange revolution brought into contrast 
two foreign policy orientations for the country to follow-  towards the EU vs. Russia -  in stark 
contrast to each other.  
Prior to the Orange revolution, when the Ukrainian politics were taking on more 
authoritarian and oligarchic characteristics under the Kuchma regime, both the EU and Russia 
were engaged predominantly in their own version of “regime promotion” in Ukraine (Smith 
2016). But the Orange revolution became a watershed event, and a new era characterized by 
some scholars as “the return of the geopolitics” dawned (Tolstrup 2013). In the triangle of the 
																																												
81 See Tolstrup (2014, 158) for more details. 
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EU, Ukraine, and Russia, the zero-sum security perceptions started to figure more centrally in 
the tools of foreign policy towards Ukraine by the two power hegemons who strove to construct 
their respective security systems with compliant Ukraine on their borders (Smith 2016). 
Thus, Ukraine’s “multi-vektorism” was not any more a palatable option for either side of 
the Ukrainian border. The EU was averse to Kuchma’s threats in the late 2004 to reject Ukraine-
EU Action Plan if concrete membership prospects for Ukraine were not spelled out. And when 
it was not, he went as far as to suggest that NATO and EU membership should be excluded 
from Ukraine’s defense doctrine (Kubicek 2007, 135; Pentland 2008).  
 In Russia, the leadership was uneasy about the prospects of Ukraine’s NATO 
membership, which would expand even more widely to the Russian borders after Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania joined both EU and NATO in 2004.82In addition, all other post-
communist states acceding to EU in that time frame followed the similar pattern: Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovakia became NATO members in 2004 and simultaneously either became a 
member of the EU or had Accession Treaties on the way. Ukraine’s indeterminate “multi-
vektorism” was an irritant in the Russian security calculations. 
 
7.2.1.  The Orange Government and the EU, 2005-2009: Foreign Policy Program Change 
 
Scholars who commented on the post-revolutionary Ukraine-EU relations have 
conflicting evaluations as to the achievements and failures of Ukraine’s foreign policy in this 
regard. Tosltrup (2013, 205), for instance, remarks that “[i]n the years following the Orange 
																																												
82 Poland was already bordering Russia as a NATO member since 1999. 
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revolution, bilateral relations between Ukraine and the EU flourished.”  Gretskiy (2013, 9) 
similarly remarks on a “new intensity and effectiveness of the EU-Ukraine relations, immensely 
boosted after the Orange revolution.” Kuzio (2012, 2015), however, notes that President 
Yushchenko’s foreign policy program was similar to the 5-year plans typical for the communist 
rule: they looked fabulous on paper, but in effect were an unattainable, half-empty rhetoric. 
Similarly, Dragneva and Wolczuk (2015, 36) also noted a gap between words and deeds of the 
Ukrainian leaders as far as their EU foreign policy is concerned, calling it a “declarative 
Europeanization.” Mychajlyszyn (2008, 49), on the other hand remarks that President 
Yushchenko’s policy towards EU was promising as regards Ukraine finally ending its post-
Soviet security and identity “fluctuations” and firmly orienting itself towards the EU. Semeniy, 
in contrast, midway through President Yushchenko’s term already assessed his failure to 
capitalize on the “Eurointegration” drive and deliver concrete achievements in the EU-Ukraine 
relations (2007, 128).  
How are we to make sense of these contradictory assessments of Ukraine’s foreign 
relations with the EU during the presidential term of Viktor Yushchenko? The analytical 
framework that I use in this research helps to clarify this. As pointed out above, I make an 
distinction between Ukraine’s foreign policy behavior (verbalized and non-verbalized) and 
foreign policy outcomes (the results of the implemented foreign policies). For the purposes of 
this research, I examine the foreign policy behavior proper, noting any difference in “what is 
done, how it is done and the purposes for which it is done” (C. F. Hermann 1990, 5) -  in both 
official communication (verbalized foreign policy behavior) and official institutional activities 
(such as delegation visits, cooperation programs, trade dynamic etc.  - non-verbalized foreign 
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policy behavior). Such approach helps to detect any possible foreign policy changes and 
determine their level of magnitude. 
As for the verbalized foreign policy towards the EU, Viktor Yushchenko ran on a 
presidential campaign that did not explicitly mention any foreign policy preferences. His 
program, “The 10 Steps Towards People” included the only reference to Ukraine as a 
“European” country.  The 2004 presidential races, however, started to acquire a more 
contentious and polarizing character, especially after Viktor Yushchenko’s poisoning. Facing a 
clearly pro-Russian opponent, Yushchenko’s rhetoric regarding the democratic advancement 
and rule of law became quickly associated for both Ukrainian public and foreign observers with 
a pro-Western foreign policy orientation. Viktor Yushchenko embraced these electoral 
preferences and in his inaugural speech declared that “my goal is Ukraine in the united Europe” 
since “our [Ukrainian] place is in the European Union” because “together with Europe we 
[Ukrainians] belong to the same civilization and we share its values.”(Yushchenko 2004). 
The 2005 Government Program for the Cabinet of Ministers prominently featured the 
“European integration” as “the priority for the Government’s work.” In fact, it was placed at the 
very top of the agenda in the Program’s section on world affairs. Furthermore, the Ukrainian 
government was cognizant of previous foreign policy discrepancies and stated in this Program 
that “[t]his government will move from its declaratory manner to concrete measures that will 
take the relations with the EU to the level of membership prospects” (Program of Activity for 
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Towards People” 2005). Aware of the challenges of 
implementation, the Program also listed 13 action points for the Government. It included 
training of the staff to deal with the European integration issues; implementation of the existing 
EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (or PAC, signed by Ukraine in 1994, and 
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by the EU in 1998 for ten years). It also listed developing a new Strategy for Cooperation with 
the EU aimed at the prospective membership; and acquiring the “market economy” status in 
anti-dumping dealings with the EU. Finally, it aimed at establishing the “free trade zone” with 
the EU; and continuing to participate in NATO “Partnership for Peace” among else.83  
A range of other official Ukrainian documents soon followed treating the 
“Eurointegration,” i.e. the integration into the EU, in the same manner. My search of the 
electronic archives of the Ukrainian government yielded 364 documents that bear the “European 
integration” in their title from 1991 to present.84 These include any documents that were issued 
by any state agencies with the status of “higher organ of state power,” according to the 
Ukrainian nomenclature.85  It is interesting to note that prior to Kuchma presidency there were 




83 It is worth noting that whereas NATO and EU memberships are separate issue areas, in the Ukrainian perspective 
the relations with the EU the two are interconnected. They are often listed under the label of “evroatlantychnyi” i.e. 
Euro-Atlantic cooperation or integration. And even though EU and NATO membership for Ukraine have been 
separate processes due to the difference in the international actors involved, domestic popular opinion and regional 
dynamic, the two memberships are nonetheless often treated as concurrent in Ukrainian policymaking, as seen in 
this 2005 Program. The integration into the EU or “Eurointegration,” however, is featured more prominently in this 
document than NATO or US cooperation.  
84 My search of documents that included “European Integration” in the body of text yielded 3390 items. My choice 
of analyzing only the documents with “European integration” in the titles stems from the fact that many of these 
documents cite each other in the body of their texts, therefore multicollinearity is introduced. The online archive of 
the official Ukrainian documents (http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws) does not allow to resolve it in the existing format. 
A future research project may address that challenge. 
85 Some agencies, for instance do not have “Ministry” in their title, but are considered “higher organs” such as the 
Office of the President of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, National Bank of Ukraine etc., a total number of 19 
governmental bodies. Records of the Ministry of Economy are available only starting from 2005.  
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As we see from the table, in general, the document activity of government agencies 
issuing documents that had “European integration” in their title was practically similar during 
both Kuchma and Yushchenko terms. However, during Yanukovych term the European 
integration dropped in title mentioning by the government agencies significantly - by seven 
times. Granted, this statistic is meant to reflect only the thematic direction of documents and 
does not differentiate as to the level of importance of documents (e.g. a Law of Ukraine vs. a 
																																												
86 I include this category of post-2014 Transitional government and President Poroshenko’s current tenure for 
comparative reasons. The latter’s foreign policy is very strongly pro-European and pro- Euro-Atlantic integration, 
given the annexation of the Crimea and the conflict in the Eastern part of Ukraine. Maidan is the shortened name for 
Maidan Nezalezhnosti (the Independence Square), the heart of the protests in 2004 and 2014-2015. “Maidan” now 
also denotes in the contemporary Ukrainian language a popular protest and aspirations for political change. 
87 This is the date of my most research search, but Poroshenko’s government is still in office as of the time of 
writing of this paper. 
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Memorandum of Understanding with Country X vs. a Presidential decree etc.). Such an analysis 
may prove to be fruitful for future exploration. Another caution in interpreting these results 
should be taken as regards any amended versions of the same document: such amendments are 
not included in this statistic. For instance, the Law of Ukraine on State Program for Adaptation 
of the Ukrainian Law to the European Union Law was signed into force by President Kuchma 
on March 18, 2004, about 10 months before he left office. It appears as one of the documents 
with the “European integration” in the title among the listed 199 items. Later, this Law was 
amended three times, once during Yushchenko’s term in 2009, and twice during Yanukovych’ 
term in 2010 and 2011. These amendments are not included in the respective counts for the two 
Presidents however, since they are not coded under a new number in the Ukrainian 
documentation system. Hence, what Table 7.1 reflects, in essence, is new initiatives that 
necessitated the issue of new documents during the term in office.88  
As for the non-verbalized foreign policy behavior, I examined an annotated 
chronological register of the Ukrainian international relations. This register is the official 
publication of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, compiled by the Institute of 
History of Ukraine, the highest research institution in Ukraine. Their historical series on the 
Ukrainian foreign relations is comprised of three volumes, covering the periods 1991-2003, 
2004-2007 and 2008-2013. These chronological registers have a format of a list of events in 
																																												
88 To note, some of the ‘new’ documents included in this group of 364 items are issued to abolish old initiatives, and 
they are included in this count since the Ukrainian nomenclature assigns a new identification number to a document 
that reverses the force or abolishes an existing document. However, if an existing document is amended, it is not 
considered ‘new’ to the system, but receives an extended number from the original document. Thus, to a degree 
Table 7.1 reflects an activity to completely reverse a predecessor government actions, but not to tweak it. However, 
from my preliminary analysis such acts of reversals constitute about 7% of the total number of items.  Another 
future research project could potentially explore the dynamic of how many EU-issue related documents from one 
regime were amended or abolished by the subsequent one, but such exploration is presently out of scope of this 
dissertation.  
	 169	
Ukraine’s relations with a particular country. Ukraine’s relations with each country are then 
grouped according to the regional and geographical principle. Ukraine’s foreign relations with 
the EU are listed in addition to Ukraine’s relations with each EU member.89 The events 
included in these registers are of varied nature and not limited to the official visits and meetings 
of the Ukrainian government representatives and respective officials of a given state, but also 
include momentous cultural events shared by the two countries; visits and cooperation between 
political party leaders and local self-governments; and other various events that pertain to 
Ukraine’s relations with that country. These three publications of the National Academy of 
Science draw on the official printed press of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine, as well as on news from the official websites of the Ukrainian agencies.90 
According to this chronology, 185 events are listed in Ukraine’s relations with the EU 
during Viktor Yushchenko’s term. These events include diverse level executive and legislative 
delegation visits and meetings of Ukrainian and the EU representatives; signature of official 
documents; key announcements related to financial and technical aid as well as cooperation 
projects. In order to establish how this level of activity is indicative of a foreign policy change, I 
am guided by the categorization developed by Hermann (1990) discussed in Chapter 2 
(adjustment change, program change, goal change and orientation change).  
Earlier in this Chapter I showed that the EU integration was indeed part and parcel of 
Kuchma’s foreign policy. Therefore, Yushchenko’s foreign policy change cannot be qualified as 
“orientation change” which would involve a complete redirection in actor’s orientation towards 
																																												
89 Ukraine’s relations international organizations are listed in this source separately as well. 
90 The authors of this publication discuss their sources and selection method in the preface to the second publication 
in the series covering 2004-2007. 
	 170	
worlds affairs. Similarly, Yushchenko’s intensified EU integration efforts are not a goal change 
of foreign policy. Indeed, I have demostrated that such goal had been articulated in prior official 
Ukrainian documents, even if it stayed at the level of proclamation rather than serious 
implementation. On the other hand, such policy change is not quantitative (in terms of the 
number of document activity of under Yushchenko), and thus cannot be defined as an 
adjustment change. Rather, there is marked difference in means and methods applied to achieve 
the same goal of the EU integration under President Kuchma vs. President Yushchenko. It 
points me to the conclusion that the Ukrainian foreign policy experienced a PROGRAM 
CHANGE after the Orange revolution. 
Further evidence from the Ukrainian foreign policy during this time also points in this 
direction. The new means and methods included the initiative of the Orange regime to 
incorporate the EU integration goal into the very depths of its bureaucratic machinery. In 
particular, in 2005, the government created the position of a Vice prime minister for European 
integration, answerable to the Prime Minister of Ukraine. Further, for the first time in April 
2005, having signed a new EU-Ukraine Action Plan, the Ukrainian government had a 
mechanism of its implementation with the so called “roadmaps” for 2005 and 2006. The 
itemized activities were detailed for specific agencies to meet the expectations of the Action 
plan for various sectors and issues, such as the rule of law, the accession to World Trade 
Organization and removing trade restriction between Ukraine and the EU among else. These 
were concrete templates against which both parties could now evaluate progress or stalemate in 
their relations that had not been in place before. 
Another new mechanism was employed to harmonize the depths of the Ukrainian 
bureaucratic procedures to the EU standards and procedures at the level of diverse agencies. The 
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EU Twinning program, originally developed to bring new candidate members in compliance 
with the EU set of rules, directives, laws and regulations (acquis communautaire) was extended 
to Ukraine. Twinning programs aimed to deepen administrative, regulatory and procedural 
harmonization of the Ukrainian sectoral agencies and their policies with the corresponding EU 
ones by ‘twinning’ respective Ukrainian agencies with those of an EU member state. The areas 
of twinning Ukrainian sectors ranged from aviation to agriculture, rule of law and the training of 
civil servants etc. Twenty-seven Twinning projects were in identified for potential cooperation 
in 2006 and four of them were in active preparation the same year. Six were launched into the 
implementation stage the year after. By the end of 2010, ten Twinning projects of pairing 
Ukrainian and EU agencies were completed, eight were ongoing, with additional twenty-three 
in preparation by the end of Yushchenko’s term.91 In 2007, the EU spend 20 million euros on 
Twinning in Ukraine, and that budget increased to 21 million the subsequent year and thus 
continued as the program grew to today’s 61 Twinning project.   
Twinnings are not the only instruments that were implemented in Ukraine as a way to 
upgrade Ukrainian public administration according to the EU standards. However, out of 200 
EU technical assistance projects in Ukraine with a total budget of 262.7 million euros, the 
Twinning program constitute one of the most significant part of Ukraine-EU institutional 
relations up until present day (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 2017). 
What is important to draw out of this empirical example is that indeed, the foreign 
policy of Ukraine towards the EU started to include some “new methods and means” by which 
																																												
91 Detailed information may be found at the official website of the Ukrainian Center in charge of implementation of 
the EU institution building programs in Ukraine:  http://www.center.gov.ua/en/press-
center/articles/itemlist/category/77-twinningfg 
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the relations were built between the two actors which testifies that the foreign policy change 
was that simply an adjustment, but a foreign policy program change, where goals remained the 
same (the EU integration), yet “what was done and how it was done” shifted (C. F. Hermann 
1990). 
Many analysts and disappointed Yushchenko’s voters commented on the lack of highly 
visible achievements in the Ukraine-EU relations during President Yushchenko’s term at the 
backdrop of his own presidential pronouncements in this regard. Some fault the domestic 
Ukrainian political feuds, including contentious cohabitation, snap elections of 2007 and the in-
fighting in the Orange camp. Other point out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rotated 
between six Ministers during Yushchenko’s presidency (including a repeated term for Mr. 
Ohryzko).  Whereas such domestic political circumstances along with the global financial crisis 
did add to Ukraine’s uncertainty of the political transition, it would erroneous to equate the lack 
of desired foreign policy outcomes for Ukraine (the EU membership) with the lack of effort on 
the Ukrainian part.  
Indeed, in some areas, the EU and Ukraine were able to achieve unprecedented progress. 
Among them are the EU acknowledgement of Ukraine’s status as a “market economy” in 2005 
and a new agreement to substitute 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and to spell out 
Ukraine’s associated membership in the EU. The latter was brought up for discussion in 2007 
and saw over 11 rounds of negotiations by the end of 2011. It included the discussions of 
establishing a free trade zone between Ukraine and the EU that was initially linked to Ukraine’s 
obtaining membership in the Word Trade Association. Ukraine and EU also held 7 summits in 6 
years of Orange presidency as opposed to 7 summits in Kuchma’s previous ten years. 
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Such foreign policy outcomes should be regarded as a result of the EU-Ukraine’s 
interactions, rather than simply Ukraine’s action or lack thereof. Indeed, on the part of the EU I 
observe some controversial positions on Ukraine’s integration.  For instance, in January 2005 
the European Parliament lauded the achievements of the Orange revolution and urged the EU 
Commission to give Ukraine a “European perspective” that would “possibly ultimately leading 
to the country’s accession to the EU.”92 But the Commission was far more concerned with 
challenges of integrating the newly accepted members and dealing with the global financial 
crisis in order to provide Ukraine with any concrete membership language in any of its 
documents. The disappointment on the Ukrainian side grew to the point that in 2006 Viktor 
Yushchenko threatened to withdraw one of his new means of integrating closer with the EU:  
the visa-free travel for the EU citizens to Ukraine.  
Instead, the European Commission was more comfortable dealing with Ukraine through 
its “less than integration” format, namely its newly launched in 2007 European Neighborhood 
Policy. In this policy Ukraine was treated under Eastern Partnership umbrella, along with 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. European Neighborhood Policy 
provisioned “all but integration” with the neighborhood states. In other words, while 
encouraging their domestic democratic reforms, rule of law and economic development to reach 
EU standards, the EU was not committing to give them a share in any of its political decision-
making aspects, security guarantees, or its structural funds. 
To summarize, although Ukraine-EU relations during the Orange regime received a 
controversial treatment in both academic literature and public sentiment in Ukraine, I have 
																																												
92 Full text of the document is available here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2005-0009+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
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shown that distinguishing between foreign policy behavior and policy outcomes helps us to 
disentangle such assessments of foreign policy change in the transitional Ukrainian context. The 
verbalized foreign policy behavior of Ukrainian president and its Orange government examined 
here illustrated that Viktor Yushchenko built on the previous EU-vector initiated by President 
Kuchma. The close examination of the new initiatives by the Ukrainian post-revolutionary 
government, such as visa-free travel to the EU citizens, Vice-Prime Ministerial Office for EU 
integration, and the launch of Twinning projects, showcases that the Ukrainian foreign policy 
during that time experienced a change not in its goals or orientations, but rather in means and 
methods as regards the EU integration prerogatives. Such efforts represent a foreign policy 
PROGRAME CHANGE. Although the Ukrainian foreign policy change towards the EU did not 
produce the stated outcome of clear membership path towards the end of Yushchenko’s 
presidency, this is due to the complexities of implementation in interaction with the EU partners 
and their policy preferences towards Ukraine93.  
I will now turn my attention to another ‘vector’ of the Ukrainian foreign policy inherited 
by the Orange regime, its relations with the Russian Federation in 2005-2009. I will look at the 
development of verbalized and non-verbalized Ukrainian foreign policy behavior in this regard 
and will then process trace party substitutes’ interests in Ukraine’s foreign policy towards the 
EU and Russia in completion of this chapter. 
 
																																												
93	Voznyak (2010, 170–71)analysis agrees with my conclusions. He writes: “Now [ in late 2009] everyone 
understands the ta the failure of the Ukrainian Eurointegrational and Euroatlantic plans is caused not only by the 
incompetence of the Ukrainian leadership but also by the blockage of these processes on the part of the main actors 
in the EU, in particular, by Germany and France.” 
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7.2.2. Ukraine and Russia, 2005-2009: A Foreign Policy Tango of Readjustment Change 
 
While Ukrainian relations with the EU were predicted to grow following the Orange 
revolution, the relations with Russia were left in a very ambiguous state. On one hand, with the 
Russian authorities clearly banking on Yanukovych victory and conspiracy theories circulating 
about Moscow’s a hand in poisoning Viktor Yushchenko, the Orange leaders were perceived to 
have a position of non-accommodation for the Russian hegemony in the region.  Unhelpful in 
that regards were the widely circulated statements of the Russian leaders that the Orange 
revolution, along with the Rose revolution in Georgia and the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan, 
were stirred by the Western agitators in order to destabilize the regional order to the Russian 
disadvantage.  To see whether the Ukrainian foreign policy towards Russia indeed, experience a 
marked change, I will now examine the verbalized foreign policy of the Orange leaders and the 
government similarly to my analysis of Ukraine-EU relations in the section above. 
 Viktor Yushchenko’s electoral program was as empty of promises on the count of 
relations with Russia as it was on the count of the EU. There is no mention of foreign policy 
goals, priorities or implementation in his “10 Steps Towards People” document. Yushchenko’s 
inaugural speech does mention in very broad terms that Ukraine will continue to develop “stable 
cooperation with all states,” including “our neighbors to the East and to the West” (Yushchenko 
2005).  However, since his rhetoric continues to press on the importance of integrating in the 
“European family of nations,” and does not mention Russia by name, such omission is to a 
degree an indication of change from the foreign policy rhetoric of Kuchma. Kuchma, as I have 
discussed, had purposefully courted the Russian public and policymakers and even instituted 
2004 as “The Year of Russia” in Ukraine, replete with diverse cultural events. 
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 In the 2005 Government Program for the Cabinet of Ministers, “Towards People,” the 
relations with the Russian Federation are discussed towards the end of the document, followed 
by the very last section on Ukraine’s wider regional collaboration. The program calls for “equal, 
mutually beneficial and predictable” relations with Russia and apart from rather generic 
language of cooperation, singles out free trade zone “without exceptions or limitations,” as well 
as “mutually beneficial” energy sector cooperation and transborder collaboration - all very vital 
issues in Ukraine-Russia relations (Program of Activity for the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
“Towards People” 2005). The language of the document in this section is without platitudes. 
The excerpt on Russia is limited to 60 words compared to almost 3.5 times longer section on the 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration in this 10,054 word –long document. 
  As for the document activity of the Ukrainian government agencies mentioning the 
Russian Federation in their titles, my search of the electronic database of the Ukrainian 
government archives yielded a total of 1,352 documents within the date range of post-
independence 1991 through mid-June 2017.  This is almost 1,000 documents more than what I 
retrieved with the “European integration” mentioned in the title of the documents.  However, in 
contrast to the European integration, the legacy of economic, border and political connections 
between Ukraine and Russia necessitated document activity in the Ukrainian officialdom right 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. The results are summarized in the comparative table below.  
Table 7.2. Government Document Activity on Russian Federation, 1991-2017 
	
President Name Number of 
Documents 
(N) 








































As seen from the table above, both President Kravchuk and President Kuchma 
governments had similar raw rate of new document activity that mentioned the Russian 
Federation in its title. However, during Yushchenko’s term we observe a 36% drop in such level 
of activity by the governmental agencies. It is not that the Russian Federation disappears from 
Orange government agenda completely, or is subject to very low new document activity. 
Indeed, drawing on current knowledge of the antagonism of the post- 2014 Maidan transitional 
government and President Poroshenko’s foreign policy towards the Russian Federation over the 
Crimea and militarized hostilities in the Eastern part of Ukraine, one can conclude that 
contentious foreign policy agenda towards Russia could be characterized with much lower 
measures (0.07 in this case). However, this is not what I observe with Yushchenko’s 
government document activity. His government document activity on the Russian Federation 
was indeed, the lowest since the collapse of the Soviet regime. But during Yanukovych’s term it 
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quickly regained its place in the Ukrainian officialdom and went up to almost the pre-Orange 
government levels.  
The non-verbalized foreign policy behavior, according the above mentioned chronicle of 
Ukraine-Russia relations, constitutes 294 events. Of course, this count is only helpful in 
estimating a general level of engagement and does not indicated whether the quality of these 
events was aimed at building more cooperative or stirring more contentious relations between 
the given set of states. For such analysis, a closer in-depth exploration of the events is 
necessary.  
Thus, for instance, on the very first day in office, right after his inauguration Viktor 
Yushchenko flew to Moscow in order to meet with Vladimir Putin. Such urgency put all other 
Ukrainian state affairs on hold including the formation of a new Cabinet of Ministers etc. But it 
also showed that the Orange President placed a great priority of building relationship with the 
Russian Federation. However, the very format of such meetings and visits between the two 
statesmen changed. In fact, one of the most widespread previous formats of presidential 
meetings between the Russian and Ukrainian top leaders was the so-called “diplomacy without 
ties” (Vidnianskiy et al. 2014). In such meetings the two state leaders would one-on-one settle 
any contentious sectorial issues during a more informal and relaxing time, reminiscent of how 
issues within the executive wings of the former Communist Party were settled during the Soviet 
period.  
And even though mutual visits to Kyiv and Moscow continued, such specific format was 
lost. Instead, in May 2005, the heads of the two states established a more formal body, the 
Yushchenko-Putin Committee of Cooperation, with sectorial subcommittees covering some 
corresponding areas of the Ukrainian-Russian relations. However, the Committee was 
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ineffective in swiftly addressing any issues that arose between the states from disagreement on 
demarcation of the state borders, objection to Sevastopol Fleet participating in Russo-Georgian 
war of 2008 and others. Furthermore, the Committee’s work was sometimes used as a premise 
to postpone the personal meeting between the leaders themselves. The Russian side, for 
instance, in November 2006 considered that all issue subcommittees needed to hold their 
meetings prior to fixing a date for President Putin’s visit to Ukraine (ibid, 251). In addition, the 
Committee’s meetings were infrequent to solve a variety of situations and minor or larger 
conflicts that arose such as gas disputes of 2006 and on; meat, milk and metallurgy trade wars 
and so forth. 
At the same time the frequencies of meetings between the heads of states subsided: 
Presidents Kuchma and Putin a total of 14 times by the end of 2004; whereas after Yushchenko 
took power, Putin visited Ukraine as a President only two times - once in 2005 and once in 
2007, skipping 2007 and 2008. However, the Ukrainian side continued to send representative of 
all levels to Moscow with official visits, including frequent meetings of Prime-Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko. The latter generated a range of suspicions and speculations by analysts and 
President Yushchenko alike as to her loyalties to the Ukrainian interests rather than promoting 
her own political candidacy with implicit support of the Eastern neighbor.  
In Mr. Putin’s assessment, such work in personal meetings with President Yushchenko 
and Yulia Tymoshenko was a normal conduct of foreign affairs, despite the fact that he 
considered the election of Yushchenko in a third round “unconstitutional.” “We argued, and 
argued bitterly at times on economic issues, but we did cooperate” was the summary assessment 
by Putin of Ukrainian-Russian official meetings during the Yushchenko years (Putin to 
Ukrainians: You Will Turn This into Iraq and Libya for US! 2015). 
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Hence, overall, in foreign relations of Ukraine towards Russia, there was both 
quantitative and qualitative decrease in verbalized and non-verbalized foreign policy behavior 
exercised by the Orange government. Indeed, as we see in the rate of new document activity 
subsided and the number of chronological events experience a drop, whereas the efforts put 
towards the proclaimed neighborly good relations diminished. In this sense, I categorize the 
Ukrainian foreign policy change towards Russia as an ADJUSTMENT CHANGE.  There was 
no reorientation or a goal change in terms of how Ukraine envisioned its affairs with the Eastern 
neighbor. It aimed at “equal” and “mutually beneficial” relations and pursued these goals with 
grossly same methods that generated the same non-verbalized activities. Namely, having 
examined the record of chronological activities in Ukraine’s relations with Russia, I find 
continued cooperation between Ukrainian and Russian local self-governments, party leaders and 
trade union delegations; and cultural exhibits on topics form the Russian history in Ukraine or 
Ukrainian history in Russia etc.  
Here, again, it is worth noting that foreign policy outcomes are not a direct result of an 
implemented foreign policy. Indeed, the outcomes of the intended goal of “treating Russia as 
any other great power state” in mutually beneficial neighborly relations were far from achieved. 
To the contrary, some experts remark that the Ukrainian relations with Russia during the 
presidency of Viktor Yushchenko hit a remarkable low. Certain international developments 
contributed to such deterioration. First, when the Russo-Georgian war erupted in August 2008, 
Ukraine took the Georgian side and demanded that the Sevastopol-based Russian Fleet inform 
the Ukrainian authorities of its prospective moves. And even though Russian and Ukrainian 
sides started the inventory process of the Black Sea Fleet and continued to negotiate on the 
Azov Sea Crimean border between the two states, in 2005 the Russian side explicitly raised a 
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concern of possible NATO ships entry into these waters per Ukrainian cooperation with 
NATO.94 
Further unhelpful were the ongoing energy disputes over gas supply to Ukraine and gas 
transit to Europe through Ukraine. Other specialists have thoroughly treated this subject 
elsewhere (Balmaceda 2013a). There is no analytical need for a detailed description of Ukraine-
Russia gas disputes at this moment. Suffice it to say that in the context of predominant energy 
dependence on Russian gas, both for its communal heating purposes and for industrial 
production needs, the Russian Gazprom position of continued pressure to raise gas prices was 
viewed as in violation of previous agreements by the Ukrainian side. On the other hand, the 
Russian previous accommodation for lack of timely payments from half-empty Ukrainian 
government coffers was considered no longer tenable for Russia. It was especially so in the 
context of what Russia perceived as continued Ukrainian drift towards the West and its security 
architectures. Hence, similarly to what I have discussed under President Kuchma, the Russian 
gas supply was used towards a geopolitical goal of achieving a more politically compliant 
Ukraine in terms of its foreign policy orientations according to the Russian preferences. 
Ukraine, on the other hand, attempted to sabotage such influence by cutting the levels of 
transited gas to the European states. Finally, the cyclical gas disputes of 2005-2006, 2007-2008 
and 2008-2009 were to a degree stabilized by Tymoshenko-Putin agreement of 2009.   
																																												
94 Ukraine’s position on NATO was not consistent during the Orange years. For instance, in April 2005 the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Mr. Tarasyuk informed Mr. Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, that 
Ukraine may become a NATO member as early as 2008. Due to the conflictual position on this question within 
Ukrainian domestic actors, when Mr. Yanukovych became a Prime-Minister, he paused such process by saying that 
Ukraine needs to hold a referendum on the issue. Ukraine’s NATO membership was a key contentious point for the 
Russian leadership, as mentioned above. President Putin, remarking later on the occasion of the Crimean republic 
joining the Russian Federation referred to these security concerns as well due to the Ukrainian revolution of 2014. 
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In addition, the Russian ban on Ukrainian dairy products and meat in 2005 and 2006, 
and again for dairy in 2008, as well as some heavy metal products and pipes were deemed by 
analysts as a way to force Ukrainian producers to realize that their distribution chains would 
suffer unless they turn away from the Russian market and the Eurasian Custom Union. The 
latter what of strategic importance for the Russian Federation who was urging Ukraine to join it 
in order to counterbalance the EU market. 
In addition, the Russian leaders reacted very acutely to elements of cultural domestic 
policies that Viktor Yushchenko promoted. A range of domestic memory politics that 
Yushchenko pursued stemmed from his ideological position. Yushchenko preferred to embrace 
complex and entangled ethnic and linguistic history of Ukraine, rather than stick to its ‘purged’ 
communist version. Whether it was his promotion of the recognition of Ukrainian famine of 
1932-1933 enforced by Communist authorities as a genocide against the Ukrainian people; or 
his acknowledgement of the Ukrainian Rebel Army and its leaders fighting against the Polish, 
German and Soviet troops around WW2 as Ukrainian national heroes at the state level among 
others –these Ukrainian domestic historical and cultural policies proved to be symbolically 
important issues to Moscow. 
  Finally, Ukraine-Russia’s relations reached a boiling point when President Medvedev 
decided to address the Ukrainian people in his open letter to President Yushchenko on August 
11, 2009. He berated the Ukrainian side-taking in the conflict with Georgia, warned against 
Ukraine’s “stubborn policy of seeking to join NATO,” disapproved Ukraine’s manipulation of 
gas transportation systems and was appalled at the “exaltation of the role of the Ukrainian 
nationalists” along with the characterization of the famine as genocide by the USSR towards 
Ukraine. He also underscored the unwelcomed - by the incumbent Ukrainian government - 
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treatment of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch in his recent visit to Ukraine (Yushchenko had 
prepared a grand celebration of the Christianization of Kyiv in 2008 with the participation with 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew instead). In brief, with such long list of concerns the 
Russian president decided not to appoint a new Ambassador to Ukraine, until “there are genuine 
improvements in Russian-Ukrainian relations” (Medvedev 2009). 
Despite such strong pronouncements, Ukraine continued to use the same foreign policy 
tools. Mr. Putin and Mrs. Tymoshenko met 20 days later in Poland. The Ukrainian and Russian 
foreign affairs chiefs had a meeting a month later on border cooperation. Ukraine (again) 
changed its Minister of Foreign Affairs. And the gas talks were resumed in Moscow in late 
November 2009. This was similarly followed several days later by Putin-Tymoshenko meeting 
in Ukraine. And after both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko both made it to the second round of 
the presidential elections on January 17, the Russian Federation sent its new Ambassador to 
Ukraine within a week.  
To sum up, the Ukrainian post-revolution foreign policy verbalized and nonverbalized 
behavior demonstrates that the same goals and orientations were persistent on Ukraine’s foreign 
policy agenda as regards Russia. Likewise, the same means and methods were employed to 
achieve them, such as negotiations, meetings, change of key foreign affairs figures, and 
signature of documents in regards the (same) energy, border, trade or the Black Sea Fleet issues. 
The change in the Ukrainian foreign policy that did occur in this regard was that of an 
adjustment, of a decreased effort put into the same means and methods of implementing 
unchanged foreign policy goals.  
 In that sense, “the controversial elections of 2004 harkened an era of “Europe and 
Russia” (Mychajlyszyn 2008, 48). But because Ukrainian foreign policy was now facing 
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different set of expectations and perceptions both in Moscow and Brussels than those that were 
during Kuchma’s term, some of the stated foreign policy outcomes were either unattainable or 
failed to materialize. Smith (2016, 127) puts it this way: “due to the prevailing geopolitical 
environment and the identity and perceptions of each actor, clear zero-sum behavior was present 
in the security policies of the EU and Russia in Ukraine, despite Ukraine’s preference (and 
attempt) to have strong political relations with both Brussels and Moscow.”95  
My conceptual distinction between the foreign policy behavior (verbalized and non-
verbalized acts) and foreign policy outcomes helps to understand why despite increased effort in 
one direction Ukraine experienced only modest achievements and with a small adjustment in its 
policy to Russia reaped significant worsening in the bilateral relations. The next subsection of 
this chapter will examine the oligarchic interests present in these foreign policy changes. 
 
	 7.3. Oligarchic Interests in Orange Foreign Policy Change: The Economic 
Argument 
 
In the last two subsections, I have established that the Ukrainian foreign policy during 
President Yushchenko’s years experienced a change of a smaller degree. As regards the 
																																												
95 As a separate vector in Kuchma’s foreign policy we have observed the regional cooperation to the exclusion of 
Russia, EU or USA, such as GUAM. As for Yushchenko’s policy in this regard, it has been noted that Ukraine’s 
relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States and GUAM significantly subsided, with lack of significant 
progress in Ukraine’s participation in either (Vidnianskiy et al. 2014) . Nonetheless, Viktor Yushchenko did attempt 
to construct a new international organization, “Community of Democratic Choice” in Kyiv, in 2005 with 
participation of Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic states, Romania, Macedonia and Slovenia. Yekelchik  describes such 
project as an attempt at regime promotion and cites in this regard Yushchenko’s post-Orange revolution visit to 
Washington DC, during which the Ukrainian president “self-assuredly discussed with President George W. Bush 
how Ukraine and the United States could work together to “support the advance of freedom” in Cuba and Belarus” 
(2015, 96). However, while such regional cooperation minus Russia is not a new foreign policy direction for the 
Ukrainian foreign politics, it appears that it was given very small attention and/or effort, since in the end the 
organization basically folded and held its third (and last on record) meeting May 2006. 
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integration with the European Union, it was a program change. Towards the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine undertook an adjustment in its foreign policy. What follows from the causal mechanism 
that I elaborated in the previous chapters, is that foreign policy when conducted in the 
conditions of transitional uncertainty could be traced to the interests of the party substitutes, i.e. 
of oligarchic preferences in our case of Ukraine. This is the objective of the current subsection: 
to process trace such evidence. 
Thus, in the previous chapter I have shown that the profit-driven interests to protect their 
wealth brought the Ukrainian oligarchs to accumulate political protection and power. This 
process in turn gave way to molding policies and politics for them to accrue larger economic 
assets and profits.  To continue from this point, I need to trace these interconnected interests of 
oligarchic profit and power in the set of foreign policies that Ukraine pursued towards the EU 
and Russia.  Two levels of evidence could be helpful in this connection. One is found at the 
state level that would include a macroeconomic evaluation of the Ukrainian situation following 
the Orange revolution and analyze it in terms of whether the large accumulated capital in 
Ukraine did indeed benefit from intensified integration with the EU (program change) and from 
a moderation in relations with Russia (adjustment change).  
The second type of evidence, more closely connected to my main line of argument, is be 
at a lower, individual level of analysis that looks at specific personal economic interests that the 
oligarchs connected to the Ukrainian foreign policymakers had in Ukraine’s integration with the 
EU and cooperation with Russia.  
As for the macro-level economic situation in Ukraine, I turn to the trade dynamic of 
Ukraine with its major partners over the span of 2004-2009, paying a special attention to the 
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years of 2005 (beginning of Yushchenko’s term); 2008 (global financial crisis); and 2010 (end 
Yushchenko’s term). 
 Thus, in terms macroeconomic situation, overall Ukraine had a strong export portfolio 
that is relatively well diversified. On economic complexity index (ECI) which measures the 
production characteristics of large economic systems, in 2004 Ukraine was ranked as world’s 32 
most complex economy, right behind Brazil, Portugal and Russia. Its ranking dropped to 41st 
place in 2008 and remained there in 2010.96 Ukraine had 168 import and 171 export partners in 
2004, and these numbers grew to 194 and 190 respectively by the end of 2010. However, 
geographically, Ukraine’s trade relationships in their majority were dominated by a handful of 
actors, where the Russian Federation played a major role throughout the timeframe under 
discussion. As seen from figure 7.1, the Russian Federation figures prominently in the first 
place for all Ukrainian imports and exports during this time.  
Figure 7.1. Ukraine’s Largest Trading Partners, 2000-2010 
 
																																												
96 According to http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings/country 
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Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions Database by World Bank. 
Overall, Ukraine has experienced a negative trade balance in its recent history, as seen in 
Figure 7.2. It only closed the trade balance gap in the last three years, after both import and 
export form Russia subsided due to the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine. 
Figure 7.2. Ukraine’s Trade Dynamic, 2005-2015 in billion USD 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions Database by World Bank. 
The Ukrainian producers had a lot to offer to Russian markets. In fact, in the context of 
high standards, regulations and tariffs from the EU, Russia’s share in the Ukrainian export 
showed a good growth dynamic in 2000-2010. Ukraine’s export bounced back promptly despite 
the effects of the global financial crisis, as evident from graph 7.4.  This export primarily 
consists of metals and machinery, and for Ukraine, Russia far outstrips any other partner in 
these two categories.  Russia held first place for Ukraine’s export of metal all the time 
throughout 2005-2010, followed not very closely by Turkey. And in machinery and electronics, 
Russia leaves behind any other Ukrainian partner by a magnitude of 3 to 6 times in trade 
volume over the investigated timeframe.  
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Figure 7.3. Russia’s Share in Ukraine’s Total Export, 2000-2010 
 
Figure 7.4. Ukraine’s Total Export by Product, 2000-2010 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions Database by World Bank. 
On the other hand, being also Ukraine’s largest importer, Russia dominates in fuel 
supplies (primarily natural gas and oil), and Ukraine appears “hooked on cheap Russian gas” 
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(Havrylyshyn, 2016). The following figure shows the breakdown of the major Ukrainian import 
by product and underscores the importance of fuel in Ukraine’s trade flow.   
Figure 7.5. Ukrainian Total Import by Product, 2000-2010 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions Database by World Bank. 
What all this data shows is that the Ukrainian economy -  in terms of what is supplied 
and what is consumed -  in was extremely tied to the Russian market and products 2000-2009. 
To put it simply, in order to produce metallurgical products, Ukraine’s largest import 
predominantly sold to Russia, it needed the Russian gas, Ukraine’s largest export, also from 
Russia. In addition, Russian gas was built in the production chain of many other post-Soviet 
manufactures, making other Ukrainian sectors economically vulnerable to fluctuation in gas 
prices.  
However, that trade dynamic started to change after as gas disputes erupted between 
Russian and Ukraine in 2005 and on. The prices for Russian gas for Ukraine kept rising from 
stable $50 per 1,000 of cubic meters in 1992-2005, to almost a two-fold increase to $95 in 2006; 
	 190	
then to $130 the following year and taking a leap to $179.5 in 2008 and reaching a peak of $360 
in 2009. After the Tymoshenko-Putin gas deal, the price dropped for the first time to $260.7 in 
2010, thus increasing by over five times over the time Yushchenko’s term. (How Did Russian 
Gas Price for Ukraine Change throughout 24 Years? 2016). 
As the price kept going up, after the first gas dispute the consumption of natural gas in 
Ukraine overall started to steadily decline, as did Ukraine’s import of it, as seen in Figure 7.6 
and Figures 7.7 below.  
Figure 7.6. Ukrainian Consumption of Natural Gas, 2000-2010 
 
Figure 7.7. Ukrainian Import of Natural Gas, 2000-2010 
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Much more detailed economic data could be potentially brought to bear in this analysis 
of the macroeconomic picture of Ukraine in 2000-2010. However, in my investigation of where 
the economic interests of oligarchs intersect with foreign policy, the trade dynamic stands as the 
most important lynchpin. Indeed, most oligarchs are heavily invested in a particular Ukrainian 
import or export, having made their initial capital and established rent/profit-seeking 
mechanisms surrounding it. For Yulia Tymoshenko it was natural gas; for Petro Poroshenko it 
was confectionary business; for Rinat Akhmetov it was metallurgy; for Pinchuk it was pipes; for 
Firtash it was natural gas and titan; for Ihor Kolomoiskyi it was petrochemicals and so on. 
Looking at the general market picture of import and export from Ukraine and linking them to 
the oligarchic economic interests in expanding profits and markets, allows me to sketch several 
observations as to the foreign policy interests of these party substitutes and foreign policy 
change in Ukraine. 
First, and foremost, as seen from data above, Ukrainian producers at the beginning of 
the Orange regime were heavily invested in Russian market, both in terms of supply and 
demand. Moving away from Russia politically forebode many economically painful losses, but 
further integrating with Russia into a sort of economic Eurasian Union was not a very palatable 
option either. The dependence on Russian imports would lock the Ukrainian oligarchs in an 
economically subservient role. Indeed, the economic inputs for the Ukrainian producers (the 
natural gas in particular) could be jerked up by Gazprom to the point that the Ukrainian 
producers won’t be able to make profits. This would force the Ukrainian businessmen to sell off 
their ‘golden eggs’ to outsiders, potentially more dominant Russian oligarchs. The latter would 
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compete strongly with the Ukrainian oligarchs if all were to join in some new Eurasian 
economic system97. 
As a result, some Ukrainian oligarchs, “hooked on cheap Russian gas,” attempted to 
diversify both the markets for their products and the type of business they were invested in. For 
instance, Konstantyn Zhevago, a Ukrainian oligarch and a Rada deputy since 1998, was the first 
Ukrainian businessman to present his iron ore mining company Ferrexpo at London Stock 
exchange in 2007 (while still holding a deputy seat). Other oligarchs similarly redistributed their 
capital between banking, media, chemicals and heavy industry in order to have a cushion 
against possible Russian-tied losses. Matuzsiak et al (2012b) gives a detailed list of all business 
interests that the top Ukrainian oligarchs owned, and some them were already touched on in the 
previous Chapter. Malnykovska and Schweickert  (2008) similarly note how the Ukrainian 
oligarchs started to enter the global capital market in the 21st century when they borrowed in 
foreign currency from international banks, issued bonds and traded their stocks at international 
stock exchanges. 
In this context, the most promising direction of market diversification for the Ukrainian 
business elites was deemed to be toward the European Union. Indeed, Anders Aslund (2005a), 
applied a  gravity model to the Ukrainian case that assessed the extent to which the countries 
should trade with each other given the size of their economies and the distance between them. 
He showed that post-enlargement EU of 2004 should have a share of 60% in the Ukrainian 
export. Nevertheless, sensitive materials such as steel, chemicals, textile and agriculture 
remained heavily protected by EU from the competition by the Ukrainian producers.	More 
																																												
97 Torr Bukvoll (2004) explored how this consciousness of ‘economic loss’ for Ukrainian oligarch developed during 
President Kuchma’s negotiation of the  Common Economic Space Agreement with Russia in 2003-2004. 
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recently Havrylyshyn (2016a, 246) also reviewed a range of economic studies to that effect and 
concluded the export diversification “have been a major success story for Ukrainian economic 
performance;” and that, in fact, an export share to Russia of about 25% is the right equilibrium.  
What this analysis of the trade situation in Ukraine does for my analysis of the foreign 
policy is that it supports the logical conclusion that overall, the Ukrainian oligarchs in early 
2000s, while interested in maintaining their export connections with Russia, also intensified 
efforts to get access to new European markets and favored such foreign policy change 
especially due to severe gas price fluctuations that followed in 2005-2009.  
And the empirical evidence further supports that argument:  after Ukraine was granted 
the ‘market economy status’ by the EU in 2005, the latter insisted that the WTO membership 
was a pre-condition for any further deepening of their trade relations. As a result, Verkhovna 
Rada needed to adopt new laws that would bring the Ukrainian rules, procedures and 
regulations in conformity with the WTO policies. Remarkably, despite the cohabitation and 
political feuds within the Orange camp, the WTO accession was ratified by 411 votes on April 
10, 2008. Prior to that, in similarly unanimous fashion, the deputies of all oligarchic origins 
voted in support for over 60 legislative acts adopted between 2005 and 2008 on Ukraine’s 
taxation, customs, banking, insurance sectors along with the intellectual property rights.  
President Yushchenko immediately pledged its support for Russia’s membership in 
WTO. Russia was still in negotiation at the time, and Yushchenko emphasized that Ukraine was 
eager to settle all its trade-related disagreements with the Russian Federation according to the 
international WTO standards and procedures. Such position is another evidence that Ukraine’s 
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foreign policy goals towards Russian did not experience any change: Ukraine was still seeking 
to cooperate and keep communication channels open.98  
Ukraine’s exports to the EU, following the WTO accession that was followed by the 
start of the Ukraine-EU free trade zone talks in 2008, did see significant growth. Prior to the 
WTO accession in 2007, Ukraine’s export to the EU grew by 25.5 %, and in 2008 it slowed due 
to the global financial crisis. But as Ukraine’s economy bounced back, in 2010 it grew by 45% 
and now, after the Association Agreement was signed in 2014, the EU holds first place in 
Ukraine’s exports.99 Similarly, direct foreign investment into Ukrainian business increased 
exponentially after Ukraine received the “market economy” status from the EU in 2005, already 
in 2006 the FDI was at 5.5 billion of Euros, compared to a meagre 230 million euros in 2003.100 
To summarize, at the macro level, the Ukrainian oligarchic interests preferred to 
continue to have stable relationship with Russia that would curb any potential disruptions of the 
existing economic ties due to their heavy dependence on Russian gas supplies. However, they 
were also strongly interested and worked to get greater access to the European markets. As of 
2004, these markets remained heavily protected from Ukrainian producers. The EU market 
access held a promise of both increased trade flows, profits and the potential FDIs to modernize 
energy-inefficient and outdated post-Soviet production models still in place during those years. 
																																												
98 In contrast, observe that Georgia threatened to block Russia’s WTO membership process until Russian 
checkpoints are removed from the borders with Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/06/business/worldbusiness/06trade.html 




At the micro level, i.e. at the level of concrete interests of those oligarchs that were 
directly linked to the Orange leaders, I observe a similar evidence of benefits reaped through 
adjusted foreign policy towards Russia and program shift in policy towards the EU. 
 Thus, for instance, the most closely linked to President Yushchenko group of 
RosUkrEnergo, owned by Dmytro Firtash, was the largest voice in maintaining Russian energy 
flows going into Ukraine. As the gas price rise continued throughout Yushchenko’s term, 
according to Global Witness, RosUkrEnergo reaped $700 million in 2005 only, whereas 
Naftohaz Ukrayiny accrued $500 in debt (Kuzio 2015, 402–3). This corrupt rent mechanism, 
half-owned by Gazprom and half-owned by Firtash and Furksin (the latter has direct links to 
Kuchma), would potentially ensure the continued flow of Russian gas, since Gazprom was 
double-interested in getting benefits both as a supplier and as half-owner of the intermediary 
that charged the Ukrainian government fees on the supplied. The bill ended up being dropped at 
Naftohaz door, who then received “more than $6 billion of subsidies in domestic bonds from 
2009 to 2012 to cover the regulated household utility gas prices and to pay for the expensive 
Russian energy imports” (ibid, 403).   Thus, RosUkrEnergo that was backed and was backing 
President Yushchenko as well as Prime-Minister Yanukovych, received clear benefits from the 
continued flow of revenues through Ukraine’s relations with the Russian Federation. 
Another Orange oligarch turned politician, Petro Poroshenko had his own clear benefits 
in maintaining Ukraine’s relations with Russia at the same level of goals and orientations: his 
confectionary business until recently supplied 8,000 tons of sweets to Russia monthly and 
collected a total of $ 1 billion USD in 2011 (Kramer 2013). On the other hand, Poroshenko, like 
other oligarch was able to gradually diversify his supply network including to the EU, and by 
2013 his products were sold in 30 different countries (ibid). 
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 The Russian leaders knew well that they could find a leverage over Poroshenko. They 
found him to be an acceptable replacement for the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
2009 and as a Minister for Trade and Economic Development under President Yanukovych in 
2011. The soreness of disrupted relations with Russia was especially felt by Poroshenko in 
2013, when Ukraine and Russia wielded the so called “chocolate trade war” targeted mostly at 
Poroshenko’s business. It made his factories’ production go down by 14% in the first several 
months (ibid).  The arbitrary use of Russian government’s power to punish Ukrainian producers 
– whether in early 2005 and 2008 dairy bans, metal bans, or “chocolate” and “cheese” trade 
wars of 2013 and 2012 –summarily signaled to the Ukrainian business elites that dealing with 
the EU rule-bound trade bureaucracy was more predictable than dealing with fluctuating 
Russian trade ‘punishments.’  
Further, another “Orange oligarch,” Ihor Kolomoiskyi, also benefitted from moderated 
foreign policy position of Ukraine towards Russia and strengthened cooperation with the EU. 
Thus, he briefly cooperated with Russian oligarch Abramovych in 2008, but the global financial 
crisis put an awkward end to that cooperation. Indeed, Kolomoiskyi banking business, Privat, 
was hit particularly strong in 2008.  In 2008 Forbes estimated Kolomoiskyi to have a net worth 
of $4.2 billion and rank as world’s billionaire # 253, whereas in 2009 his wealth shrank by 
almost four times and equaled $1.2 billion. Privat Bank, until recently was the largest Ukrainian 
bank with 20 million customers (Ukraine’s biggest lender PrivatBank nationalized 2016). It had 
a total of 56, 270 million of Ukrainian hryvnia in assets in 2007, and was able to grow that to 
87,520 million in 2008. However, in 2009 it only grew by 2, 169 million, as compared to an 
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increase of 31,250 million Ukrainian hryvnia the year before.101 In other words, PrivatBank 
suffered a major blow as a result of the global financial crisis. The necessity to follow clear 
financial regulations, in accordance with the Ukrainian law and best international practices, led 
Kolomoiskyi to initiate the change of PrivatBank from Limited Liability Company to Closed 
Join-Stock Company in 2009. By then, PrivatBank had already started to appear on 
Standard&Poor and Fitch ratings, in particular for the first time in on S&P’s list in 2003. In that 
sense, in addition to what I delineated in the previous Chapter as Kolomoiskyi’s generally 
competitive positions vis-à-vis both Russian and some sectorial EU businesses, his case 
demonstrates he benefitted from his business globalizing with favorable Ukraine-EU relations.  
Hence, in this subsection, I have presented two set of empirical traces for oligarchic 
interests present in the eventual changes in the Ukrainian foreign policy. The first one was of 
macroeconomic nature. It showcased how the Ukrainian trade flows throughout 2000-2010 was 
greatly dependent both in its export and import on stable cooperation with Russia. In fact, the 
main Ukrainian imports overall almost were predominantly servicing the Russian market, yet in 
their production they were fundamentally dependent on the supplies of the Russian natural gas. 
On the other hand, such dependency was also a major economic reason why the Ukrainian 
business was looking to explore alternative markets, trying to increase its trade share with the 
EU. The Orange revolution provided an excellent ideological basis for promoting such business 
interests, and indeed, after the ‘market economy’ status that Ukraine achieved from the EU in 
2005, the exports to the EU kept growing despite the temporarily setback on the global financial 
crisis of 2008-2009.  
																																												
101 This information is from PrivatBank official website: http://en.privatbank.ua/privatbank-s-profile-en/financial-
statements/ 
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In addition, as the price of the Russian gas was unpredictably fluctuating and Russia’s 
trade bans on selective products were jeopardizing the flow of goods and services, the 
Ukrainian business was further interested to intensify their economic and foreign relations with 
the EU and moderate potentially destructive dependency relations with Russia. My 
microanalysis of select Ukrainian oligarchs shows their profits and losses from such kinds of 
foreign policy changes and confirms these propositions.  
To summarize, in this Chapter I set out to estimate the final element in the causal 
mechanism, the foreign policy change during 2005-2009 in transitional Ukraine. I started with 
the analytical differentiation between foreign policy behavior (verbalized and non -verbalized 
acts) vs. foreign policy outcomes. Indeed, the declared and implemented foreign policy by a 
state may differ from its intended outcome since such result involves a complex interaction with 
one or multiple actors. The focus of this Chapter, and this research project at large, is the 
foreign policy behavior, rather than outcomes.  
 Having looked at both Ukraine’s verbalized and non-verbalized foreign policy behavior, 
I have determined that the Orange leaders’ foreign policy underwent relatively small changes 
during the presidency to Viktor Yushchenko. Indeed, as compared to the ‘multi-vektorism’ of 
Kuchma, Ukraine’s foreign policy towards EU continued to pursue integration: the goal 
remained the same. The means and methods of achieving it included new forms of collaboration 
and incorporation of the EU standards into the life of the Ukrainian governmental machinery. 
On the other hand, as regards its policy towards Russia, the Ukrainian transitional leaders 
adjusted their foreign policy (goals, means, and methods remained the same), by changing the 
level of effort put towards its implementation. Ukraine still sought to maintain cooperative and 
beneficial relations with Moscow. Yet both at the level of official documents and at the level of 
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actions (visits, exchange of delegations, cultural events, foreign policy chiefs’ appointments 
etc.), there was a marked decrease both in quantity and/or quality of implementation under the 
presidency of Viktor Yushchenko. 
My differentiation between foreign policy behavior (verbalized and non-verbalized) and 
foreign policy outcome proved also to be useful in explaining why the declared Ukrainian 
foreign policy goals were not achieved during the transitional time of the Orange rule. As 
Ukraine attempted to maintain “mutually beneficial cooperation” with Russia, it was not 
prepared to respond to the new means and methods of foreign policy that Russia employed (i.e. 
natural gas price fluctuation; Russo-Georgian war and the participation in it by the Crimean 
based Russian fleet; trade bans etc.).  
On the other hand, despite the new and increased cooperation with the EU, Ukraine 
failed to secure its main goal. The prospects of EU membership were not achieved, but not 
necessarily because Ukraine was not trying ‘hard enough’ (consider, for instance, the synced 
work of Rada towards WTO accession etc.). Rather, in Ukraine-EU relations there was a  
significant reluctance on the part of the EU to integrate Ukraine after the most expansive 2004 
enlargement. The EU policy was to relegate its relations with Ukraine to European 
Neighborhood Partnership, with potentially strong economic, but not political integration. 
Finally, in order to trace the oligarchic interests that link Ukraine’s foreign policy 
change to the party substitute interests, I examined both macro- and micro- level of evidence 
that confirmed that the Ukrainian party substitutes both favored and benefitted from increased 
cooperation with the EU, since the Ukraine-EU export-import flows grew after the “market 
economy” status. This further prompted the Ukrainian business towards diversification in sales 
at potentially more profitable and politically stable European markets. The stability in relations 
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with the Russian Federation was equally of interest of the Ukrainian oligarchs, and some 
Ukrainian oligarchs benefitted from Yushchenko’s supported gas dependency (e.g. RUE), 
whereas others suffered losses due to gas prices increases and global financial crisis. 
My next chapter will situate the same analysis of Ukraine’s foreign policy for the next 
period of the Ukrainian history, post-Orange revolution presidency of Viktor Yanukovych and 
will examine the foreign policy changes in this political context.  
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Chapter 8  
 TRANSITIONAL YEARS UNDER VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH 
 AND UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY, 2010-2011 
 
8.1. Theoretical Note  
 
This Chapter aims to undertake the analysis of Ukraine’s foreign policy under the 
transitional years during presidency of Viktor Yanukovych. Here, I aim to evaluate the kind of 
changes that took place in Ukraine’s verbal and non-verbal foreign policy behavior since Viktor 
Yanukovych took office on February 25, 2010. His term ended abruptly almost exactly four 
years later, when on February 21, 2014 he hastily fled the country to the neighboring Russia in 
the middle of the popular uprising that demanded his resignation and Ukraine’s return to the 
Association Agreement (AA) with the EU. This political protest, due to the nature of its 
demands that included the signature of the AA and the fight against increasingly corrupt regime, 
was popularly named the Euromaidan revolution, or the Revolution of Dignity.102 
What such chain of historical events shows is that within four years of Viktor 
Yanukovych’s presidency Ukraine underwent significant political and social transformations. In 
Chapter 4 I concluded that the political transition in Ukraine was not completed by the end of 
2009. Indeed, I showed that the Orange leadership was not able to implement the declared 
revolutionary values into the workings of new or reform governmental institutions. What 
happened in Ukraine since then? Can we say that the Orange transition never ended until a new 
transitionary government took office in February 2014? Or rather, are we looking at the end of 
one transition and the beginning of another? These questions are important insofar as they 
																																												
102 ‘Maidan’ in contemporary Ukrainian acquired the meaning of protest, and overthrow of corrupt power. 
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determine the scope of applicability of the causal mechanism that I delineated in Chapter 2. 
Thus, if the Orange transition never ended and lasted until through new revolution of 2014, then 
I can analyze Viktor Yanukovych’s foreign policies through the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 1 for transitional states. If, however, we are dealing with two separate 
transitions -  from late years of Kuchma rule through the Orange revolution, and from late years 
of Yanukovych’s term through Euromaidan – then I should find markers that the first transition 
ended before a new one started. From my close knowledge of the case, I am inclined to argue 
the former: the Orange transition ended (in a failure), a new political order consolidated and it 
started to be challenged by new political forces that sought another change of power. Between 
the two transitions, I argue we observe the consolidation of a more authoritarian system.   
 Before I proceed to specify these scope conditions for Yanukovych presidency, another 
theoretical distinction is in order. Recall that in my treatment of the foreign policy of the 
transitional period, I first gave a foregrounding to President Kuchma’s foreign policymaking. 
However, I applied the analysis of the causal mechanism (party substitutes’ interests in FP) only 
to President Yushchenko’s term. This, at a first glance, may not seem to fit into my defined 
transition period, which started with the protests “Ukraine without Kuchma!” in 2000. The 
reason why I have not applied the transitional foreign policy making mechanism to Kuchma’s 
final years is that whereas the transition was indeed under way, autocratic rulers do not 
necessarily face the kind of transitional uncertainty that political leaders do once the regime 
change has occurred. To clarify, often the opposite is in place: authoritarian leaning leaders tend 
to limit the “institutionalized uncertainty” that democracy necessitates, per famous Przeworski 
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term.103 They resort to mechanistically limiting the uncertainty of the political outcomes in any 
institutionalized interaction, which a democratic political system would potentially amply 
provide. To be more precise, they limit such institutionalized uncertainty only to the outcomes 
that are favorable to their own continued tenure. In other words, there is a limited uncertainty of 
the outcomes that authoritarian system offers by privileging the incumbent’s tenure in all 
possible governmental interactions. 
What such limitation of institutional arrangements does for the kind of cognitivist 
uncertainty that I ascribe to political leaders in transition is that the information that would be 
otherwise plentiful and/or contradictory in its complexity becomes limited to a set of possible 
stamp-legislated or otherwise enforced outcomes in an authoritarian political system. Therefore, 
in the current causal mechanism I cannot treat authoritarian leaders as functioning under the 
same constrains of the transitional uncertainty as those who take power after the regime change. 
Indeed, the mechanism I delineated is not aimed to explain authoritarian decision making due to 
the fact that the effects of transitional uncertainty do not apply to them in the system of limited 
institutional arrangements. Such political system to a degree prescribes political outcomes and 
leaves little room for complexities of outcomes such as a transitional leader would typically 
consider. 
While I describe the conditions in which an authoritarian leaning leader makes decisions 
as prescribed outcomes, I do not mean it in a teleological sense. In other words, I do not mean 
that what may transpire in an authoritarian political order must have predictably been an 
																																												
103 Przeworski (1991) treats democracy as ‘institutionalized uncertainty’ in other word as such system of political 
order where the results of open political competition are not predetermined ex ante, and the peaceful turnover of 
power occurs because the ‘losers’ of one election cycle has a reasonable expectation of being able to win in the next 
elections due to the political freedoms exercised  in a country. 
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outcome of a particular design or a process that had no other possible eventual outcomes. The 
reality of the authoritarian-opponent interaction may result a variety of possible outcomes. But 
when it comes to the cognitive processes that a political leader is experiencing, the authoritarian 
system furnishes its decision makers with different heuristics as compared to transitional leaders 
who function under the effects of transitional uncertainty. In such cases, other theoretical 
insights could be combined with poliheuristic theory (for instance, De Mesquita 2005, 2010; 
Siverson et al. 2003); and the resulting theoretical propositions could be applied to cases when 
decision making takes place in relatively stable political orders etc.  
What this practically means for the current research is that similarly to not applying the 
causal mechanism to the foreign policies of President Kuchma, I will not be applying it to the 
time frame when the authoritarianism consolidated under Viktor Yanukovych.104 From that 
point on another set of theoretical assumptions and models should be applied that are more 
specifically geared towards authoritarian decision making, which are outside of the goals of this 
paper. 
 Setting such analytical boundaries, I first need to determine specific time frames of my 
analysis of the foreign policy of Viktor Yanukovych to be reviewed here. This is the task of the 
first subsection in this chapter. Following that, similarly to Chapters 4 and 5, I will give a 
necessarily brief survey of the transitional uncertainty and determine its levels in Yanukovych’ 
post-Orange transitional years of 2010-2011 in subsection 8.2. This will be followed, in line 
with Chapter 6 format, with the examination of Yanukovych’s connections to party substitutes 
and their foreign policy interests in subsection 8.3. Finally, I will survey Yanukovych’s 
																																												
104 I consider authoritarian consolidated period in Yanukovych term from 2012 to 2014, and present theoretical 
grounding and empirical evidence to that below.  
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government verbalized and non-verbalized foreign policy behavior towards Russia and the EU 
in 2010-2011 to determine the level of FP change, and present the evidence to the oligarchic 
interests in these changes. This Chapter will necessarily be much more condensed than previous 
ones, following the blueprint set before without much elaboration as it has been done in the 
earlier parts of this work. In that sense, the current chapter will resemble the format of an 
application chapter, mostly presenting the results, with the exception of the following discussion 
of 2010-2011 period as the end of the ongoing transition after the Orange revolution (subsection 
8.1). 
   
8.2. End of Orange Dream: President Yanukovych and Consolidation of Power 
  
In Chapter 4, I have shown that the political transition that culminated in the Orange 
revolution was incomplete during the years of President Yushchenko, 2005-2009.  The 
empirical evidence for such conclusion was that the Orange government failed to reform the 
existing or to create new governmental institutions in conformity with the declared 
revolutionary values. As I examine the next historical period, encompassed by the presidency of 
Viktor Yanukovych, I start with the assumption that the transition indeed was ongoing and 
uncertainty was still characterizing the Ukrainian political life.  
The appropriate question then, is - when did this transition end? Previously, I 
determined that the only remaining criterion for the end of Orange transition was unreformed 
government structures that did not reflect revolutionary values. These values, however, were not 
pursed or implemented by Mr. Yanukovych either. In fact, he and his Party of Regions 
presented themselves as ideological opponents of the Orange camp since 2003.  
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 Hence, I am both in need for additional theoretical guideline and some empirical clues 
that would define the end of the political transition in the Ukrainian case.  One such theoretical 
guidepost may be derived from the original work by Ronald Francisco (2000) that I have 
previously referred to in order to find the criteria for the end of the transitional period.  In 
answering the question “When and how do regime transitions end?” Francisco remarks that 
politics constantly evolve, but at certain point they reach “a sustainable system of government” 
– a consolidation. Transitions “can be quick or interminable” but they “must set up lasting rules 
that are not significantly challenged” (ibid, 122). 
In Francisco’s sample of 40 countries, six did not complete the transition. None of these 
six countries were able to consolidate either. The researcher applied three criteria to determine 
whether the consolidation (as a process rather than as a final point of achieved stability) has 
occurred: two consecutive elections were held; a rotation of executive power had to take place 
in a country; and military needed to be tucked under civilian control in order for a country to be 
considered ‘consolidated.’ Ukraine after the Orange revolution of 2004 satisfied these criteria.  
It held two elections to the parliament in 2006 and 2007. It had a rotation of executive power in 
2010. And the Ukrainian military has been secured under the civilian control since the early 
years of independence in 1990s. Thus, Ukraine showed clear signs that the process of 
consolidation of the political system was taking root, however its direction was not democratic.  
To elaborate, Francisco follows Stepan and Skach’s (1993) suggestion that consolidation 
can be deemed democratic or non-democratic by adding another criterion: the mean country 
score on Freedom House ratings needs to be equal or less than 2.5. per year. In this sense, 
Ukraine clearly failed to achieve specifically democratic consolidation as seen from the table 
below: 
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Table 8.1. Ukraine’s Scores on Freedom of House Rating “Freedom in the World” 
 
Year Score 







Mean for Yushchenko’s term, 
2005-2009 
2.7 
President Yanukovych term 
2010 2.5 
2011 3.0 





Mean for Non-Democratic 
Consolidation, 2011-2013 
3.3 
2014 (end of Yanukovych 
regime and the Euromaidan) 
3.5 
(1 –best, 7- worst) 
  Hence, in contrast to Francisco’s sample set of countries, where all 6 state that failed to 
complete transition also failed to consolidate,  in the case of the post-Orange Ukraine, the 
transition did not end when the President Yushchenko handed President Yanukovych the 
executive post in 2010. However, by the estimates of Francisco’s criteria, Ukraine’s political 
																																												
105 I include 2011 as a year in both the Mean of Transition calculation and the Mean of Non-Democratic 
Consolidation, since both processes overlap in the same year, as I describe in my empirical data presentation further 
in the chapter. 
	 208	
system was nonetheless consolidating in a non-democratic way. What this means for my 
demarcation of the period of the end of transition is that because such consolidation was non-
democratic and was contrary to the values of the Orange revolution, it effectively ended the 
processes that the Orange transition started. Both empirical facts and expert analysis that I 
present in the following paragraphs converge in agreement on this point.  
 On empirical side, a few months after his inauguration, President Yanukovych 
eliminated Yushchenko-instituted National Constitutional Council (NCC). NCC was a 
consultative body in charge of developing strategies and recommendations for further 
constitutional reform in Ukraine. Recall, that Yushchenko lost many prerogatives under the 
2004 pact that shifted more power to the parliament starting from 2006.  Nonetheless, he 
continued to seek venues of constitutional influence in the country, including through the work 
and recommendations by NCC. 
Yanukovych also engaged in constitutional reform. He exerted administrative pressure 
on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. Subsequently, on September 30, 2010, the Constitution 
of Ukraine by the Court decision was reverted to its original 1996 version.  That granted 
Yanukovych back all the prerogatives that Kuchma held prior to the Orange revolution. The 
Court decision was voted into law and on February 4, 2011 it came into force.  
 Mr. Yanukovych’s political backing by Rada at that point was the largest with Party of 
Regions holding 175 seats. This Presidential support was further reinforced when Rada adopted 
a new electoral law in November 2011. The new law changed the electoral system of Ukraine 
back to mixed: half of the deputies were elected by first-past-the-post formula in single mandate 
districts, another half by proportional list system with a 5% threshold. No political blocks 
(unification of parties) were allowed to compete. Such provision gave a numerical advantage to 
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the Party of Regions, with largely consolidated base of voters in the Eastern part of Ukraine. 
The fall 2012 elections to Rada confirmed the predominance of the political forces behind 
Viktor Yanukovych: the Party of Regions strengthened its position and got a total of 185 seats 
in the new parliament.  
 The year 2011 also saw the beginning of political persecutions when Yuriy Lutsenko, 
former Minister of Interior under President Yushchenko, was tried and received sentence on 
charges of overstepping his functional duties on the post and other similar accusations.  Yulia 
Tymoshenko was likewise arrested, tried and sent to prison that year on charges that included 
“exceeding her governmental duties” in the connection with the gas deal of 2009. Added to such 
measures were significant changes in the appointment of Prosecutor General, changes to the 
judicial system, increased role of the Security Service of Ukraine. In short, with the institutional 
system moving swiftly to a more consolidated presidential regime, the authoritarian character of 
Yanukovych governance was also growing.  
 In addition to these empirical clues, I find many scholarly estimates pointing into the 
same direction of increasingly authoritarian record of the Ukrainian leadership at that time. Paul 
D’Anieri (1999, 448) writes that “In 2012 it appears again that the country has passed a tipping 
point on the path to authoritarianism.” Mykola Riabchuk (2012), a prominent Ukrainian 
political analyst, explores this process in more depth in his monograph by the same name: 
Gleichshaltung: Authoritarian Consolidation in Ukraine, 2010-2012. Taras Vozniyak (2013, 
48) remarks that Yanukovych’s first two years were not those of “governance” but “rule,” and 
that political power Yanukovych accumulated in 2012 superseded that which was held by 
President Kuchma. Other authors likewise agree with such characterizations, singling out 2011 
as the year when consolidation was increasing and 2012 when authoritarianism was finally 
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firmly in place (Haran 2011; Obydenkova and Libman 2014). Such authoritarian consolidation 
ended the political transition that Ukraine was undergoing in the prior years. 
 Having started as a political protest against the authoritarianism of Kuchma, the 
transition failed to establish a set of ‘lasting rules’ that would enshrine its declared ideals a 
corruption-free and responsible “government at the service of people.” The authoritarian 
consolidation ended any further progress of transition towards the implementation of these 
declared Orange values. Thus, I put forward that during Yanukovych’s years of presidency, 
only 2010-2011 could be categorized transitional,106 whereas 2012 signified a peak in a 
different stage of political development of Ukraine. Therefore, in my study of uncertainty, party 
substitutes’ interests and foreign policy change, I will apply the causal mechanism to 
Yanukovych’ first years in office, 2010 and 2011. The remaining years of his presidency are 
beyond the scope conditions for the causal mechanism that I set out in Chapter 2.  
 
8.3. Transitional Uncertainty during Viktor Yanukovych Presidency 
 
In this subsection, my objective is to evaluate the level of political uncertainty using the 
previously applied model: 
Pace of Political Transition + Political Competition + State-Building+ Economic 
Downturn à Level of Uncertainty 
																																												
106 It should be noted that the processes of transition and consolidation in Francisco’s treatment are separate yet 
often concurrent.  Thus, he evaluates consolidation in states with incomplete transition under as in those with 
completed transition, using the same criteria. Thus, the two processes may be happening at the same time, while 
transitions must set up “rules that are not significantly challenged” and these rules become conducive to minimal 
political equilibrium, a pointer of political consolidation (ibid, 122-123). 
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As for the pace of political transition, which in Jung and Deering (2015) treatment refers 
to either abrupt or gradual change of power, I will analyze the pace of the change of power 
during the presidential election of 2010.  Initially, Verkhovna Rada set the election date for 
October 25, 2009. However, President Yushchenko argued through the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine that since his new presidential powers came into force a year after he took office, his 
term should be extended, and thus elections were to be pushed to a later date.  The 
Constitutional Court ruled in Yushchenko’s favor and shortly after Rada moved the date of the 
elections to January 17, 2010.   
Despite such movements, according to the estimates of the OSCE electoral mission that 
deployed in Ukraine in November 2009, “campaign was conducted in a free and calm 
atmosphere respecting all civil and political rights.” The OSCE monitors concluded that Central 
Electoral Commission of Ukraine “mostly operated in non-partisan and collegial manner” and 
“pluralistic media environment offered the voters a range of information about the leading 
presidential candidates and their platforms.” In the end, both the first and the second round of 
the plurality formula elections of 2010 were “orderly” and voting was conducted in “efficient, 
transparent and honest manner” (Election Observation Mission Final Report 2010).  
When the election results announcing a 3.48% margin victory by Viktor Yanukovych 
over Yulia Tymoshenko were announced, the latter made a statement that there were multiple 
irregularities and miscalculations. She announced that she was going to dispute the results in 
order to reverse the outcome of the vote. Subsequently, Yulia Tymoshenko lodged a 
complained in the High Administrative Court of Ukraine. The hearing started on February 19, 
2010. However, due to the lack of evidence from district and precinct electoral commissions, 
Tymoshenko rested her case on the second day of hearing. And President Yushchenko signed a 
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decree for inauguration of Viktor Yanukovych on the same day. Admittedly, Yanukovych did 
rush the date of inauguration since Yulia Tymoshenko had refused to cede her Prime-
Ministerial seat until after her case was settled, which indicated some nervousness surrounding 
the power turnover. However, the actual rotation of the executive power from President 
Yushchenko to Victor Yanukovych did not experience any political or civil violence or 
disturbance. The electoral defeat was resolved through the appropriate judicial channels. And 
the date and the results of the election were set, challenged and resolved in well-regulated 
institutional manner. Hence, I estimate that the pace of transition (change of power) in this case 
was not abrupt. I assign it a score of 1 (LOW).  
As far as the second component of the estimates for transitional uncertainty is 
concerned, the political competition, the data I derive from the Varieties of Democracies is 
summarized in the three graphs below, following the format delineated in Chapter 5. 




Figure 8.2.  Components of Ukraine’s Freedom of Association Index-1, 2005-2010 
 
 
Figure 8.3.  Components of Ukraine’s Freedom of Association Index-2, 2005-2010 
 
 
The Freedom of Association Index during the Orange term has improved significantly 
from 0.75 in 2004 when Kuchma was leaving the office to 0.83 in 2009 towards the end of 
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Yushchenko’s tenure. Figure 8.2 and 8.3 also show that most of the components of the Index 
(party ban, multiparty elections, barriers to parties; civil society entry and exit and repression) 
remained consistently stable. It stayed beyond the average high score during 2005-2010, thereby 
allowing a significant level of political competition in the country during that time. The only 
indicator that does show a more marked change is ‘opposition party autonomy’ that dropped 
from 3.81 in 2009 to 3.19 in 2010.  This dynamic is reflective of Viktor Yanukovych’ policies 
towards the opposition as he took power in February 2010, rather than those of Viktor 
Yushchenko, under whose presidency I observe generally a stable record of high political 
competition. Hence, I assign a score of 1 for political competition (on a scale from 1 to 3, 
where 3 means the highest impact on transitional uncertainty for this component). 
Next, I am going to estimate the state-building efforts in Ukraine in 2010 and 2011 as 
they combine with the democratization process in this time.  First, the graph below represents 
the track of in the liberal democracy index for 2010 and 2011 compared to the previous 
presidency. 
Figure 8.4. Ukraine’s Liberal Democracy Index, 2005-2011 
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According to the figures in this index, Ukraine’s democracy was at one of its highest 
points in the modern history in 2009 at 0.483 (surpassed only by a score of 0.488 in 2007). But 
in 2010 it experienced a sharp drop to 0.35 in 2010 and then even lower to 0.32. Such decline in 
Ukraine’s democratic record was the single largest change from year to year since 1991. I 
assign NONE as the level of democratization for Ukraine in the years 2010 and 2011. 
As for the state-building efforts, the effective number of parties in 2010 and 2011 
remained the same (3.85). However, due to the new law, adopted by Verkhovna Rada in 
preparation to the parliamentary elections of 2012 that I discussed above, I can observe the 
effects of Ukraine’s change on the two-party vs. multiparty characteristic in the number of the 
effective parties in the elections of 2012. Thus, the number of effective parties at the electoral 
level in 2012 was 4.90 based on my calculation107. This means that Ukraine moved closer to the 
multi-party system by the end of 2012 as the result of the changed electoral formula.  
 The next in Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) characteristics of political systems on executive-
parties dimension I consider is the concentration of executive power in single-party majority 
cabinet versus broad multiparty coalitions. There were only two Cabinets during the presidency 
of Viktor Yanukovych. The first was formed two weeks after the inauguration of the new 
president and the second was formed after the parliamentary elections of 2012. Both Cabinets 
were headed by the same Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, which is a sign of a continuity in 
Yanukovych’ policies and governance practices.  The first Cabinet of Ministers of 2010 formed 
by a new Rada coalition of “Reforms and Order” that emerged the parliament on March 10, 
																																												
107 The rise and fall in number of political parties in Ukraine also comes closely associated with the rise and falls in 
political fortunes of the party patrons. In this sense, it may not come as a huge surprise that the regime change itself, 
not only institutional changes in electoral system, may have an effect on the effective number of parties at electoral 
level. I thank Erik Herron for this important point. 
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2010. The coalition was primarily composed of three parties: Block of Lytvyn, the Communist 
Party and the Party of Regions. In that sense, it did not differ from the two coalitions in 2006 
and the coalition of 2008 which also had consisted of three parties each. However, what was 
different about the 2010 case was that the Reforms and Order also included members of other 
parties from the traditional political opponents of the coalition – from Our Ukraine, Fatherland 
and others. This became a point of controversy eventually debated by the Constitutional Court 
of Ukraine. In the end, allegedly under significant pressure from the top executive (again), the 
Constitutional Court ruled that such coalition is not in contradiction with the Constitution of 
Ukraine, despite the Article 59 that does not foresee that deputies who are not members of a 
fraction could be a part of coalition. 
 Nevertheless, the fact that 16 additional deputies of Rada who were not members of 
official party factions that initiated the coalition agreement, were the signatories of the coalition 
demonstrates, in my analysis, that the Reforms and Order was broader than coalitions of 2006 
and 2008. Therefore, it testifies to the fact that Ukraine moved closer in the direction of 
“parties” to start with on the executive-parties dimension. However, by the end of 2011 Ukraine 
swung back firmly to the “executive” end, due to the constitutional changes that I describe 
further below. 
 The next characteristic on the parties-executive dimension, according to Lijphart (2012), 
is executive-legislative relationship where either the executive is more dominant or there is an 
executive-legislative balance. In this regard, I examine more closely the decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine on October 1, 2010 to abolish the amendments of 2004. The 
amendments tipped the distribution of power in favor of Rada and Prime Minister and away 
from the strong semi-presidential system that coalesced during Kuchma’s rule.  
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 In its 2010 decision, the Constitutional Court reinstated the original version of the 
Constitution of Ukraine adopted in 1996. As a result, the President of Ukraine received back its 
prerogatives to select the candidacy for the Prime Ministerial office and Rada would vote on 
such proposition. Previously, President Yushchenko, according to the 2004 constitutional 
reform, had to choose from the Rada-proposed candidates. Furthermore, Yanukovych received 
the reinstated powers to fire the Prime Minister at any point without Rada’s approval, which 
was not the case for President Yushchenko. 
 More importantly, however, the new presidential powers included appointment and 
dismissal of all members of the Cabinet of Ministers that previously were divided between 
presidential appointments of the Ministers of Interior and Foreign Affairs, and the rest were 
controlled by the Prime-Minister answerable to Rada. What gave the executive even further 
advantage in 2010 was that any presidential decree then could overrule the decision of the 
Cabinet of Ministers. This notoriously had slowed down the bureaucratic processes in Ukraine 
during cohabitation and political feuding between Yushchenko and his Prime Ministers. The 
Cabinet of Ministers would issue a directive, and Yushchenko would attempt to override it with 
his decree, the case would end up in High Administrative or Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
and so forth. Yushchenko continued to challenge the decision and policies of the Cabinet 
through the courts. Examples included migration policy, the use of state funds and others 
(Yushchenko Accuses Cabinet in Misuse of 8 Billion Hryvnia 2010, Yushchenko Turns to 
Constitutional Court re the Law of Cabinet of Ministers 2007).  At the same time, the Cabinet 
challenged Yushchenko back in courts on the constitutionality of his use of veto powers 
(Cabinet Challenges Yushchenko’s Budget Veto at the Constitutional Court 2006). Such 
disorganization was ended when all power to appoint, dismiss and override the Cabinet of 
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Ministers was concentrated in the hands of Viktor Yanukovych in December 2010, i.e. when the 
constitutional changes came into the effect. 
 In addition, the President had returned prerogatives to appoint and dismiss the head of 
the Ukrainian intelligence agency, the Security Service of Ukraine which previously had to be 
coordinated with the legislature. Similarly, as the result of this constitutional reform, 
Yanukovych could dismiss Prosecutor General without any institutional involvement of Rada in 
this question. A range of powers in regard to establishing new and reforming or eliminating the 
existing structures of the central government were also shifted towards Ukraine’s president. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that precisely because the new constitutional order left to the 
President’s discretion the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers, Rada was no longer obligated 
to create a ruling coalition.  
Yanukovych swiftly used his new prerogatives and in December 2010 fired 15 Ministers 
(while reinstated some of them to different posts) in one day, leaving only 6 portfolios 
unchanged in Azarov’s large 26-member coalition government of 2010. In 2011, such unilateral 
human resource management on the part of Yanukovych continued: there were three additional 
new dismissal and appointments of key agency chiefs. 
 Hence, over all, in 2010 -2011 the Ukrainian political system in terms of executive-
legislative balanced shifted strongly towards executive dominance, even to the point that the 
nature of multi-party Cabinet of 2010 was undercut by the executive appointments granted to 
the President according to the new constitutional reform. Such overhaul of power was even 
criticized by the authoritarian leaning ex-president Leonid Kuchma himself (Kuchma Scared of 
Inadequate President 2010). Thus, I conclude by characterizing Ukraine’s 2010 and 2011 as a 
significant move towards the “executive” end on this characteristic of the dimension. 
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 Finally, as discussed in above, the new electoral law of 2011 reinstated the mixed 
electoral system, moving it from fully proportional list one. As I showed in earlier parts of the 
dissertation, the effects of such change are primarily felt at the level of single-member districts. 
At the electoral level, the reputational assets and damages of political parties during transitions 
may vary vastly. But the ability of individual candidates to appeal to (and occasionally buy 
votes) the localized district interests is to the advantage of those ‘pork’-rich candidates who 
have connection to the consolidated executive powers. Thus, for instance, while the Party of 
Region was trailing in approval ratings at modest 20ish %, it was nonetheless able to amass a 
sweeping 113 out of 225 seats in single-member districts.  
This result was also assisted by a ‘generous’ provision in the new electoral law of 2011 
that the district size was allowed to vary by 12 % from 1/225 fraction of total electorate. In 
practice, it meant that a district could vary from around 181,000 of voters to 142,000 voters in 
each. But since the authority of setting district boundaries fell on shoulders the Central Electoral 
Committee of Ukraine, it could conduct redistricting in a manner that would potentially 
eliminate continuous areas where certain candidates were predicted to win by splitting them and 
joining them into neighboring other districts with different voting preferences. Political 
opposition has already voiced their concerns that several districts they were expected to win 
may disappear, whereas the number of districts with pro-incumbent sentiments is set up to 
increase through dividing these larger areas into smaller districts in 2011.108 
																																												
108 I explore the reasons behind why such electoral changes were introduced and adopted in Ukraine in my other 




 In the end, such gerrymandering did occur and became a prominent topic in the 
Ukrainian politics in 2012. Opposition parties and local Ukrainian experts confirmed the use of 
“administrative resource” i.e. the machine politics by the incumbent political actors to the 
disadvantage their contenders. I direct an interested reader to a more detailed discussion of this 
in the footnoted sources below.109 Thus, I characterize the movement of the Ukrainian political 
system towards the increased “executive” pole end on this characteristic as well during 2010 
and 2011. 
Over all, the cumulative changes that the Ukrainian institutional set up underwent in 
terms of the building of the system of governance in 2010 and 2011 could be graphically 
represented as follows. 
Figure 8.5. Ukraine’s Institution Building, 2010-2011 
 
																																												





As the Figure 8. 5 demonstrates, on two characteristics Ukraine moved significantly 
closer to the “executive” pole on the dimension of executive-legislative balance and electoral 
system. In the case of the latter, the gerrymandering gap left much wider space for executive 
maneuvering and vote courting/buying. The country not merely returned to the position of 
where it was with electoral rules prior to the Orange revolution, but passed the threshold 
towards the “executive” pole. Further, even though the coalition of 2010 was more diverse in 
terms of the representatives of the multiple parties as compared to the coalitions that existed 
before, because of the negated effect of presidential appointments, the arrow of “coalition” also 
tips over to the “executive” pole on this dimension as well. Overall, I characterize state-building 
changes in Ukraine over these two years as LARGE. 
According to the Table 5.1, LARGE level of state-building efforts and NONE 
democratization combine produce a score of 1 for this component that contributes to 
transitional uncertainty. 
Finally, as far as the last component in my measure of the levels of uncertainty in 
transitional period for Ukraine, the assessment of the economic situation is presented in 
graphical and tabular form in the following figures. 
Table 8.2. Three-year averages of GDP growth rates per capita in %, 2010-2012 
	

















Figure 8.6. Ukraine’s GDP growth per capita in %, 2004-2014 
 
 
What the data presented above demonstrates, is that Ukraine was able to recover from 
the 2008 financial crisis. Ukrainian economy climbed from -14.421% GDP per capita growth in 
2009 to 4.61% in 2010, and continued to grow moderately in 2011 at 5.845%. However, after 
2011, Ukraine’s GDP growth per capita kept dropping as seen from Figure 8.6. Although 2010 
and 2011 saw the largest economic growth in Yanukovych presidency, they were not nearly as 
high as the highest growth rates during Yushchenko’s term. Further, compared to the average 
three-year growth of both lower middle and upper middle income states, Ukraine was still 
falling behind these groups of states, as seen from the table above.  
And even though Ukraine demonstrated a greater growth than the average for a state in 
its region and larger than world’s level in 2010 and 2011, Ukraine did not overtake these 
regional and world’s estimates by as much as they did in the years preceding the financial crisis 
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(Table 5.3). Hence, given such mixed record of economic performance I assign MODERATE 
for the level of this factor that influences transition authority, with a score of 2. 
All the factors discussed above summarily contributed to the transitional uncertainty in 
years 2010 and 2011 in the following manner: 
Level of Transitional Uncertainty in Ukraine, 2010-2011: 
Pace of Political Transition + Political Competition + State-Building+ Economic 
Downturn à Level of Uncertainty 
1+1+1+2=5 (out of 12) à MODERATE. 
In short, having looked at different factors of political, social and economic life, I have 
determined that in the first two years of his presidency, Viktor Yanukovych faced moderate 
levels of transitional uncertainty. In fact, the transitional uncertainty decreased in 2010 and 
2011 from its high levels during the transitional post-revolutionary Orange years, as a peaceful 
executive power rotation and authoritarian consolidation provided a general backdrop of 
stability in governance compared to the previous years. Whereas the Party of Regions and its 
leader kept sinking in their popularity ratings, Viktor Yanukovych had strong oligarchic 
interests that were symbiotically and practically backing him. These ties had been strong for 
many years,  and for this research I will look at them from the time of Yanukovych political 
campaign through the final years of transition when the political system of Ukraine was 
consolidating and reached a point of “minimal stability” (Francisco 2000, 123). Thus, I proceed 
to examine the interests of party substitutes that the Ukrainian president pursued in these years, 
paying especial attention to the foreign policy preferences that Yanukovych–linked oligarchs 
had at this time. 
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8.4. Viktor Yanukovych and His Oligarchic “Family” 
 
The corruption of Viktor Yanukovych and the oligarchic clan surrounding him110 has 
recently become the object of many journalistic accounts and analyses in Ukraine. As the court 
case against Mr. Yanukovych is being heard in absentia in Ukraine at the time of writing 
dissertation, there are increasingly more details about his abuse of power, embezzlement and 
corruption exposed. For illustration purposes, suffice it to mention that Yanukovych’ wealth, 
accrued by illegal means, became one of the focal points of the next protest movement in 
Ukraine, the Euromaidan of 2013-2014. After Yanukovych fled the country in fear for his life 
and safety in February 2014, his infamously opulent 340-acres mansion, Mezhyhirya, was 
opened to public the following day. It featured a pet zoo, a collection of antique cars, a yachting 
marina, a bowling alley, a boxing ring, tennis courts, golf course with golden golf clubs among 
many other well documented extravagancies (Walt 2014). Some sources put Yanukovych 
cumulative assets at $16 billions whereas there is evidence under examination of the Ukrainian 
authorities at the moment that he himself paid at least $2 billion in bribes (Tucker 2016). In 
another colorful illustration, Yanukovych’ elder son, Oleksandr, a trained dentist and a Rada 
deputy increased his wealth by 72 time in three years, from $7 million  in 2010 to $510 million 
in 2013, and it was not due to a sudden rise in the Ukrainian dental hygiene, as Havrylyshyn 
puts it (2016a, 151).  
																																												
110 Viktor Yanukovych’s circle of closest allies, supporters and sponsors was dubbed “family” by Ukrainian political 
analysts in reference to an extremely narrow circle of privileged few that he trusted especially in the second part of 
his presidential term. 
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What is of interest to my research here is not necessarily the amount of the ill-acquired 
capital or the details of their growth, but rather the interests of those connected to the top 
decision makers and the foreign policies they preferred based on their oligarchic interests. 
Yanukovych’s rise to power started at the regional level, as a governor of Donetsk, one of 
Ukraine’s powerhouses for coal mining, metallurgy and other branches of heavy industry that 
saw violent and sometimes deadly competitions in the early years of Ukraine’s independence. 
Yanukovych along with other key regional actors strategically used local organizational and 
business resources to build the managerial base for the Party of Regions. This party became a 
lynchpin for political and oligarchic connections and interests from 2001 to 2015, i.e. from the 
time of its establishment to its collapse. Immediately after Yanukovych’s exodus the Party of 
Regions fell apart and its head, Mr. Rybak, resigned two days afterwards. This is another sign 
that the party primarily served the needs and interests of certain figures behind it, rather than 
functioned to give policy representation to its members and voters. To underscore this point, for 
instance, in the 2015 local elections, most of the Party of Regions former representatives were 
going under various new party banners (Dorosh 2015). These were set up and run by the same 
group of key political actors (Hrushevskyi 2014). 
Avioutskii (2010, 127) claims that the Party of Regions was created “in order to achieve 
a well- defined objective: Prime-Minister Yanukovych victory in 2004 presidential elections,” 
and in subsequent years it transformed only moderately by widening its electoral base outside of 
Donetsk region. The majority of party control remained behind its indubitable powerholder, 
Rinat Akhmetov. In author’s estimates, “[h]is influence in policy-making is so overwhelming 
that even his opponents are bound to appoint his representatives to high-ranking posts in the 
state administration…This is considered a kind of a parallel government in Ukraine. The 
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nominal leader of the P(arty) of R(egions), V. Yanukovych, is in fact supported by only a very 
small circle of party members.” (ibid). Avioutskii further lists ten key oligarchs connected to 
Rinat Akhmetov and the Party of Regions, whereas Matuszak (2012) provides a more elaborate 
map of their connections to other political and oligarchic figures. 
I will use Rinat Akhmetov’s business interests here mainly as a shorthand for a larger set 
of oligarchic political orientations that stem from the same regional and industrial foundation. 
The general basis for this is not only the fact that according to the analysis mentioned above 
Akhmetov’s interests prevailed in most important political matters handled by the Party of 
Regions, but also that most of Yanukovych oligarchic supporters were to a degree regionalized 
(Donetsk) and economically sectorial (metallurgy and mining in Donbass). 
Rinat Akhmetov’s major financial and industrial holding company, System Capital 
Management (SCM) was originally founded in 2000, although his involvement in business goes 
back to the early 1990s, as is common for most of the Ukrainian oligarchs.111 SMC is 
composed of several dozens of subsidiaries, and by 2010 it was Ukraine’s  largest conglomerate 
accounting for roughly 8% of the country’s GDP (Deals of the Year: 2010 Metinvest 2011).  
SMC’s most prominent company, Metinvest was also Ukraine’s biggest domestic producer of 
steel by 2010, representing 40% of total iron ore output and 28% of Ukraine’s total steel 
production (ibid). It should be noted that the predominant part of such production in Ukraine (an 
average of 75.3% in 2009-2012) is heavily export oriented, since domestic consumption 
constitutes a much smaller part, as seen from the graph below.  
																																												
111 The story of Akhmetov’s financial rise as a major businessman in Ukraine and the owner of the Ukrainian soccer 
champion team, Shakhtar, is detailed here: http://www.espnfc.com/uefa-champions-league/2/blog/post/2664720/the-
story-behind-shakhtar-donetsks-owner-rinat-akhmetov 
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Figure 8.7.  Ukraine’s Export Share of Steel Production, 2009-2015 
Source: US International Trade Administration, 2016 Report on Ukraine 
 In practical terms, Rinat Akhmetov’s business is primarily export oriented, and both 
European (Italy, Turkey) and Russian markets are key to making profits in this area. The largest 
problem for the industry in terms of the EU markets is that the steel sector is considered one of 
the “sensitive” ones with EU’s strong protections towards Ukrainian products still in place 
throughout 2004-2009. In 2004, prior to the Orange revolution, Ukraine-EU agreement 
previewed an expansion of the existing quota to 606. 824 tons per year to accommodate for the 
EU enlarged member-states. The EU quota was increased in 2007 with the condition that the 
terms of such agreement would expire once Ukraine becomes an WTO member. 
Once such status was achieved, Ukraine’s steel exports to the EU indeed, saw a 
remarkable increase: in 2007, the EU’s share in Ukrainian steel export was at 17%, whereas by 
2010 it constituted 24% (Vlasyuk 2011). 
This growth in the EU export share dynamic, however, should be set at the background 
of a general decline in steel export in Ukraine from 28,2 million ton in 2007 to 23,8 million ton 
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in 2010. Partially such decline was due to the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008. 
However, the decline was also observed even prior to that and is attributed to a combination of 
the drop in world market prices and the rise in natural gas prices for Ukraine (Global Analysis 
Report for the EU-Ukraine TSIA 2007, 104). The latter was a result of many cyclic gas disputes 
between Ukraine and Russia in fall-winter seasons of 2005-2006, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009.  
In light of such global and regional processes, Ukrainian steel producers since 2009 
were operating at much more modest profit margins as compared to previous years, and the 
production cost was the dominant factor in pricing by Ukrainian steel businessmen (Vlasyuk 
2011). Indeed, for a long period Ukraine’s steel industry was enjoying one of the world’s lowest 
unit costs in steel production with cheap labor at only 7% of the final product cost (Global 
Analysis Report for the EU-Ukraine TSIA 2007, 104). But the rise in material costs of the 
productions that was dependent both on cheap Russian gas and on the old Soviet model of  raw 
material-intense technologies presented in front of the Ukrainian steel businessman three major 
challenges in post-Orange years:1)  the input prices needed to be stable, most importantly the 
prices for the Russian gas; 2) in post financial crisis environment of low profits, the export 
shares needed to be expanded; 2) outdated technologies had to be modernized by the attraction 
of new investments.  
These were the business interests for Yanukovych-linked oligarchs that translated into 
their foreign interests of Ukraine’s dealing with international partners.  Primarily, such interests 
dictated that relationships with Russia would be stable, uncontentious to the point where the 
Russian gas prices would not fluctuate as a result of geopolitical punishment for Ukraine’s 
foreign policy behavior that did not align with the Russian preferences. Secondly, the relations 
with the Russian Federation figured prominently for this oligarchs’ industry in the expansion of 
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their export shares specifically after the global financial crisis that severely undercut the affluent 
Europe with its steel quotas112 and drove global prices for steel products down to the detriment 
of the Ukrainian steel business.  The investments from diversified financial centers, including 
from Russia were also much in interest for the major steel producers in Ukraine.  
In brief, these three business strategies dictated intensified and expanded cooperation 
with Russia in the transitional period of 2010 and 211 during Yanukovych presidency. In terms 
of the relations with the EU, the Ukrainian oligarchs by 2010 had seen some major benefits 
from the “market economy” status and WTO accession. But more aggressive movement 
towards the political integration with EU and its transparency norms etc. could expose their rent 
mechanisms and require unfavorable changes in the conduct of these affairs. Hence, while 
expansion to the EU markets was also in Yanukovych party substitutes’ interests, it was not as 
critical. Rather, the EU needed to be a stable partner and not a whip for changes in the political 
system where the oligarchs were reaping “krysha” and immunity benefits. Therefore, 
Yanukovych party substitutes were interested more in maintaining the EU markets open without 
having to follow new set of rules for their domestic political gambits.  
I now turn to examine to see what changes this has produced in the Yanukovych 
government verbalized and non-verbalized foreign policy behavior that shaped its relations 
towards Russia and Ukraine during in 2010 and 2011. 
 
																																												
112 As a result of 2009 global financial crisis, the EU faced the deepest recession since 1930s and had the sharpest 
contraction of its GDP, by 4%, in its history. For more, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication15887_en.pdf 
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8.5. Ukraine’s Foreign Policy: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back with Russia and the EU 
  
Similar to my examination of Viktor Yushchenko’s foreign policy, I will now look at 
Viktor Yanukovych foreign policy as evident from some primary and core documents – his 
electoral program, inaugural speech to the key governmental documents produced in 2010 and 
2011.  I will then survey Ukraine –EU and Ukraine-Russian verbalized and non-verbalized 
foreign policy behavior to determine the level of the foreign policy change that took place in 
these years. 
In his presidential electoral program, Viktor Yanukovych played it safe on the foreign 
policy count: on one hand, he started with a mention of “global and regional integration” as 
Ukraine’s foreign policy direction, followed by “a progress in Eurointegration” and closed it 
with the “cooperation with the Russian Federation and other states:” 
“The foreign policy, Ukraine’s participation in global and regional integration 
processes, progress in Eurointegration, cooperation with Russian Federation and other states 
that are our traditional partners will be intensified and serve the national interest and 
strengthening of our country”(Yanukovych 2004). 
 
In this way, the integration into the EU is mentioned first, but it is set in the context of 
both “regional cooperation” mentioned right before it.  And “regional” for Ukraine may also 
mean further integration into the Russia-led Eurasian economic structures. Similarly, such 
context underscored “progress” implying that it was not a start of anything new, but a 
continuation of what already existed. On the other hand, the Russian Federation is the only 
country mentioned by name here, which emphasizes its strategic importance – it is specifically 
singled out from “other states.” In this sense, Yanukovych’s electoral program is reminiscent to 
Kuchma’s multi-vektorism that pursued multiple policies without appearing to over-privilege 
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one to the other, and leaving enough room for interpretation and expansion into any possible 
direction. 
In his inaugural speech, Yanukovych started with the acknowledgement of the electoral 
“choice of the people” and dwelt on how this was an important and “responsible test” of power 
transition that was “successfully passed” by the Ukrainian “young democracy” (Yanukovych 
2011a).  There was a palpable sense in these opening paragraphs that Viktor Yanukovych was 
acutely aware of the transitional nature of the politics in Ukraine as he was taking over the 
presidential role, for he also underlined in the second paragraph that such “choice of people 
cannot be put to doubt by any manifestations of someone’s ill will” -supposedly referring to the 
challenge he received in election results from Yulia Tymoshenko and her supporters. He further 
added clarity to that by calling on the opponents to acquiesce to his victory since doing 
otherwise is both “destructive to the state” and “deeply immoral” (ibid). And he quoted a 
passage from the Holy Scripture on peace and reconciliation. 
 As for the foreign policy specifically, Yanukovych continued in the line of his electoral 
program by emphasizing “equal and mutually beneficial relations with the Russian Federation, 
the European Union, the USA and other states that influence the development of the 
international situation.” In this way, the Russian Federation was mentioned first.  
But further paragraphs on the integration are put in a more generalized and somewhat 
ambiguous way. First, the new president mentioned that the global community “needs to unite 
in the widest format possible” adding that “the humanity, and Ukraine in particular needs the 
EU in a global sense” (ibid).  He then made a quick play on words, explaining that by “the EU” 
here he meant a “Single World” – the Ukrainian abbreviation for the EU and his coined phrase 
of “Single World” are the same: ES. And whereas this left again a lot of room for potential 
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guesses and interpretations as to where these linguistic maneuvers were supposed to lead in 
terms of the EU vs. Russian economic integration policies, several things were abundantly clear. 
First, Yanukovych mentioned the Russian Federation first, and then specified that “Ukraine will 
be an out-of-bloc state” meaning that Ukraine will not pursue any NATO membership 
prospects, a persistent sore in Ukraine’s relations with Russia as I mentioned before.  
In his inaugural speech, Viktor Yanukovych promised that he would soon propose a new 
Foreign Policy Concept for Rada’s review and adoption. Such document shortly followed, as 
promised and came into force on July 1, 2010 as the Law of Ukraine 2411-VI “On the 
Foundations for Domestic and Foreign Policy” (Law of Ukraine 2411-VI on the Foundations 
for Domestic and Foreign Policy of Ukraine 2010). This Law was very consistent with 
Yanukovych’ commitment to keep Ukraine out of NATO: it stipulated that previous references 
in the Ukrainian official documents as to the potential membership in NATO and “Euro Atlantic 
security systems” should be amended and expunged.  
On the point of Ukraine’s relations with the Russian Federation and the EU, this 
fundamental document was not clearly consistent with Yanukovych’s earlier public statements. 
On one hand, the Russian Federation disappears from the language of this Law, in contrast to 
being amply and prominently featured in previous rhetoric. On the other hand, the integration 
into the EU which was somewhat muffled in his inaugural speech and folded into “regional 
cooperation” in Yanukovych’s electoral program, now comes significantly to the fore. First, this 
Law describes Ukraine as “European country” and refers to Ukraine’s commitment to “the 
European standards” in many aspects of governance and domestic policy – from education to 
from civilian control over military, market oversight and professional civil service, among 
others. 
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The Law also clearly speaks of putting Ukraine’s energy systems, including natural gas, 
oil and electricity transfer networks “in conformity with the European Union’s working 
conditions.” Obviously, such stipulation was an attempt to give an assurance to the EU: the 
Union had been receiving a significant part of its own natural gas imports from Russia through 
Ukraine, and then suffered from shortages in the midst of Ukraine-Russia gas disputes under the 
Orange years of 2004-2009.113 
But most importantly, this Law stipulates that one of the key foundations for the 
Ukrainian foreign policy is “ensuring Ukraine’s integration into the political, economic and 
legal space with the goal of acquiring membership in the European Union.” Whereas such 
position is not at all contradictory to previous statements of Yanukovych, the Law speaks of its 
in very clear prescriptive terms, without pre-texts and contexts in which such integration could 
be re-interpreted other than the final goal of membership, not ‘progress’ or ‘association’ etc. 
How then can all these public proclamations be understood in a summary assessment of 
Viktor Yanukovych foreign policy positions? What is clear from the purposes for which all 
these three key documents were created, the Law has more institutional weight and is primarily 
geared to direct the work of the Ukrainian government agencies in their formulation of policies. 
For that matter, this Law has significantly less international visibility compared to the electoral 
program or the inaugural speech. The latter, in fact is closely watched and is delivered in 
presence of the invited foreign diplomatic corps as the ceremonial procedures of the Ukrainian 
presidential inauguration prescribes. 
																																												




 By contrast, electoral programs can be as specific or as general about foreign policy 
aspects as a candidate sees fit (recall, for instance, that Yushchenko’s program did not proclaim 
any foreign orientations at all). Such document is designed to target -  first and foremost -  the 
Ukrainian voter. It is closely monitored by domestic political opponents and is of some interest 
to international observers who follow the change of power in a country.  The presidential 
electoral program of Viktor Yanukovych more than anything else was an attempt to appeal to 
the widest electoral base, essentially the Ukrainian median voter.  And so, it includes those 
foreign aspects that are attractive to the widest number of people, both those who prefer the 
intensified European ‘vector’ of Ukraine and those who would like to see reinforced relations 
with Russia. 
The inaugural speech, however, does not serve such purpose. With a still somewhat 
shaky legitimacy provided by recent general vote, the new Ukrainian president in his inaugural 
speech was more firmly re-engaging the policy issues that he stood for. In terms of its focus on 
foreign policy, the inaugural speech caters much more to the international audience and should 
be regarded as such. Hence, Yanukovych as a President started by appealing to both European 
and Russian foreign aspiration of Ukrainian voters in his electoral campaign, in Kuchma’s 
multi-vektorism style. Later, he wanted to send a clear message to Russia (and other states) of 
the prominence of relations with Russia in his foreign policy priorities outlined in the inaugural 
message. On the inside, however, he preferred his government to work by the European 
standards and towards the EU accession, without the “red cloth” of NATO membership that was 
so disturbing to the Russian Federation throughout the years.  
In sum, these documents point to no change in foreign policy orientations or goals for 
Ukraine as far as its relations with the European Union are concerned (integration), but they do 
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point us in the direction towards a larger shift towards increased cooperation with Russia, as 
compared to the presidency of Yushchenko. My subsequent analysis of Ukraine’s foreign policy 
behavior towards the EU and the Russian Federation in 2010 and 2011 looks at both verbalized 
and non-verbalized pieces of evidence that help me to ascertain the precise level of such change. 
 
8.5.1. Ukraine and Russia: The Thaw Settled In 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in terms of the documents that Yanukovych 
government produced that had Russian Federation mentioned in the title, I observe the 
following statistic: 
Table 8.3. Government Document Activity on Russian Federation under V. Yanukovych 
	















211 1000 0.21 
02/26/2010- 
12/15/2011114 
123 455 0.27 
12/16/2011- 
02/22/2014 
88 545 0.16 
 
																																												
114 I use this date as the time marker of when the new Law of Ukraine on Elections took force and thereby signaled a 
fully consolidated institutional equilibrium in Ukraine, discussed above. 
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Hence, we see from the table, the first two years of Yanukovych presidency were 
relatively busier for the Ukrainian government document activity.  A new document was issued 
almost every three days by various government agencies. In this perspective, it was as active as 
the document activity of both Leonid Kravchuk (0.27) who directly dealt with the breakup of 
the Soviet Union and the need to regulate relations with Russia in a new world order. And such 
Yanukovych government document activity rate is similar to Leonid Kuchma’s record for his 
term (0.25), during which he dealt with border demarcation, new economic system and energy 
disputes and cooperation with Russia.   
On the other hand, such activity subsided significantly in the last two years of 
Yanukovych’ increased authoritarian rule. Indeed, having dropped to 0.16 (a new document was 
issued less than once a week). In this sense, the latter years of Yanukovych presidency are the 
same as President Yushchenko’s statistic on this count over the time of his term in office. What 
is important to note is that the initial vibrant record of document activity on the Russian 
Federation in 2010 and 2011 comes for Yanukovych government precisely at the backdrop of 
Yushchenko’s low rates in this regard. Hence, I observe in these estimates that at the level of 
effort, Yanukovych’ government in 2010 and 2011 experienced a marked change towards an 
increase in this foreign policy verbalized activity that mentioned the Russian Federation. 
As for the non-verbalized behavior foreign policy program, in 2010 and 2011, the 
Ukrainian –Russian relations saw 73 events. This count over 455 working days of Yanukovych’ 
first two years in office gives a rate of an official event per every 6 working days. This, seems 
to be lower than Yushchenko’s rate of an official event with the Russian Federation every 4 
working days. However, a closer examination reveals that the quality of these foreign policy 
behavior acts was quite different from those that Ukraine engaged in during Yushchenko’s term. 
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First and foremost, the Ukraine’s relations with Russia in Yanukovych’ term started 
with a huge culturally symbolic endorsement. The Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill came to 
Ukraine to give a special blessing to the new President in an elaborate ceremony that took place 
right before the inauguration itself, in the heart of the Ukrainian capital.  Some Ukrainian 
activists urged Yanukovych to spurn such anointing from the Russian power center and resort to 
local Ukrainian Orthodox leaders. Recall that Patriarch Kirill’s visits had been previously 
regretted by President Medvedev in his open letter as too coldly received by the official Kyiv in 
Yushchenko’s years.   
Immediately after the inauguration, the visit of Rada chief followed, and Yanukovych 
himself visited Moscow on March 5, 2010. Admittedly, such meeting was not as immediate as 
Yushchenko’s second day on the job visit to Moscow. However, Yanukovych visit was better 
prepared given the passage of time. Moreover, it conducted in extremely amicable terms. Both 
presidents remarked on the new era in Ukrainian-Russian relations, ending the “dark streak” as 
President Medvedev described the relations under the previous Ukrainian leader (Harding 
2010). 
In addition, the very format of these meetings changed as well. The more informal 
meetings returned: Viktor Yanukovych made a private visit to Russia exactly a month later to 
celebrate the Easter Monday with Patriarch Kirill and visited a grave of his mentor buried in 
Moscow (Yanukovych Spends Easter Monday with Medvedev and Patriach Kirill 2010). He 
also met with President Medvedev in his out-of-city residence, for an informal dining, a tour of 
the residence and talks. The “diplomacy without ties” was back in the arsenal of the Ukrainian 
foreign policy tools. 
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Other Ukrainian agency chiefs followed the suit. The Ukrainian Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Education all forged cooperation through visits and 
document signatures in the first one month of the new presidency. Such activity culminated in a 
single most important agreement Ukraine concluded in Russia since the 1997 Friendship 
Agreement: the Kharkiv Pact.  This document was signed barely two months into Yanukovych 
presidency on April 21, 2017 and reverberated the Ukrainian politics at all levels. The pact 
foresaw the lease of the Sevastopol base to the Russian Fleet until 2042 at $100 million a year, 
subject to automatic renewal every five years unless parties inform each other of an intended 
changed a year prior to the end of the lease.  Further, the gas price was fixed at $333 per 
thousand cubic meters of natural gas supplied from Russia at which point, Ukraine’s gas 
payment is decreased by $100 per m;3 and if the existing price would be at a lower than $333 
level than it will be reduced by 30%. The Pact was ratified in Kyiv and Moscow on April 27, 
2017.  
Such agreement, on one hand, was of remarkably high level between the two states. 
Against the basis of about three hundred legal acts signed by Kyiv and Moscow, it stands out as 
one of with the widest scope in terms of military, security and economic impact for Ukraine.115 
On the other hand, the text of the Pact itself is very clear that its legal foundations draw on the 
Friendship Agreements of 1997. And the advocates of Yanukovych policy did not tire to point 
out to their opponents that there is a clear continuity in how Ukraine had treated Russia in terms 
of the lease of the Sevastopol base and in how they intended to continue to do so.  
																																												
115 A full list of Ukrainian-Russian official documents is available here: http://russia.mfa.gov.ua/ua/ukraine-ru/legal-
acts 
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Additionally, whereas the Kharkiv Pact agreement proponents underscored that such an 
agreement was a continuation, not a fundamental shift in Ukraine’s relations with Russia, 
Yanukovych foreign policy remained otherwise strong and largely unmovable on several other 
issues. Among them was Ukraine’s consistent and nonnegotiable refusal to combine the assets 
of the Ukrainian Naftohaz and Russian Gazprom at the Russian repeated suggestion. Another 
nonnegotiable position for Ukraine was non-acknowledgement of the independence of Georgian 
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, propped by Russia. But perhaps most 
importantly for Ukraine’s economic and political position, during many visits that I trace in the 
Ukrainian foreign affairs chronicles of 2010 and 2011, the Ukrainian representatives time and 
again refused to negotiate the country’s membership in the Russian economic project of the 
Customs Union that was designed to counterbalance the EU regional economic potential.  
The Eurasian Customs Union was established on January 1, 2010, prior to Yanukovych 
taking office and was composed of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and Russia. 
The states did not levy the customs on goods traded across their borders, but did impose a 
common external tariff on all goods entering the Union. The Ukrainian authorities since 
Kuchma were leery of creating customs union of such format. They insisted on the free trade 
zone that would not penalize the flow of the EU goods through its most extensive border. In this 
sense,  the Ukrainian position was neither new nor changed and was strongly upheld throughout 
2010 and 2011.  
Finally, in the Ukrainian chronicle of the relations with the Russian Federation, I also 
observe an increased military cooperation and contracting that took place in these two years, in 
addition to multiple cultural events that intensified on the level of cooperation between local 
Ukrainian and Russian communities and regions. Some prominent examples include the first  
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since 2003 joint navy training, “Farvarter Myru” (“The Forwarder of Peace”) in June 2010 and 
trilateral military training with Belarus in October 2011.  
To recapitulate, Yanukovych’s foreign policy towards the Russian Federation shows the 
increased record of the verbalized activity in the document production by the Ukrainian 
government in 2010 and 2011. Similarly, compared to the account of non-verbalized foreign 
policy behavior, Viktor Yanukovych presidency in 2010 and 2011 exhibits a higher level of 
engagement in terms of the number of events that took place in relations between the two states. 
Looking deeper at the quality of non-verbalized foreign policy records, I note that new means 
and methods were applied by Ukraine in this time frame. The Black Sea Fleet lease was 
renegotiated between the states in the new Kharkiv Pact. Ukraine renewed military exercises 
with Russia and the two states reinstated “diplomacy without ties.” This change in foreign 
policy was not of the level of goal change, however. 
 As evidenced by Ukraine’s refusal to join the Customs Union and insistence on non-
integration of the assets of the two countries energy agencies, in 2010 and 2011 Yanukovych 
was not pursuing an economic or political merge. Rather he attempted to restore the amical and 
cooperative relations that had existed prior to the Orange revolution. Therefore, I qualify such 
foreign policy change as PROGRAM CHANGE, where “what is done and how it is done 
changes, but the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged” (Hermann 1999) and that is 
what occurred in Ukrainian foreign policy toward Russia in 2010 and 2011. 
 
8.5.2. Ukraine and the EU: The Growing Pains 
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The Ukrainian government under President Yanukovych issued only 13 documents 
mentioning the European integration in the title over the span of 1,000 working days. This, 
however, should be taken in the context of other documents that may not have had integration to 
the EU in their title, yet prompt at it in the main body of the text as did the Law on the 
Foundations of the Domestic and Foreign Policy of Ukraine.  Such lack of new document 
visibility, however, was not due to a lack of EU-Ukraine interaction. Thus, during 2010 and 
2011, there were 40 events recorded, which means that the official representatives had a 
publicly recorded interaction at least every 11 days. This also stands in contrast to President 
Yushchenko and his team track of about 1 comparable event every 7 working days. By contrast, 
Yushchenko’s government’s new document rate activity generated seven times larger output 
than that of President Yanukovych’s in relation to the integration into the EU. 
Having observed such decline in the efforts of foreign policy conduct by Ukraine in 
2010 and 2010 in relation to the EU, it is worth examining whether there is also a change in the 
means, methods and goals of these relations on Ukraine’s part.  As far as Ukraine’s goals with 
the EU are concerned, I already showed through the analysis of Yanukovych’s electoral, 
inaugural documents and the above-mentioned Law, that the European integration remained on 
Ukraine’s agenda with the EU.  In fact, Yanukovych further underscored this point when he 
planned his first official visit as a President to Brussels on March 1, 2010. This move was 
reminiscent of the typical Ukrainian method of reassuring a partner of Ukraine’s commitment to 
good relations.  Yushchenko similarly made his first official visit to Russia, the potentially 
disturbed party in 2005. 
The level of Yanukovych’s Brussels visit was the highest possible. He met with the 
heads of the European Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament as well as 
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EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. During the visit, the habitual 
issues were discussed: the Association Agreement, including trade and visa free travel for the 
Ukrainian citizens.  
The importance of such first official Presidential visit is also evident from the fact that 
President Medvedev who met with Yanukovych only four days later asked the Ukrainian 
President why the EU was the first on his list rather than Russia. To which Yanukovych replied, 
dodging an edgy question, that the EU invitation came to him first. Hence, the symbolism of 
timing and the level of these official meetings was not lost on the official Moscow and therefore 
must have been considered by the Presidential team when Yanukovych’s travels to the EU and 
Russia were planned promptly after his inauguration and closely in time to each other. 
Apart from exchanges in official visits, meetings, negotiation, and the like, Ukraine also 
continued those means and methods that were introduced or launched during the Orange 
regime. Thus, the Twinning program was continuing its charted course both in terms of the 
funding, the participating Ukrainian agencies and EU country partners. My examination of the 
chronicled records of the Ukraine-EU relations shows that the EU questions in 2010 and 2011 
were routinely handled by Prime Minister Azarov at the request of the President of Ukraine, 
signifying that Ukraine continued to place prime focus on its relations with the EU. 
Hence, the verbalized foreign policy of President Yanukovych in 2010 and 2011 showed 
that the goal of integration into the EU remained prominent in Ukraine’s relations with the 
Union. Yet at the level of efforts that was put in both document activity and in the number of 
events that took place between Ukraine and EU official representatives, Ukraine’s foreign 
policy was adjusted to a less intense level. Means and methods of conducting the relations with 
the EU remained without any new Ukrainian initiatives in 2010 and 2011.  Therefore, the 
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foreign policy change that Ukraine saw during President Yanukovych’s first two years in 
relation to the EU was that of ADJUSTMENT.   
Another point remains to be clarified before I conclude this subsection on EU-Ukraine 
in final years of political transition.  This analytical point is in relation to the above discussed 
difference in foreign policy behavior and outcomes.  Whereas the Ukrainian foreign policy 
behavior targeted the same goals, with the same means and methods but with a lessened effort, 
the results in EU-Ukrainian relations in 2010 and 2011 left much to be desired. Partly this was 
in connection with the position that the EU took on Ukraine’s negotiations with Russia on the 
Customs Union. In particular, only two days after President Yanukovych reformatted his 
relations with Mr. Medvedev to “diplomacy without ties” in April 2010, the Director General 
for External Relations at the European Commission indicated that EU-Ukraine Association 
agreement was an impossibility if Ukraine became a member of the Customs Union. This put 
Ukraine in a position of a delicate balance between the growing Russian pressure to join the 
Customs Union and potentially losing on the count of one of its main strategic goals, i.e. being 
integrated into the EU’s political and economic space. 
Another unforeseen development in Ukraine-EU relations was the effect of Ukraine’s 
domestic authoritarian consolidation. Several high-ranking EU officials took a very strong 
position on the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko in 2011.  She was personally well known to 
many EU political actors, and eventually was strongly advocated for by her political allies and 
her own daughter who made a case on her behalf throughout Europe and the US. The tension 
with the EU over such politically motivated persecution grew to the point that eventually the 
EU made the continuation of the association talks conditional on the improvement of the 
situation surrounding the case of Yulia Tymoshenko. Yanukovych response was evasive in this 
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regard.  He presented the matter as domestically conducted act of justice, performed in 
compliance with the existing Ukrainian law and therefore as something that held internal 
legitimacy in Ukraine. Therefore, in his argument, it should not be affecting the international 
relations between the two partners. However, at the end of 2011, Yanukovych government 
failed to employ any new means of methods in foreign policy behavior that would adequately 
address the issue. Conversations, statements and talks continued in the format that had seen 
before between the two sides, only with the added weight of Tymoshenko case. 
To synopsize, in this section 8.4 I have examined the evidence from both verbalized and 
non-verbalized foreign policy behavior of Ukraine towards the Russian Federation and the EU. 
In the case of the former, I noted that Ukraine underwent a larger foreign policy change at the 
level of PROGRAM. The goals for beneficial cooperation with Russia remained, but there were 
new and reinstituted means and methods of conducting these relations in 2010 and 2011. 
Regarding the EU, in the first years of Viktor Yanukovych presidency, Ukraine reaffirmed its 
unchanged goal -  the integration with the Union. However, in contrast to its relations with 
Russia, Ukraine’s put less effort towards the implementation of such goal both on the counts of 
verbalized and especially at non-verbalized foreign behavior. Additionally, as Ukraine saw 
worsening of the relations with the EU over the case of Yulia Tymoshenko or in the context of 
the non-compatibility of the EU and Customs Union integration, in 2010 and 2011 it did not use 
any new ways and means to address these challenges. Hence, I conclude that there was a foreign 
policy change of ADJUSTMENT in Ukraine’s relations with the EU in these two years.  
 
8.6. Foreign Policy Changes and Yanukovych’ Party Substitutes 
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In the subsection 8.3 I discussed Viktor Yanukovych’s connections to oligarchic circles 
that formed his party substitutes. I presented an overview of the macroeconomic situation in the 
steel industry of Ukraine that prepared the ground for the foreign policy interests these actors 
had during Yanukovych’s presidency. In particular, I showed how in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, Ukrainian oligarchs who threw their weight behind the new President were 
generally oriented towards securing the fluctuating prices for Russian natural gas. I also 
stipulated how important it was for them to continue to expand their trade flows with EU and 
Russia in particular. Further, I underscored that finding new sources of investment was looming 
large for the Ukrainian producers in the context of outdated Ukrainian technologies and global 
economic prognosis for the steel market.  
In this section, I will dissect how these party substitutes resurface in the foreign policy 
changes that I have determined in the previous section. More specifically, I will look at the 
activity, profits and prospects of steel industry in the first years of Viktor Yanukovych 
presidency. 
Rinat Akhmetov’s core company SCM prides itself on its global connections. Indeed, by 
2016 it had representations in a variety of European states. Its major revenue generating sector, 
metal and mining, is primarily concentrated in Ukraine. But after Ukraine, the EU comes 
prominently on the list with 6 SCM representative offices. In this context, Rinat Akhmetov’s 
interests for Ukraine’s foreign policy were to continue with the charted course with the EU, and 
the stabilize and expand of the business relations with Russia.  
By the end of 2009, Metinvest exports to Europe plummeted because of the global 
financial crisis, although they enjoyed a remarkable growth in the previous years due to the 
changed ‘free market’ status and WTO accession. The graph below shows that Metinvest sales 
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in the EU where three times larger in 2008 than its sales in Russia. However, by the end of 
2009, that gap significantly closed as all sales declined and the export to the EU and Russia was 
at the same levels (Figure 8.8). The overall Ukraine- Russia trade flows were recovering fast, 
and July 2010 levels already reached the pre-2008 levels, according the remarks made at the 
meeting of the Ukrainian and Russian Presidents celebrating the Day of Russian Fleet in 
Crimea. Hence, Metinvest pursued the Russian direction for its trades more vigorously in 2010 
and 2011 than before. 
Figure 8.8. Rinat Akhmetov’s Metinvest Export by Region, in Million USD 
 
  Legend: Dark Blue=Europe; Light Blue=MENA; Gray=CIS 
Source: Center for Transport Strategies, Kyiv, Ukraine. 
 
Thus, by the end of 2011 Metinvest almost tripled its export to Russia, and in fact 
Metinvest Eurasia, its regional arm that started in 2008, was expanding very quickly in 2010 
and 2011.  By the end of 2011, it had 24 warehouses throughout Russia, and it was the growth 
“from zero.” The company earned an award as “The Best Sale Distribution Network in Russia” 
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at Moscow international metal industry conference in November 2012. The sales of sheet metal 
alone for Metinvest Eurasia rose by 27% in the first half of 2010 and by 45% in the first half of 
2011. And its plans for 2012 were to increase these numbers by yet another 25%. Every year on 
the Russian market, Metinvest Eurasia on average would add 21 new products in its sales to the 
Russian market. And more broadly, from 2010 to 2016 it offered the Russian buyers a total of 
146 new products.116 All this growth should be evaluated on the backdrop of the Russian 
Federation itself being the world’s fourth largest steel exporter (Steel Export Report: Russia 
2016).  
In addition to making profits and winning awards on competitive Russian market that is 
already full of global steel players, Metinvest was able to successfully attract Russian capital for 
its own investment purposes. Thus, one of the world’s deals of the year in 2010, according to 
Trade and Forfeiting Review, was $700 million pre-export finance that Metinvest attracted with 
the “rare” participation of Russian investors (Sberbank and Gazprom). The deal was remarkable 
both in terms of being one of the biggest structured transactions in Europe and Middle East in 
2010 (according to MLA WestLC), but also precisely because of such syndication of “Russian 
banking fraternity” (Deals of the Year: 2010 Metinvest 2011). 
To summarize, I traced Viktor Yanukovych party substitutes’ interests both prior to his 
taking office and in 2010 -2011, when the changes to Ukraine’s foreign policy were introduced. 
I argued that the oligarchic circles behind the new President were interested in maintaining the 
relationship with the European Union that they were developing due to the profit trajectory that 
these business elites had already experienced with Ukraine’s  new ‘market economy’ status vis-
																																												
116 This information was collected from the company’s official website: https://www.metinvestholding.com/ua 
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a-vis the EU and the WTO membership. A more aggressive integration with the EU would 
potentially threaten these oligarch’s domestic political rents by forcing them as politicians to be 
more transparent and abide by the rule of law that the EU promoted. Such EU position was 
evident from the Union’s pressure on Ukraine over the Tymoshenko case. Thus, the oligarchic 
elites pursued more modest progress pace in Ukraine’s existing policy course towards the EU 
integration. As a result, the Ukrainian foreign policy towards the EU experienced only an 
adjustment change.  
On the other hand, the global financial crisis and unseen fluctuation of gas prices set by 
the Russian supplier, prompted Yanukovych-tied oligarchs to strengthen the connections to both 
Russian export markets, Russian capital and, more importantly to secure gas prices. This 
necessitated Ukraine’s pursuit of the foreign policy towards Russia that showed new and 
renewed efforts, means and methods of cooperation. My analysis of the profits and dealings of 
the oligarchic party substitutes of Viktor Yanukovych confirm that indeed, the oligarchic 
business with connections to Yanukovych benefitted from such policies and even expanded on 
the tough Russian steel market.  
Overall, in this empirical chapter I have shown that Ukraine was still undergoing 
transition when the new President, Viktor Yanukovych took power in early 2010. While the 
Orange leaders were unable to bring government institutions in conformity with their declared 
revolutionary goals, Yanukovych’s authoritarian consolidation put an end to such process by the 
conclusion of 2011. The country significantly shifted to the semi-presidential form of 
government with an overpowering role of the executive. The first two years of the presidency 
for Viktor Yanukovych were still characterized with moderate uncertainty under which he was 
compelled to consider the interests of his primary domestic actors -  the oligarchs who 
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functioned as party substitutes in this regard. Connected to him through a straight link to mining 
and metallurgic Donbas region, these groups were reoriented towards the intensified relations 
with Russia by the end of 2009. They needed stable prices for natural gas, more investment and 
more market share in Russia, as global financial crisis undercut their revenues significantly.  
But on the EU side, having reaped initial benefits from eased trade with the Union, these 
business elites were keen on keeping that relationship yet without necessarily redrafting 
Ukrainian domestic political system according to the EU pressure or standards. This it would 
require oligarchs to act more transparently, lose profitable rents or immunity and comply with 
the norms that disallow the use of political machinery towards personal enrichment goals in 
general. The case with the persecution of Yulia Tymoshenko underscored the EU’s high 
intolerance for such actions. What defined oligarchic interests in Ukraine’s foreign policy 
toward the EU was the continuation of business as usual without much aggressive 
reinforcement. 
This was indeed, turned out to be what Viktor Yanukovych put in action in the first two 
years of his presidency. First, the relations with Russia experiences a program change in foreign 
policy. New and reinstated means and methods were applied. They were hallmarked with the 
Kharkiv Accords aimed to stabilize gas prices and generally improve relations with Russia. 
Towards the EU, Ukraine’s level of efforts to achieving the same goal of EU membership was 
decreased. No new means and methods was applied handle a crisis surrounding Tymoshenko 
case or a conflict surrounding Ukraine’s potential membership in Eurasian Customs Union. 
Thus, Ukraine experienced only an adjustment change in these two years as far as its EU 
foreign policy was concerned. 
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This concludes my empirical investigation of foreign policy change under the conditions 
of transitional uncertainty that Ukraine experienced in 2005-2011. I now turn to discuss and 
summarize these results in the concluding Chapter 9 to follow. 
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Chapter 9  
 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
9.1. Assessment of Research Results 
 
This research was originally conceived as an empirical puzzle: over the span of a decade, 
from 2004 to 2014 Ukraine saw two revolutions that rocked its political and social life to the 
very core. At the same time, the country showed signs of seemingly opposing foreign policies 
vacillating between closer ties with the EU to its west, and the Russian Federation to its east. 
Mr. Viktor Yushchenko, who took power after the Orange protests, was initially lauded as a 
great reformer, able to bring Ukraine into the fold of the European Union. Despite these 
expectations, no membership prospects were secured for Ukraine by the end of his term. On the 
other hand, his opponent with a long-standing Russian support, Mr. Yanukovych, once at the 
helm of the state, often passed for an EU enthusiast, and even went as far to state that “beyond 
EU, Ukraine has no other alternative” (Yanukovych Says Ukraine Has No Other Alternative but 
the EU 2013). 
As I set to investigate the driving forces that were shaping the foreign policymaking in 
Ukraine in these years, I posited that it was precisely because such policies were shaped in an 
uncertain post-revolutionary transitional political environment that we are able to see seemingly 
contradictory results in Ukraine’s relations with the EU and Russia. I elaborated a new causal 
mechanism to explain the connection between transitional political uncertainty and foreign 
policy change: 
Transition (impacts the level and nature of) à Uncertainty (shortens time horizons for) 
à Foreign policy decision maker to consider voter vs. sponsor interests (sets the course for) à 
level of foreign policy change.  
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This mechanism reveals the connection between the transitional uncertainty and the 
interests that political actors pursue, eventually leading to concrete course of foreign policy that 
may change as a result of it. 
My theoretical framework for this mechanism was grounded in a combination of insights 
from both comparative and international political science research alike. From the foreign 
policy literature, I drew heavily on the cognitive approaches to the political decision making 
that conceptualize uncertainty as an analytical equivocality caused by a wealth of information 
(Iida 1993; Rathbun 2007).  From the poliheuristic theory, I adopted the theoretical proposition 
which underscored the importance of the domestic, non-compensatory dimension of every 
foreign policy decision (Mintz 2005).  Finally, I borrowed from the growing foreign policy 
analysis literature that offers ways to differentiate diverse levels of foreign policy change. 
(Gustavsson 1999; C. F. Hermann 1990).  
From comparative literature, I relied on the existing scholarship dealing with party 
systems in developing states. I incorporated theoretical insights from Lupu and Riedl (2013) and 
Jung and Deering (2015) who stress the impact of uncertainty on strategies of political actors in 
transitional domestic politics. I further tied these insights to Henry Hale’s research on 
alternative actors of prime consideration for leaders in developing states, the so-called ‘party 
substitutes’ (2005). Finally, I used clear theoretical guidelines on the beginning and end of 
transitions from Ron Francisco (2000) and on patterns of institutional design from Lijphart 
(2012). 
 According to my theoretical proposition, volatile political setting in transition puts 
distinctly different constraints on political actors: they have shorter time horizons and thus seek 
not the reelection per se, but political and personal benefits from more long-term-oriented actors 
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in the system. Such actors, the ‘party substitutes’ are able to deliver these political and personal 
benefits in highly uncertain environment.  
Ukraine at the brink of 2004 had a distinct group that fitted in this category -  the 
country’s oligarchs, one of the world’s richest and most deeply imbedded in the political system 
of the country. Following my line of argument, I posited that because of such close link between 
the high-ranking officials at the top of the state to their oligarchic sponsors, the foreign policy of 
Ukraine in transitional years may reflect the interests of the party substitutes. Hence, my 
variable of interest, foreign policy change (or lack thereof) could be theoretically and 
empirically traced to the impact of transitional uncertainty. This, I argued, constituted the causal 
mechanism that explains the foreign policy change in transitional environment. The scope 
conditions of political transition generate new levels and kind of uncertainty. Foreign policy 
change is thus generated according to the new interests that transitional leaders pursue under 
impact of transitional uncertainty. The causal mechanism proposes that in conditions of 
stringent transitional uncertainty, political decision makers consider first and foremost the 
interests of their political sponsors rather than voters. 
My methodological approach was rooted in process tracing that has been recently 
‘refitted’ to better respond to the challenges of empirically detecting the causal links in a single 
case studies in social sciences (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett 2010). I applied process 
tracing to each element of my causal mechanism in order to present rich evidence at various 
levels of analysis: 
-  at the individual level, I described Viktor Yushchenko’s and Viktor Yanukovych’s 
personal connections to the Ukrainian oligarchs in conjunction with their business 
interests and foreign policy preferences; 
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- at the group level, I analyzed how new political forces mobilized for political 
transition in 2000, and looked at the Ukrainian party politics as well as at the 
emergence and development of the Ukrainian oligarchy as a distinct political group;  
- at the state level, I examined the Ukrainian institution building in 2005-2011, the 
democratization process and overall economic indicators with specific trade flows;  
- finally, at the international level, I pointed out different international responses to the 
Ukrainian foreign policies, such as gas disputes, Russian security concerns regarding 
NATO expansion; and the impact of the EU’s enlargement and Eastern 
Neighborhood Policy. 
Such variety of evidence collected at different levels of analysis was rigorously rooted in 
each step of the proposed causal mechanism. I linked these diverse levels in order to give a mid-
range theoretical explanation to a complex social phenomenon that is, in fact, an outcome of 
activity and interaction of many individual actors, groups and structural conditions. Such 
approach, in fact, is in conformity with the modern call and challenge for the foreign policy 
analysis to integrate levels of analysis and help us to see a more complete picture of intricate 
psychological, social, economic and international factors that all play into the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy in the 21st century (Hudson 2013).  
My empirical results showed that transitional uncertainty did have causal connection to 
the interests of oligarchs in the Ukrainian politics when it came to foreign policy. Viktor 
Yushchenko, tied to business elites who preferred the economic connections to Russia to be 
largely undisturbed, whereas the EU markets to become increasingly open to their products, 
adjusted the Ukrainian foreign policy by putting less efforts towards the existing cooperation 
with the Russian Federation. As regards the EU, Yushchenko’s goals were not different from 
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his predecessor, President Kuchma, who aimed for an eventual integration into the Union for his 
country. In line with the oligarchic interests, Yushchenko changed the program of Ukraine’s 
foreign policy by adding new means and methods of pursuing the same goal. His failure on both 
counts – to establish friendly and mutually beneficial relations with Russia and to get clear 
prospects of the EU membership for Ukraine – was not simply a misfit of goals and means, but 
rather a result of a complex interaction with these partners. My conceptual differentiation 
between foreign policy behavior and foreign policy outcome helps to disentangle the empirical 
puzzle that gave an initial impetus to this research.  
Similarly, Mr. Yanukovych as a President prior to his tenure in office formed strong 
connections to the oligarchic circles from his native Donbas. The industrial base of this region 
and its oligarchs had been traditionally strongly linked to favorable economic relations with the 
neighboring Russia. But the global financial crisis and troubles with natural gas prices under 
President Yushchenko even further prompted these oligarchs and Viktor Yanukovych to seek 
improved and stable relations with the Russian Federation. This was solidified in the Kharkiv 
Pact between Ukraine and Russia where Ukraine traded relative gas price stability for prolonged 
stationing of the Russian Fleet in the Ukrainian waters. On the other hand, with the EU, the 
preferences of Yanukovych-tied Ukrainian oligarchs were to continue favorable economic 
relations, but not to proceed with decoupling of politics and their personal rents under the 
watchful eye of the EU. Yanukovych pursued the same goal that Yushchenko did, the EU 
integration. However, he did that with a decreased effort in 2010 and 2011, by adjusting 
Ukraine’s verbal and non-verbal foreign policy efforts in this regard. In conclusion, I have 
shown both in the case of the first post-Orange President Yushchenko and his successor 
President Yanukovych who both operated in transitional environment that the causal 
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connections between Ukraine’s foreign policies and the oligarchic interests were born out as 




Such results leave room for both discussion and further elaboration. First and foremost, a 
question may be posed as to the uniqueness of the evidence presented here that would 
reasonably lead to the results I came to.  That is, could my explained outcomes be a result of 
some other causal chain or of an impact of another single factor? Admittedly, it is not possible 
to evaluate a different set of hypothesized causes with the mechanism I suggested. In other 
words, if foreign policy change in transitionary Ukraine was caused by a completely different 
set of actors and structures, then I cannot simply add them to the model just as easily as a 
quantitative analysis would add a control variable and keep estimating the same model. In this 
case, an alternative explanation with an alternative causal mechanism should withstand its own 
test of evidence, on its own merits. 
  For instance, the foreign policy of Ukraine in 2005-2011 could be claimed simply a 
result of a geopolitical interplay between the big powers, the EU and Russia, rather than more 
deeply and organically grown domestic process as I suggest. In this case, such alternative 
explanation needs to face its own potential criticism. For instance, this explanation may fall 
short justifying a range of geopolitically smart positions that Ukraine should have taken long 
time ago, yet failed to do so. For example, the NATO membership in such neorealist 
geopolitical analysis should have been Ukraine’s primary security goal way back when Russia 
started to ‘flex the energy muscle’ during President Kuchma presidency in early 2000s.  In fact, 
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the theoretical primary fault line of these neorealist approaches is that they tend to ignore 
smaller states in principle, and focus on big powers and their security preoccupations. Hence, 
they are not able to holistically explain the Ukrainian foreign policy, with attention to domestic 
processes that generate it.  
 An array of recent scholarly work demonstrates it. 117 In a ‘hot fashion’ to explain away 
“the Ukraine crisis,” these approaches focus on the conflict between the EU, Russia and the US. 
The very term “the Ukraine crisis” presents Ukraine as an objectified topic, rather than a 
legitimate international actor of its own accord. The term ‘crisis’ implies urgency as in ‘crisis 
management,’ when in fact, this “crisis” should be rather viewed as an international and 
internationalized war fought within borders of one state, and it has been waged for over two 
years now with a loss of over 10,000 lives as of the time of writing of this work. 
On the other hand, some alternative theoretical propositions could be evaluated against 
the general logic of the policymaking in transitional politics that my suggested causal 
mechanism implies. Thus, for instance, it could be argued that the changes in the Ukrainian 
foreign policies towards the EU and the Russian Federation in this time frame were due not to 
the interests of the oligarchs who stood behind the policymakers, but rather due to the policy 
preferences of the Ukrainian voters.  Such proposition does not dismiss the initial premise in the 
mechanism, i.e. that transition leads to uncertainty. However, it targets the next link in this 
causal chain which posits that uncertainty focuses leaders on sponsor groups other than voters.  
In order to evaluate this alternative explanation, I would need to examine -  similarly to the 
analysis I have done for Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych’ oligarchic connections - 
																																												
117 For instance, Smith (2016), Tolstrup (2013), Matlary et al (2016) are some recent examples. 
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the profile of their respective ‘median voters’ and their preferences. This line of argument 
would also require proving the saliency of foreign policy issues for the Ukrainian voter as well.  
Alternatively, since the presidential candidates in all-national elections aim to capture as 
many votes as possible, it could be argued that in this case, the policy preferences of the greatest 
voter group were reflected in Yushchenko’s and Yanukovych’s eventual foreign orientations. 
Whereas the Ukrainian public opinion in foreign policy for an earlier period has been analyzed 
elsewhere (Chudowsky and Kuzio 2003; Copsey 2013), a quick look at the data from the 
reputable sociological surveys by the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Science 
of Ukraine demonstrate that the public opinion of the Ukrainians at the national level cannot 
adequately explain such foreign policy variation: 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 Ukrainian Public Opinion on Russia and the EU, 2000-2013 
 
What is your opinion on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union? I am … 
 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Rather 
negative 
9.6 15.0 11.7 19.9 23.2 18.8 19.1 22.1 27.9 
Hard to 
say 
34.4 40.1 39.7 32.9 33.8 36.9 35.3 31.8 30.3 
Rather 
positive 
56.0 44.4 47.9 47.2 43.0 44.1 45.5 45.9 41.6 
No 
response 
0.1 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 
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What is your opinion towards the idea of Ukraine’s joining the union of Russia and 
Belarus? I am… 
 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Rather 
negative 
37.0 23.1 20.1 27.8 24.7 24.2 22.1 24.6 28.5 
Hard to 
say 
22.2 18.8 16.8 18.4 14.3 15.4 16.3 18.7 22.4 
Rather 
positive 
40.8 57.8 62.8 53.6 61.0 60.2 61.4 56.3 48.9 
No 
response 
0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Source: 2013 National Academy of Science of Ukraine Omnibus. 
Indeed, as seen from the tables above, Ukrainians were as negative about the accession to 
the EU in 2005 as they were in 2010, that is in the first year of President Yushchenko and of 
President Yanukovych, respectively. Equally, Ukrainians were as positive about the idea of 
Ukraine’s joining Belarus in a political and economic union with Russia in 2005 as in 2010. 
Thus, such short overview points to the difficulty of explaining the variation in Ukraine’s 
foreign policy in these transitional years as based on leader’s orientations towards voters’ 
preferences. Some further geographical breakdown of this data may, indeed, be useful, yet the 
variation in these statistical numbers is not as large at this first look as to be able to explain the 
variation in levels of Ukraine’s foreign policy change that I have traced. 
9.3. Future Research 
 
This discussion leaves an interesting open door towards the analysis of the current 
processes that are underway in today’s Ukraine. If, we considered that the Euromaidan 
movement ushered in a new transitional period for Ukraine, and that the military separatism on 
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the East of the country is still threatening the political stability, it signals that the current 
transition in Ukraine is far from being over. It is especially so due to the fact that the reforms to 
the political system in accordance with the values of the Revolution of Dignity have not been 
firmly put in place. It is logical to conclude, according to my suggested causal mechanism that 
oligarchic interests are still calling the shots as far as the foreign policy of the country is 
concerned. Indeed, the emerging political commentaries on the matter which bemoan Ukraine’s 
declining democratic freedoms and criticize Mr. Poroshenko’s government as no different from 
corrupt ways of Mr. Yanukovych- all the while Ukraine’s trade with Russia shows signs of 
great recovery despite economic sanctions - are preliminary signs that the theoretical 
propositions elaborated in this paper hold true. This could constitute the next possible 
application of my research project that would more vastly undergird the period from 2000 to 
present, when Ukraine has been attempting more firmly hit the iron of its economic, political 
and cultural future in the globalizing world of the 21st century. 
A more comparative future work also could take into consideration the similar processes 
of transition in the post-Soviet space. The causal mechanism could be brought to bear on other 
transitional countries that similarly struggled or are still struggling between the interests of its 
oligarchic groups and the challenges of uncertainty in nascent new regimes. Among them, 
several countries in particular stand out for their comparative value: the post-Bulldozer 
revolution Serbia, the post-Rose revolution Georgia and failed transition in Kyrgyzstan after the 
‘Tulip’ protests. A range of transitions following the Arab spring and its reversal could also 
provide and insightful window on how top leaders work with their interest groups on their 
countries’ foreign policies as well.  
	 261	
Further, it could be noted that one does not have necessarily to observe oligarchic groups 
for such causal mechanism to work. The party substitutes’ functions in Ukraine are indeed 
captured primarily by oligarchs.  However, if in transitional uncertainty a leader identifies and 
resorts to another group (or an individual) from his/her own political setting who is capable of 
delivering the necessary political and personal benefits, then indeed, such causal chain may be 
applied with a changed set of actors that would fit the political system under consideration. 
Therefore, I use a more generic ‘sponsor’ rather ‘party substitute’ term for this element of the 
causal chain. In this sense, the causal mechanism is wide open for subsequent extension to help 
us understand the foreign policymaking in thorny transitions that many countries around the 
globe so arduously undergo. With such openness to further elaboration, the theoretical 
contribution of the current research may continue to grow and be of use to both researchers, 
policymakers, and all those who strive to understand the entangled knots of political transitions 
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